R 242212Z FEB 10
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

S E C R E T STATE 017263 
 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2035 
TAGS: ETTC IR KN MTCRE PARM RS TSPA
 
SUBJECT: U.S.-RUSSIA JOINT THREAT ASSESSMENT TALKS - 
DECEMBER 2009 
 
REF: 09 STATE 082572 
 
Classified By: ISN Acting A/S Vann H. Van Diepen.  Reason 1.5 (D) 
 
----------- 
(U) Summary 
----------- 
 
¶1. (S) A U.S. interagency team -- lead by ISN Acting 
Assistant Secretary Vann H. Van Diepen -- met with a Russian 
interagency team lead by Vladimir Nazarov, Deputy Secretary 
of the Russian National Security Council (full participants 
list is provided in paragraphs 76-77 below), on December 22, 
2009 for a second round of discussions on a Joint Threat 
Assessment (JTA), as agreed by Presidents Obama and Medvedev 
in the 2009 U.S.-Russia Summit Joint Statement on Missile 
Defense Issues.  The Russian delegation came prepared to 
engage seriously, and made  presentations on their evaluation 
of the missile programs of Iran and the DPRK; a conceptual 
framework for evaluating the risk posed by various missile 
programs; Russian concerns about instability in Pakistan and 
the security of nuclear weapons and missiles there; and the 
work of the FSB (Federal Security Service) in countering 
efforts by Iranian and North Korean agencies to either obtain 
nuclear and missile technologies and materials in Russia or 
to transship the 
m through Russian territory.  While the Russians were 
prepared for discussions of cooperation at a strategic level 
on countering missile proliferation, their position remained 
the same: in their analysis, the missile programs of Iran and 
the DPRK are not sufficiently developed, and their intentions 
to use missiles against the U.S. or Russia are nonexistent, 
thus not constituting a "threat" requiring the deployment of 
missile defenses.  The discussions included a vigorous 
exchange of questions and answers, and concluded with an 
invitation by the Russians to hold the next round of the JTA 
in Moscow in March or April 2010.  The discussions lasted the 
full day.  End Summary. 
 
------------------- 
(U) Opening remarks 
------------------- 
 
¶2. (S) Van Diepen recalled that the July 2009 U.S.-Russia 
Joint Statement called for U.S. and Russian experts to work 
together to analyze ballistic missile threats and that the 
U.S. side had provided analyses of Iran's and North Korea's 
missile programs at the September JTA.  He said that the U.S. 
side looked forward to receiving Russian perspectives on 
these programs and discussing areas of agreement and 
disagreement.  He added that the U.S. hoped that development 
of a more shared perspective on these issues would help 
inform how the U.S. and Russia address missile threats 
bilaterally and multilaterally.  Consistent with the Joint 
Statement and the non-paper U/S Tauscher provided to Russia 
in November, this effort also could help the U.S. and Russia 
assess how to defend against missile threats if that becomes 
necessary.  Van Diepen ended by underscoring that the U.S. 
looked forward to detailed discussions and then deciding on 
potential next steps. 
 
¶3. (C) Nazarov thanked Van Diepen for reminding both sides of 
the context for the work of the JTA.  He noted that the July 
6 Joint Statement said that experts of both countries would 
analyze threats of the 21st century and make recommendations 
for political and diplomatic means to address them.  Russia 
takes this seriously, and President Medvedev has given the 
highest priority to this work and has instructed that this 
work be coordinated under the Security Council of the Russian 
Federation.  Accordingly, Nazarov said, the Russian 
delegation includes representatives from all of the Russian 
agencies responsible for tracking missile threats and 
countering them.   He added that the Russian side planned to 
make presentations, focusing primarily on Iran and North 
Korea.  After that, the Russian delegation would be prepared 
to comment on the presentations made by the U.S. at the last 
JTA meeting in July.   He said the Russian delegation had 
studied these materials closely and had several comments and 
questions. 
 
¶4. (S) Nazarov concluded by noting that Russia looked forward 
to a creative dialogue and robust exchange of opinions 
between the experts of both sides.  He said Russia would 
focus primarily  on the threats from Iran and North Korea, 
noting that Russia believed the long-term strategic interests 
of the U.S. and Russia largely coincide and that the 
acquisition of nuclear and/or missile capabilities by Iran, 
North Korea, or other threshold states is unacceptable. 
Nazarov hoped that the discussions would be productive and 
potentially lead to the drafting of a joint assessment, and 
perhaps to the creation of a joint document. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
(U) Russian Presentations on Iran and North Korea 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
Iran: 
 
¶5. (S) Evgeny Zudin of the Russian Ministry of Defense gave 
detailed presentations on the Russian assessment of the 
Iranian and North Korean missile programs, and the degree to 
which Russia believes these programs constitute threats 
requiring missile defense responses.  For Russia, the bottom 
line is that, in essence, neither program constitutes a 
threat at the moment or in the near future. 
 
NOTE:  Russia did not provide paper copies of either 
presentation to the U.S. delegation.  END NOTE. 
 
¶6. (S) On Iran, Zudin made the following points concerning 
Scud missiles: 
 
--Given the challenging and complex situation of the regional 
context that surrounds Iran, Iran's leaders view acquiring a 
missile capability as a deterrent to existent threats.  To 
that end, they also consistently exaggerate Iran's 
achievements in missile production. 
 
--The core of the Iranian missile program has been the 
evolutionary development of liquid-fueled missiles based on 
Soviet Scud technology from the 1960s. 
 
--Tehran acquired Scud B systems from a number of countries 
during the 1980s. 
 
--The Iranian version, called the Shahab-1, has a range of 
300 km and a reentry vehicle of 1 ton. 
 
--With scientific and technological assistance from North 
Korea, Iran acquired production capabilities for both the 
Scud B and the Scud C. 
 
--The Scud C, called the Shahab-2 by the Iranians, has a 
range of 550 km with a 700 kg payload. 
 
--Iran has also developed and commissioned a medium range 
ballistic missile (MRBM) called the Shahab-3, based on the 
North Korean No Dong-1 and using Scud-based technologies. 
The Shahab-3 has a range of 1,500 km and a 700 kg payload. 
 
--Iran has done a good deal of work to improve the precision 
and range of this system, creating the Shahab-3M, which Iran 
claims has a range of 2,000 km, although so far the confirmed 
range is only 1,600-1,700 km. 
 
--Russia's analysis indicates that this was achieved by 
reducing the re-entry vehicle weight to 250 kg and improving 
the engine. 
 
-- Russia also believes that this very nearly exhausts the 
potential for Iran to increase the range of the Shahab-3 or 
make further improvements to Scud-based missile technology. 
 
¶7. (S) Moving on from Scud-based technology, Zudin made the 
following points on Iran's development of a 2,000 km-range 
solid propellant system: 
 
--Iran has been developing solid propellant MRBMs/IRBMs with 
better operational capability since 2000. 
 
--Currently, Russia is seeing the development of a two-stage 
intermediate (2,000 km) solid propellant missile. 
 
--The first test of this system in November 2007 failed. 
During the second test on November 12, 2008, Iran 
successfully accomplished the uplift stage of the missile. 
 
--Following the third test of the missile in May 2009, Iran 
announced that the launch was successful and that it would 
begin serial production of this missile. 
 
--This system was tested again on December 16, 2009, and Iran 
also claimed this test was successful. 
 
--The Russian assessment is that regardless of optimistic 
statements from Iran, the test of this missile was actually 
just a test of a successful prototype and that what the test 
did was allow Iran to practice first stage operation and 
stage separation. 
 
--Russia believes Iran will need another 2-3 years of testing 
to perfect the missile.  Russia believes it will not actually 
be deployed for 5-6 years. 
 
¶8. (S) Zudin said that another potential success indicator 
for Iran's missile program is the Safir space launch vehicle 
(SLV) program.  He said the Safir launch on February 2, 2009 
was successful in putting the Omid  (26 kg) satellite into 
orbit.  However, Iran's first attempt to launch the satellite 
into orbit on August 17, 2008 was unsuccessful.  Russia 
assesses that in order to achieve the successful launch, Iran 
had used 
the maximum potential of its liquid-propellant technology 
(the first stage of the Safir was a Shahab-3).  As for Iran 
developing combat/offensive long-range missiles based on SLV 
technology, Russia believes, in theory, this is possible. 
However, from a military technological perspective, Russia 
believes this is unviable due to low throw weight of the 
system.  In addition, Russia believes that development of a 
long-range missile based on its SLV efforts would require 
Iran to intensify its research and development, conduct a 
series of test launches outside its territory, and increase 
throw weight and accuracy.  Thus, in Russia's view, despite 
Iran's successful launch of a satellite, it is premature to 
talk about Iran successfully developing the technology for a 
militarily useful long-range ballistic missile capacity. 
 
¶9. (S) Zudin summed up his presentation on Iran by noting 
that over the last four years, Iran has successfully launched 
a 26 kg satellite into orbit and conducted several successful 
launches of a solid propellant MRBM, according to unconfirmed 
information.  However, Russia believes Iran's "success" boils 
down to creating Shahab-3-class liquid propellant missiles 
with an accuracy of several kilometers that can reach targets 
in the Middle East and Southeastern Europe, but given 
conventional warheads, these missiles cannot do substantial 
damage.  Under favorable conditions, Russia believes Iran 
might be able to begin a program to develop ballistic 
missiles with ranges of between 3,000-5,000 km after 2015, 
but Russia does not see Iran taking any steps in this 
direction.  Rather, Russia has concluded that Iran's 
ballistic missile program continues to be directed toward 
developing combat ready missiles to address regional concerns. 
 
North Korea: 
 
¶10. (S) Zudin made the following points with regard to the 
DPRK's missile program: 
 
--Over the last two decades North Korea has paid increased 
attention to developing and producing ballistic missiles and 
SLVs. 
 
--The DPRK has commissioned the production of liquid 
propellant missiles such as Scud Bs and Cs (which North Korea 
calls the Hwasong 5 and 6), the No Dong I, the short-range 
KN-02, and the "Luna-M" tactical missile, plus solid 
propellant battlefield and tactical rockets. 
 
--The core of North Korea's missile capability is missile 
technology from the 1960s. 
 
--The potentially outdated No Dong-1, with a range of 
1,000-1,300 km and a reentry vehicle of one ton, is the most 
advanced missile commissioned by the North Korean military. 
 
--In Russia's assessment, only the KN-02, with a range of 
less than 100 km, is relatively modern. 
 
--Since early in the 1990s, North Korea has slowly developed 
missiles of the Taepo Dong class. 
 
--Russia estimates that the Taepo Dong-1 (TD-1) was a 
prototype two-stage liquid propellant missile with a 
2,000-2,500 km range. 
 
--The TD-I first stage used a No Dong-1 engine, and the 
second stage used a Scud engine. 
 
--The only flight test of the TD-I was conducted on August 
31, 1998, during which the DPRK practiced separation of 
missile stages.  North Korea declared this test to be an SLV 
launch. 
 
--The Taepo Dong-2 (TD-2) MRBM is a two-stage liquid 
propellant missile with a range of 3,500-6,000 km, depending 
on the weight of the warhead. 
 
--A July 5, 2006 test launch of the TD-II failed as the 
missile exploded 40 seconds into flight. 
 
--Russia estimates that North Korea tested elements of the 
Taepo Dong-2 with its April 5, 2009 SLV launch. 
 
--Russia believes North Korea has demonstrated a certain 
level of progress in the missile area by creating a first 
stage engine with a thrust of 100 tons. 
 
--North Korea conducted tests of nuclear devices on October 
9, 2006 and May 26, 2009.  However, it remains unproven 
whether North Korea can make a nuclear warhead of the size 
and weight that would allow it to be carried by a ballistic 
missile. 
 
¶11. (S) Zudin said that in Russia's view, the widespread 
claims about North Korea's achievements in the missile area 
are dubious.  In particular, Russia notes that it is claimed 
that North Korea has a new missile based on the Soviet R-27 
(NOTE: SS-N-6.  END NOTE) submarine-launched ballistic 
missile (SLBM) that is capable of reaching ranges of 
2,400-4,000 km.  However, the many published reports 
regarding this missile, which is known as the BM-25, contain 
claims that are made without reference to any reliable 
sources.  Moreover, Zudin said, the fact is that there have 
been no successful tests of this missile in either North 
Korea or Iran.  Russia also is unaware that this missile has 
ever been seen.  There are claims that 19 of these missiles 
were shipped to Iran in 2005, but there is no evidence for 
this and concealment of such a transfer would be impossible. 
 
¶12. (S) Zudin said Russia believes the real missile potential 
of North Korea is an impressive arsenal of outdated missiles 
with ranges no greater than 1,300 km and that are only a 
threat to countries in the region that North Korea considers 
to be enemies.  Russia estimates that in the years to come 
North Korea will devote considerable effort to improving and 
perfecting its SLV.  To this end, it will use the launch 
facility near the community of Tongchang-Dong (NOTE: Known to 
the U.S. as the Yunsong facility.  END NOTE).  Russia 
assesses that North Korean development of long-range 
ballistic missiles based on SLVs is possible in principle, 
but perfection will take years.  The prospects for North 
Korea developing a combat operational system from such a 
process is not likely due to the inability to conduct 
concealed preparations for launch and the long preparation 
times. 
 
¶13. (S) Summing up, Zudin said Iran's and North Korea's 
missile programs can be characterized as follows:  the only 
real successes are liquid propellant intermediate range 
missiles with ranges of 1,300 km, and both countries would 
face real technical difficulties in trying to make additional 
advances to increase the range of their systems. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
(U) Discussion on Iranian and North Korean Missiles 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶14. (S) Van Diepen thanked the Russian delegation for its 
presentations, noting that there appeared to be some areas 
where both sides agree, other areas where the two sides see 
the same thing a little differently, and areas where the two 
sides disagree.  He said it is good to have the opportunity 
to examine the differences and the reasons for them, and 
urged that this be done in a structured way.  Van Diepen 
proposed discussion begin with Iran and North Korea 
generally, and then move to specific categories of 
short-range, medium range, and long-range missiles.  On Iran, 
he said it appeared that both sides had similar assessments 
at the technical level with regard to short range missiles in 
Iran. On medium range missiles in Iran, both sides agree 
there is the original No Dong, a modified No Dong with longer 
range - although the U.S. and Russia have different ideas of 
the modifications made to achieve that longer range.  And 
both sides seem to agree that Iran is developing a two-stage 
solid propellant missile. 
 Beyond that, U.S. and Russian assessments seem to diverge. 
 
¶15. (S) Based on the Russian presentations, the U.S. 
delegation posed a number of questions.  The Russian 
delegation also raised a number of questions about U.S. 
comments and the U.S. presentations on Iran and North Korea 
from the September JTA talks.  The topics raised and 
follow-up discussions were as follows: 
 
¶16. (S) Shahab-3 Reentry Vehicle Mass 
 
The U.S. noted that based on modeling, it assesses that the 
modified Shahab-3 has 600 kg re-entry vehicle mass at a range 
of 2,000 km, and asked for Russia to explain the basis for 
its assessment of 250 kg re-entry vehicle mass. The U.S. also 
asked how useful such a missile would be as a military 
weapon.  Russia responded that there is some uncertainty in 
its estimate, conceding that the 250 kg is at the low end of 
Russia's estimate.  However, Russia believes that the low 
weight of the Shahab-3 warhead makes it pointless as a 
military weapon.  Although the range could be further 
increased with a lighter warhead, Russia's view is that such 
a missile also is pointless.  Additionally, while Russia 
views the U.S. 600 kg estimate as being close to the 700 kg 
weight of the basic Shahab-3 warhead, it assesses that the 
range of the system with that warhead is 1,300 km, not 2,000 
km.  Russia does not believe that if the weight of the 
warhead is decreased by just 50 kg, it is realistic to assess 
that the Shahab 3 would 
 achieve a 2,000 km range. 
 
¶17. (S) Aluminum Airframe 
 
The U.S. said that its assessment of a 2,000 km range for the 
Shahab-3 is achieved through the use of an aluminum airframe 
instead of steel and increased engine thrust.  Russia asked 
whether the assessment that the Shahab 3 airframe is made 
with aluminum rather than steel is based on speculation or 
fact.  The U.S. responded that the assessment derives from 
information relating to Iran seeking various aluminum alloys. 
 Additionally, during the Information Exchange (IE) portion 
of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Plenary, a 
number of presentations, including by the UK and France, also 
assessed that the Shahab-3 has an aluminum airframe and 
described a number of Iranian attempts to procure aluminum 
for this purpose.  For this reason there also have been MTCR 
proposals to add the types of aluminum sought by Iran to the 
MTCR Annex. 
 
¶18. (S) Safir Airframes 
 
The U.S. noted that it appears that the first stage of the 
Safir SLV is the Shahab-3, and asked whether Russia believes 
the Safir could achieve orbit with a steel airframe.  Russia 
answered that the facts are that the Safir was used to put a 
satellite with a very low mass into orbit.  It is likely that 
the technologies used to achieve this were exploited to their 
utmost.  Russian analysis showed that the size of the Omid is 
the limit of what Iran could put into orbit.  The U.S. agreed 
 that a very low weight satellite was all that the Safir 
could put into orbit, but assessed that even orbiting such a 
small satellite could only be done using an aluminum 
airframe.  In U.S. modeling of the launch using a steel 
airframe, the Safir was not able to get close to putting 
anything into orbit. 
 
¶19. (S) Russia remarked that even if the U.S. and Russia 
disagree over the materials used in the airframe, both sides 
can agree that the capability of this missile was used to its 
maximum to get a satellite into orbit.  If there is agreement 
on this point, then both sides should be able to agree that 
using this system as a weapon is pointless.  The U.S. 
responded that this was not necessarily so and would depend 
on how the rocket   is used.  The Safir launch might have 
been a technology demonstrator.  If one clustered or stacked 
the Shahab, it could be used as a longer-range system.  The 
U.S. added that something using a single Shahab as its first 
stage will have limitations, but that is not the only option. 
 
¶20. (S) Using Clustered Engines 
 
Russia noted that during the JTA talks in Moscow, the U.S. 
discussed several options Iran would have with regard to a 
cluster scheme.  However, in Russia's view, the problem with 
a cluster scheme is that it makes the missile nonviable for 
military purposes.  The U.S. responded that a cluster scheme 
would make the system less mobile, but noted that it would 
provide a possibility for putting a missile further 
downrange.  However, the basic U.S. point is that the Safir 
could have been a technology demonstrator for staging, 
separation, ignition, and control of an upper stage.  Russia 
noted that it views the Safir launch as a success and has 
stated this.  Additionally, Russia agrees there are ways to 
increase the throw weight, including the clustering of 
engines, but the goal of the Russian review of Iran's missile 
capabilities was to examine whether the Iranian program could 
create a combat ready missile that meets certain 
specifications.  In Russia's view it cannot, and talking 
about the Shahab-3 as a long-range 
 combat missile is unrealistic. 
 
¶21. (S) The U.S. agreed it is not realistic for a mobile 
missile, but thought it would be realistic for use in a silo 
or underground.  Russia responded that such a missile would 
require a fixed launch pad.  Fifty years ago fixed launch 
pads deep inside a country were survivable, but now that is 
not realistic.  The U.S. countered that both Russia and the 
U.S. still have hundreds of such launch sites.  Russia said 
that was a topic for another discussion, not JTA. 
 
¶22. (S) Iran Not Capable of Producing Longer-Range Missiles 
 
Russia said its bottom line is that Iran lacks appropriate 
structural materials for long-range systems, such as high 
quality aluminum.  Iran can build prototypes, but in order to 
be a threat to the U.S. or Russia Iran needs to produce 
missiles in mass quantities, and it lacks materials 
sufficient for the type of mass production needed to be a 
security threat.  Russia further noted that the technology 
for longer-range missiles is sophisticated and difficult to 
master.  For example, the elongated airframes Iran is using 
might not survive the stresses of a ballistic flight path, 
and the guidance system for the missile (Shahab-3) is 
outdated and does not allow for precision steering. 
According to Russian calculations, if the control system is 
used at a range of 2,000 km, it could veer as much as 6-7 km 
off its target; at 5,000 km, the accuracy could be off by 
50-60 km.  In addition, the liquid propellants used by the 
Iranians are of low efficiency.  Iran is working to improve 
the power of the engine and develop 
more efficient kinds of fuel.  However, it faces significant 
challenges.  Iran also has problems with launch preparation 
times, although it has made some recent improvements. 
 
¶23. (S) Launching from Silos 
 
Russia said it does not think a Shahab-3 derived system could 
be launched from a silo.  Ground launch sites that are for 
SLVs are not suitable for military launches, and missiles 
with side-based vent engines and clustered engines cannot be 
silo-based.  The U.S. responded that this might be an area 
where U.S. and Russian assessments differ.  For example, the 
U.S. thinks the Taepo Dong-2 is a clustered missile that can 
be launched from a silo or underground launcher, adding that 
there are scenarios to compensate for shortcomings of this 
technology should the Iranians or North Koreans choose to 
pursue them. 
 
¶24. (S) Iranian Solid Propellant MRBM 
 
The U.S. said it does not see the solid-propellant MRBM as a 
technology demonstrator.  This system has been tested four 
times in the past two years, and the U.S. assesses Iran will 
be ready to field it in less than the 5-6 year timeframe 
Russia envisions.  Russia asked how soon the U.S. thought the 
system could be ready.  The U.S. said that it would not be 
surprised if a two-stage system with a range up to 2,000 km 
were fielded 
within a year, at least in limited numbers.  The U.S. also 
noted that not all countries follow the same testing 
procedures as the U.S. and Russia.  North Korea is an extreme 
example, but Iran does not have the same test philosophy as 
either the U.S. or Russia. 
 
¶25. (S) The Path to Long Range Missile Development in Iran 
 
The U.S. said the main potential avenue for Iran developing 
long range missiles is by using current systems as building 
blocks.  For example, using the Shahab-3 with clustered or 
stacked engines could be one path.  Another path might be the 
so-called BM-25 missile that the U.S. believes was sold to 
Iran by North Korea.  A third path might be development of a 
solid-propellant MRBM with more powerful motors.  Russia said 
that its views on the Shahab 3 had already been discussed. 
Russia had some questions about the other two paths the U.S. 
had identified.  In addition, Russia thinks it also will be 
very important to consider the intentions of Iran and North 
Korea that could lead to creation or improvement of its 
missiles.  This will affect what each side (U.S. and Russia) 
does to monitor what these countries (Iran and North Korea) 
do to acquire missile technologies, including procurement 
methods.  It also will help define the key technologies 
required by these countries now and in the future and in 
finding a means for protecting these technologies. 
 
¶26. (S) The BM-25 
 
Russia said that during its presentations in Moscow and its 
comments thus far during the current talks, the U.S. has 
discussed the BM-25 as an existing system.  Russia questioned 
the basis for this assumption and asked for any facts the 
U.S. had to provide its existence such as launches, photos, 
etc.  For Russia, the BM-25 is a mysterious missile.  North 
Korea has not conducted any tests of this missile, but the 
U.S. has said that North Korea transferred 19 of these 
missiles to Iran.  It is hard for Russia to follow the logic 
trail on this.  Since Russia has not seen any evidence of 
this missile being developed or tested, it is hard for Russia 
to imagine that Iran would buy an untested system.  Russia 
does not understand how a deal would be made for an untested 
missile.  References to the missile's existence are more in 
the domain of political literature than technical fact.  In 
short, for Russia, there is a question about the existence of 
this system. 
 
¶27. (S) The U.S. repeated its earlier comment that Iran and 
North Korea have different standards of missile development 
than many other countries, including the U.S. and Russia. 
North Korea exported No Dong missiles after only one flight 
test, so it is not unimaginable that it would build and seek 
to export a system that has not been tested.  This is 
especially true for North Korea because of its need for hard 
currency.  In the U.S. view, the more interesting question is 
why would Iran buy a missile that has not been tested.  One 
possible answer is that Iran has recognized that the BM-25's 
propulsion technology exceeds the capabilities of that used 
in the Shahab-3, and that acquiring such technology was very 
attractive.  Iran wanted engines capable of using 
more-energetic fuels, and buying a batch of BM-25 missiles 
gives Iran a set it can work on for reverse engineering. 
This estimate would be consistent with the second stage of 
the Safir SLV using steering engines from the BM-25 missile. 
 
¶28. (S) Safir and BM-25 
 
The U.S. explained that based on a comparison of Internet 
photos of the second stage of the Safir, the U.S. assessment 
is that the steering (vernier) engines on the Safir are the 
same as on the R-27.  The weld lines and tank volumes from 
the Safir second stage show that the ratio of oxidizer to 
propellant is not consistent with Scud propellants and more 
consistent with unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine (UDMH) and 
nitrogen tetroxide (N2O4), which were used in the R-27.  The 
U.S. does not have any information on why Iran has not flight 
tested the BM-25.  It may be due to difficulties assembling 
the missiles, but it appears that they have at least done 
work with the steering (vernier) engines.  Russia asked if 
the U.S. was saying that its case for the existence of the 
BM-25 missile is that individual elements of the Safir 
resemble the steering engines of the R-27 missile. 
 
¶29. (S) The U.S. said that is only part of the case.  In the 
media, and more importantly in the MTCR Information Exchange, 
countries have offered direct evidence of the transfer of the 
BM-25 from North Korea to Iran.  Russia asked if the U.S. had 
pictures of the missile in Iran.  The U.S. did not, but noted 
that North Korea had paraded the missile through the streets 
of Pyongyang.  Russia disagreed.  Russia said it had reviewed 
the video of the North Korean military parade and concluded 
that North Korea had shown a different missile.  Russia does 
not think the BM-25 exists.  The missile appears to be a 
myth, and some say that it is based on a Russian missile. 
However, no one has seen it, and Russia cannot find traces of 
it.  The U.S. said it would endeavor to provide further 
information on the existence of the BM-25 at the next round 
of talks, noting that reaching agreement on this point will 
affect the joint assessment of Iranian and North Korean 
missile capabilities. 
 
¶30. (S) Safir Fuel 
 
Russia asked whether the U.S. had any clear images of the 
Safir that allow for the assessment of tank volumes and the 
ratio of fuel to oxidizer.  The U.S. said that the weld lines 
of the second stage are clear in the pictures Iran put on the 
Internet, and U.S. analysts were able to make pretty good 
calculations based on this information.  Russia questioned 
this, saying that the photos did not allow for accurate 
measurements of distances.  The U.S. undertook to provide 
more information on this point at the next round of talks. 
 
¶31. (S) The U.S. then asked Russia for its assessment of the 
types of propellant used in the Safir second stage.  Russia 
said it thinks that hydrazine is used.  The U.S. asked 
whether Russia thought UDMH might be involved.  Russia did 
not.  It said that there might be different combinations of 
fuel and oxidizers, but the base is hydrazine. 
 
¶32. (S) More on Propellants 
 
The U.S. asked whether Russia assesses that Iran is moving 
beyond Scud propellants.  Russia responded that it believes 
Iran is trying to move in this direction because it wants 
something more powerful - something that can lift 40-50 tons. 
 With bigger engines, Iran can improve missile range.  Thus, 
Iran has been working to acquire more-energetic fuels and 
trying to produce UDMH and N2O4.  However, Iran has been 
working on this for approximately 10 years, and Russia has 
not seen any serious results.  Russia further noted that 
Malik Ashtar University in Tehran has been working on fuel 
combinations, but it apparently has not been successful.  The 
fact that Iran has not succeeded in this area is evident in 
Iran's effort to seek this technology from abroad. 
 
¶33. (S) The U.S. noted that it was significant that both the 
U.S. and Russia assess that Iran is working on more-energetic 
propellants, even if the two sides differ in how far along 
they are.  Russia responded that this is due to the fact that 
Iran has not yet launched any longer range missiles.  There 
have been no tests, and statements from Iran that it has 
missiles that can fly 2,000 km have not been substantiated. 
The longest range that Russia has seen is 1,700 km, and that 
was achieved only because of a reduced throw weight.  If the 
U.S. has additional data to share, Russia would be 
interested.  The U.S. agreed to look into the matter and 
elaborate further at the next JTA talks. 
 
¶34. (S) However, the U.S. also noted that modeling shows that 
achieving a greater range is possible.  Just because a 
capability has not been demonstrated operationally does not 
mean that it is not possible.  Once a program has achieved 
1,500 km, going a few hundred kilometers more is not that 
much of an obstacle.  Going from 1,700 to 2,000 km is not a 
great technological stretch.  Russia said it could not agree 
because with a longer flight, various parts of the missile 
could burn through, the missile could fall apart, or it could 
go off course.  It needs to be tested at its maximum range. 
As discussed earlier, the U.S. believes Iran can achieve the 
increased range due to a combination of increased thrust from 
more powerful engines, a slightly reduced payload, and the 
use of aluminum instead of steel. 
 
¶35. (S) Russia disagreed with the U.S. assessment that Iran 
has been able to buy technology to produce solid propellant 
engines.  Russia believes Iran continues to work on the 
technology to mix and pour the propellant.  This is a very 
difficult process.  Solid fuel has to be very evenly mixed to 
work properly.  It must be put into the motor case and then 
allowed to solidify, and the resulting fuel must be 
homogeneous.  In addition, fuel loading is more complicated 
for larger engines, and Iran has not mastered this.  Russia 
also believes Iran is experimenting with fuel composition, 
how long fuels can be preserved, and how temperatures can 
affect the mixture.  Russia does not think that Iran has 
solved the problem of thermal isolation of the engine from 
the airframe, as the junction with the engine tends to burn 
through.  Russia also does not think that Iran has solved the 
problem of thrust vector control and gas steering 
technologies.  The old technologies are not reliable, and 
Iran has had a hard time getting 
 components from abroad.  In addition, Iran cannot produce 
high-quality spherical aluminum powder and without this it 
cannot reliably produce solid fuel.  Russia noted that even 
Israel needs to buy ammonium perchlorate from abroad.  Iran 
has been trying to produce it indigenously, but Russia has no 
information indicating it has been successful.  In Russia's 
view, Iran appears to be having very serious problems with 
engine development. 
 
¶36. (S) The Ashura 
 
Russia said that in June 2008, it had received information 
from the State Department that within the framework of the 
Ashura program, Iran is producing a 3-stage missile called 
the Ghadr-110.  At that time, the U.S. told Russia that this 
missile is very similar to the Pakistani Shaheen-II and has a 
range of 2,000 km with a throw weight of one ton.  Testing of 
the Ghadr-110 may have started in 2008, and Russia would like 
additional information on this system.  The U.S. said that 
there appeared to be some confusion:  the Ashura is a 
two-stage solid propellant missile with a 2,000 km range, and 
the Ghadr-110 is the Fateh-110, a single-stage SRBM. 
 
¶37. (S) Sejjil 
 
Russia asked whether the Sejjil was part of the Ashura 
program.  The U.S. said it thinks the Sejjil is another name 
for the Ashura.  In addition, Iran also has a short range 
solid propellant system called the Fateh-110.  The experience 
gained from that program has been used in the development of 
the Ashura and helps explain how Iran acquired the capability 
to develop larger motors.  In the 1990s, Iran received 
production technology and infrastructure from China to 
develop solid propellants.  That infrastructure was used in 
the Fateh-110 and now is being used as the technological 
basis for the Ashura.  While the U.S. would agree that a 
larger solid propellant engine is challenging, Iran has over 
a decade of experience producing solid propellant motors and 
it got an important head start from China.  Independent of 
what Iran has since acquired, this head start allowed Iran to 
develop the Ashura, which has been flight tested 
successfully, and also to work toward longer-range systems. 
Russia did not fully agree, 
saying that the technology for an SRBM is quite different 
from medium and longer range systems. 
 
¶38. (S) Iranian Challenges 
 
Noting that Russia had mentioned several problems with Iran's 
efforts to develop larger motors, the U.S. asked for the 
basis of Russia's assessment and specifically whether it 
derived from the results of ground testing.  Russia responded 
that Iran is having problems generally because it did not 
develop the technology in Iran and is trying to work off of 
North Korean technology.  The U.S. then asked how Russia 
would explain 
the Ashura having been flight tested twice successfully. 
Russia said there is nothing special there as the technology 
is all old technology as described in detail in the 
literature of the Chinese Long March 4 engine.  The U.S. 
pointed out that the Long March is a liquid propellant 
system, and the Ashura is a solid propellant system.  If Iran 
has successful tests, it shows Iran has built MRBM rocket 
motors.  Russia countered that all it shows is that Iran is 
testing parts of the missile.  Iran may have claimed success 
but that is not the reality.  If Iran wants it to be 
reliable, the missile has to be tested many times before it 
can be deployed.  This is what Russia believes.  Russia 
understands the U.S. has a different point of view and this 
can be discussed again another time. 
 
¶39. (S) North Korean Scuds 
 
The U.S. said it seemed that both sides had a common 
evaluation of what types of short range systems North Korea 
possesses:  the Scud B, Scud C, and the new solid propellant 
MRBM.  Russia said that in 2008, the U.S. indicated that 
North Korean Scuds were launched at longer ranges.  Russia 
asked for any specific data on these missile launches and for 
U.S. thinking on why these systems are extended range Scuds 
and not Scud C missiles.  The U.S. said that it would try to 
provide more information on this issue at the next round of 
talks.  However, it is known that there have been at least 
two cases of North Korea helping other countries to develop 
Scuds with longer ranges than the Scud C.    One example is 
Libya.  When Libya gave up its MTCR-class missile programs in 
2003, it showed the U.S. a missile it called the "Scud-C." 
However, it had a longer range than the missile we refer 
generally refer to as the Scud-C.  Additionally, many 
presentations in the MTCR Information Exchange have reported 
that North Korea is helping other countries, particularly 
Syria, develop a Scud with a longer range.  These 
presentations have referred to this longer range system as 
the Scud-D. 
 
¶40. (S) No Dong 
 
The U.S. thought that both sides had similar assessments of 
the No Dong.  Referring to the U.S. presentation from the 
previous JTA talks, Russia noted that the U.S. said there 
were seven launches of the No Dong in July 2009 by North 
Korea.  Russia has no information on such tests, and wondered 
if there U.S. had been referring to 2006.  The U.S. said that 
there had been tests of the No Dong just after July 4, 2009, 
and that there had been plenty of South Korean and Japanese 
reporting at that time.  Russia agreed there were July 4 
missile launches, but of missiles with shorter ranges, not 
Scuds or No Dongs.  Given the confusion on this point, Russia 
urged that the issue be revisited during the next round of 
talks. 
 
¶41. (S) UDMH 
 
Russia asked whether the U.S. thinks North Korea is trying to 
develop a new engine that uses UDMH.  The U.S. said it 
believes this effort is connected with a new system North 
Korea is working on.  The U.S. thinks this new system is an 
IRBM. 
 
¶42. (S) IRBM 
 
Russia asked whether the U.S. has any specific data on this 
system.  The U.S. said it believes the system exists and has 
been sold to Iran as the BM-25. 
 
¶43. (S) Taepo Dong 
 
The U.S. agreed with Russia that the Taepo Dong-1 was a 
technology demonstrator that is no longer being used, and 
that the Taepo Dong-2 has had two tests that have been 
unsuccessful.  However, there is not agreement on the purpose 
of the Taepo Dong-2 system.  In tests, the intent has been 
billed as putting a satellite into orbit, but the U.S. also 
thinks it is very much intended as part of the development of 
an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).  Russia noted 
for clarification that North Korea calls the Taepo Dong-2 the 
Unha-2. 
 
¶44. (S) Russia believes the system has an engine with a 100 
ton capacity that uses clustered designs based on old 
technology, and asked whether the U.S. thought the Taepo 
Dong-2 uses any new technology.  The U.S. responded that it 
has not seen any new technology associated with this system. 
Nevertheless, one path to acquiring a longer range system 
would be to cluster or stack engines for the new IRBM in the 
same way North Korea used Scud and No Dong engines in the 
Taepo Dong-2.  Russia pointed out that so far this has not 
been observed and there is no new technology associated with 
an ICBM in North Korea.  The U.S. agreed that no new 
technology has been observed in the ICBM, but it has been in 
the IRBM. 
 
¶45. (S) Russia noted that in its presentations the U.S. had 
given a range of 10,000 km - 15,000 km with a 500 kg warhead 
for the Taepo Dong and asked how the U.S. had calculated 
this.  The U.S. said that for the 10,000 km range, it had 
assumed a clustered first stage and a No Dong second stage. 
For the 15,000 km range, it assumed a 3-stage configuration 
with the same clustered engines and second stage. 
 
¶46. (S) Taepo Dong-2 and Military Applications 
 
Russia pointed out that the Taepo Dong-2 would be hard to use 
for combat due to a lack of sites and its long launch 
preparation time.  The U.S. noted that North Korea could 
mitigate those problems by placing it in a silo or using it 
as a first strike weapon.  These would not be optimal 
approaches but if North Korea is sufficiently desperate, it 
would go with the systems available to it.  Moreover, North 
Korea puts great political value on these systems.  In the 
wake of the nuclear test and the UNSCR that followed, North 
Korea threatened to conduct an ICBM test.  This is another 
manifestation of the political value of this program for 
North Korea. 
 
¶47. (S) North Korean Path to an ICBM 
 
The U.S. said it saw three potential paths for North Korea to 
follow to obtain an ICBM: 1) use the Taepo Dong-2 as an ICBM; 
2) further develop the technology for an IRBM based on their 
new MRBM, in the same way the No Dong was a path to the Taepo 
Dong; and 3) use the very large launch facility that is being 
constructed on the west coast of North Korea to launch a very 
large missile.  Russia said that the first two paths could be 
discussed at a later date. 
 
¶48. (S) With regard to the third path, Russia wonders whether 
North Korea is building the new launch site to avoid 
launching over Japan and for safety reasons.  The U.S. 
responded that the size of the facility is of concern.  It 
does not simply replicate other sites.  This facility is much 
larger than the Taepo Dong launch facility.  This is not to 
say there is evidence of a new missile system larger than the 
Taepo Dong-2 being developed, but it suggests the 
possibility.  North Korea does not spend money on things 
unless they really matter.  Russia noted that North Korea 
does not have so much money, so it must economize.  However, 
Russia can probably agree that the new site is being built to 
test new missiles.  That said, Russia still thinks North 
Korea has problems developing more-powerful engines and 
accurate guidance systems.  This merits further observation 
and analysis. 
 
¶49. (S) General Comments 
 
Russia said it sees it as significant that Iran and North 
Korea are trying to buy more materials abroad and trying to 
get around existing export control regimes.  However, each 
country is different and Russia cannot say they are working 
according to the same principles.  On clustering, Russia has 
a different point of view than the U.S., but will look 
further into this.  Russia also has a different view on 
silos, but that can be discussed in more detail next time. 
In short, North Korea is complex and neither the U.S. nor 
Russia fully understands its capabilities.  Both sides need 
to monitor this carefully and work together on this issue. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
(U) Russian presentation of a framework for evaluating 
missile risks, dangers and threats; and discussion 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
¶50. (S) Nazarov said Russia believes any missile assessments 
should be based not only on modeling, but also on 
consideration of the real technical barriers faced by Iran. 
Serious attention must be given to these technical problems. 
Otherwise, we will use erroneous assumptions to evaluate the 
problem.  For example, we can count the number of 
centrifuges, multiply by production capabilities, and say 
Iran can produce enough uranium for several warheads. 
However, this would not be correct because the models do not 
take into account the technical difficulties in cascade 
technologies that Iran has not worked out yet. 
 
¶51. (S) In the same way, Russia thinks that when talking 
about the Shahab-3, there is no possibility of Iran using 
these missiles in a launch silo configuration.  Also, Russia 
does not see Iran increasing the throw weight or range to the 
declared capabilities.  Thus, as regards attempting to draft 
a joint report, Russia foresees no problems in an evaluation 
of the basic systems, but does foresee a difference in the 
evaluations of the technical barriers faced by the Iranians. 
With regard to timeframes, Nazarov said that if we talk about 
real threats, and not just potential challenges, then we need 
to think about all the systems that need to be developed and 
tested.  To facilitate this, Russia thinks the JTA 
discussions should be divided into discussions on missile 
risks and missile threats.  The two sides should agree on 
what these are and then work to prevent missile risks from 
growing into missile threats. 
 
¶52. (S) Nazarov then asked Vladimir Yermakov, Director for 
Strategic Capabilities Policy, Russian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, to introduce Russia's proposed methodology for 
evaluating missile risks and missile threats.  Yermakov said 
Russia views the December JTA talks as the first step in 
implementing the goals of the July 2009 Presidential Joint 
Statement.  These consultations build on many years of work 
with the U.S. on missile defense, including missile threat 
assessment, and Russia would like to underscore that the 
dialogue and close collaboration on missile defense is due to 
the positive decisions taken by the new administration on 
missile defense.  Russia's official assessment of Obama's 
missile defense policy is that it is a step in a positive 
direction.  Russia commends the U.S. decision to drop the 
fielding of missile defense elements in Poland and the Czech 
Republic and replace it with a multi-phased program for 
missile defense in Europe.  Russia will only be able to give 
its assessment of the new 
 project after it has seen the implementation of the first 
phase.  Further collaboration in missile defense will depend 
on how the project will be developed on the U.S. side.  But a 
key part of our collaboration will be the joint assessment of 
missile threats. 
 
¶53. (S) Continuing, Yermakov said Russia believes that any 
further practical cooperation on missile defense will be 
based on a concrete joint assessment of the missile threats. 
The U.S. and Russia need to have a clear understanding of 
whom we are cooperating against and we need to make clear 
distinctions between missile risks, missile challenges, and 
missile threats.  Russian and U.S. perceptions may coincide 
and may differ, that is understandable.  We can work together 
to address threats we both agree on.  But there may be 
threats the U.S. sees as real and Russia sees only to be 
perceived ones, and vice versa.  In such cases, the extent of 
our cooperation may be less or lower, but we can still do 
something jointly to address these threats as well. 
 
¶54. (S) Yermakov said that Russia sees as an end-goal of the 
JTA consultations a document outlining jointly assessed 
missile threats and challenges.  Naturally, in working on 
such a document, the U.S. and Russia will recognize that 
their views differ and those differences will have to be 
reflected in this document.  We can take as an example our 
record of cooperation within the NATO Russia Council (NRC). 
 
¶55. (S) Yermakov then distributed a paper on a framework of 
criteria for assessing the level of risk of a given missile 
program.  He explained that the material on the first page is 
a graph presented in simplified form in which Russia presents 
two categories - a threat and a challenge.  In order for 
there to be a threat, it is necessary to have two components: 
 intention and capabilities.  Only when both components are 
present does a threat become real.  From the Russian point of 
view, lack of either component makes the threat hypothetical. 
 When both components are lacking, the threat is only 
"perceived," and the threat of a nuclear missile strike is 
zero. 
 
¶56. (S) Yermakov noted that on the second page, Russia 
suggests four categories:  missile challenge, missile danger, 
missile threat, and missile strike.  Russia views a missile 
challenge as an aspiration to obtain capabilities in the 
field of rocketry to fulfill one's legitimate national goals. 
 These goals can be a space program or missiles as weapons. 
A missile danger emerges when nations envision in national 
guidelines a doctrine that they could/could use missiles.  A 
missile threat is a more advanced category in which a country 
has the intention to use its missile capability to further 
its national military and political goals.  A missile strike 
is self evident.  Yermakov urged the U.S to review the paper 
and, at a later stage, provide an assessment of this 
approach.  At that point, the two sides can compare views, 
theoretical approaches and assessments of threats, and use 
this framework to develop a joint document of challenges, 
risks, and threats. 
 
¶57. (S) Nazarov thanked Yermakov for his presentation, saying 
that he believed the U.S. and Russia needed to continue their 
joint work based on a shared methodology.  The methodology 
proposed in the Yermakov presentation will allow us to 
address challenges and threats concretely, and to overcome 
differences of opinion.  Nazarov said he did not see U.S. and 
Russian differences as significant for a joint document and 
thought they could be overcome.  In this context, Russia has 
prepared  a memorandum with respect to drafting a joint 
assessment.  The essence of the paper is that the two sides 
would work together to draft a document on a joint 
understanding of the problems of missile proliferation.  It 
would be an assessment of the current trends, conditions, and 
factors that make up today's situation, and appropriate 
conclusions. 
 
¶58.  Nazarov suggested the two sides agree on a timeframe for 
drafting the document, which would lay the foundation for 
cooperation and make it more dynamic.  Russia thinks the JTA 
work could finish by the end of 2010 and believes that 
following this round, the group could come up with a draft 
report and then work to improve it and flesh out some of its 
provisions.  Based on the principle of rotation, Russia also 
thinks the next round of JTA talks should be in March or 
April, 2010 in Moscow.  Finally, given the sensitive nature 
of the eventual final document, it should be treated as 
confidential and only made available to third parties with 
the consent of both our parties.  (Passed over non-paper.) 
 
¶59. (S) Van Diepen appreciated the thought put into the 
Russian document and the invitation to Moscow, which he 
accepted.  He said the U.S. would study the paper and provide 
comments at a later date.  This will lay the groundwork for 
productive meetings in Moscow.  However, he also cautioned 
that the two sides must be careful not to let process get in 
the way of substance.  He said the U.S. and Russia need to 
share assessments first and then think about what to do with 
them.  He also said the two sides should identify the 
differences in our assessments and the reasons for those 
differences, rather than get bogged down in wordsmithing and 
nuances. 
 
¶60. (C) Nazarov said Russia shares the opinion that the JTA 
study has a practical goal.  He said Russia is serious about 
the problem of future missile threats and that the JTA work 
is under the close scrutiny of the President of the Russian 
Federation, who demands that the Russia side give an 
impartial and objective assessment.  Russia believes there is 
a danger in over- or underestimating the threat as it could 
prod us to move in the wrong direction.  When it comes to 
missile and nuclear threats, errors in estimation in both 
directions are dangerous. 
 
¶61. (S) Yuriy Korolev, an expert from the Russian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, explained that during a meeting in Budapest 
in February 2008, Russian experts presented a collection of 
interesting approaches on assessing missile proliferation 
threats.  Using that document, Russia thought one could give 
a more unbiased assessment of missile threats.  However, 
there has been no reaction from the U.S.  This may be due to 
the fact that only limited numbers of the document were 
distributed and they did not reach all appropriate senior 
U.S. officials.  Russia continues to believe this document is 
interesting and would appreciate U.S. views, analysis, 
comments, and proposals on how to make our efforts on 
countering missile proliferation more effective.  Russia's 
view is that the methodology presented would make assessments 
of missile threats more impartial (handed over copies). 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
(U) Russian presentation on the security threat presented by 
instability and Islamists in Pakistan and discussion 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
¶62. (S) Korolev noted that while the focus of the discussions 
had been on the missile threats from North Korea and Iran, 
Russia did not think discussion should be limited to only 
those threats from Iran and North Korea.  In the Russian 
view, there is another serious threat that should be 
discussed: Pakistan.  Pakistan is a nation with nuclear 
weapons, various delivery systems, and a domestic situation 
that is highly unstable.  Russia assesses that Islamists are 
not only seeking power in Pakistan but are also trying to get 
their hands on nuclear materials.  Russia is aware that 
Pakistani authorities, with help from the U.S., have created 
a well-structured system of security for protecting nuclear 
facilities, which includes physical protection.  However, 
there are 120,000-130,000 people directly involved in 
Pakistan's nuclear and missile programs, working in these 
facilities and protecting them.  However, regardless of the 
clearance process for these people, there is no way to 
guarantee that all are 100% loyal 
and reliable. 
 
¶63. (S) In addition to the Islamist interest in these 
facilities, Russia also is aware that Pakistan has had to 
hire people to protect nuclear facilities that have 
especially strict religious beliefs, and recently the general 
educational and cultural levels in Pakistan has been falling. 
 Due to these facts, extremist organizations have more 
opportunities to recruit people working in the nuclear and 
missile programs.  Over the last few years extremists have 
attacked vehicles that carry staff to and from these 
facilities.  Some were killed and a number were abducted and 
there has been no trace seen of them.  Also, even if places 
are well protected, transportation of materials is a 
vulnerable point.  In Pakistan, it is hard to guarantee the 
security of these materials during transportation.  For these 
reasons, Russia thinks Pakistan should also be a particular 
focus of JTA discussion. 
 
¶64. (S) Nazarov clarified that Russia believes the focus of 
the JTA discussions should be the missile programs of Iran 
and North Korea.  Russia assumes the nuclear and missile 
programs of Pakistan are regionally oriented and thus outside 
the scope of the current JTA discussion.  However, Russia 
recently hosted a delegation led by Senators Hagel and 
Harkin.  The Senators told a meeting of the Russian Security 
Council that Pakistan poses the greatest threat to the world. 
 Therefore, Russia would appreciate any additional 
information the U.S. can provide on the actual situation with 
regard to the protection, storage, and transportation of 
nuclear and missile weaponry in Pakistan. 
 
¶65. (C) Van Diepen appreciated Russia's concern with Pakistan 
and interest in getting further information but noted that 
the issue as described is primarily nuclear materials being 
acquired by terrorists, it is more of a nuclear issue and 
less related to ballistic missiles.  He undertook to report 
back and facilitate a response from the appropriate office 
outside the context of the JTA. 
 
¶66. (S) Nazarov said Russia is interested in using all 
channels to cooperate with the U.S. on this subject.  First 
and foremost, Russia is talking about the threat of nuclear 
terrorism.  If the scenarios include future development, the 
threat of missile technology getting into the hands of 
terrorists should also be considered.  Russia would like to 
put its concern on the record, and particularly with regard 
to the possibility of Islamists coming to power in Pakistan. 
Russia would appreciate the U.S. providing additional 
information on the subject - perhaps at the follow-up meeting 
in Moscow. 
 
¶67. (C) Van Diepen said he would report Russia's concerns but 
noted that the U.S. response would likely come through 
diplomatic channels rather than at our April/March meetings. 
He also urged that Nazarov raise his concerns with Special 
Advisor Holbrooke or his Deputy. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
(U) Russian presentation on FSB work to interdict Iranian and 
North Korean attempts to buy restricted technology, or to 
transship third party materials through Russia 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
¶68.  (C) Anatoliy Raikevich, First Deputy Department 
Director, Federal Security Service (FSB), said that both Iran 
and North Korea appear to depend heavily on illegally 
obtaining equipment and technology from abroad for missile 
and WMD programs.  The FSB has information that Iran and 
North Korea both have programs to try to acquire Russian 
technology.  One of the basic tasks of the FSB is to prevent 
them from acquiring WMD-related production technology in 
Russia.  To do this, the FSB takes action based on Russian 
law and export controls.  In particular, the FSB monitors and 
takes measures to prevent WMD technology exports.  This 
includes criminal investigations of attempts to export 
contraband and items on the prohibited list.  Russian 
analysis shows that that these efforts have significantly 
reduced the achievements of the Iranian security services in 
this area.  However, the Iranians continue to try to use the 
territory of Russia for transits and reexports of such 
materials. 
 
¶69. (C) A key effort of the Iranian services is the company 
to company approach, whereby they use fake companies run by 
the Iranian security service to procure Russian goods.  The 
FSB has set up sting companies to uncover Iranian activities. 
 In the past two years, the FSB has cut off a good deal of 
the exports of such technology. 
 
¶70. (C) The FSB has determined that Iran is trying to get 
equipment such as measuring devices, high precision 
amplifiers, pressure indicators, various composite materials, 
and technology to create new missile engines from Russia and 
from sources in Western Europe.  To produce these items 
itself, Iran would need to seriously modernize its 
technological base.  To combat this, the FSB must cooperate 
with the U.S. and European security services.  Russia has 
many years experience cooperating with U.S. security services 
and has moved from information exchanges to operational 
activities.   The FSB thinks U.S. services are very 
professional and well prepared, and hopes cooperation will 
continue. 
 
¶71. (C) Van Diepen thanked Raikevich for his presentation, 
noting that he had had lots of experience during the 1990s 
working with Russian counterparts on the problem and trying 
to reduce the success of Iran in acquiring missile 
technology.  Van Diepen said he was impressed by the people 
in Russia working on export controls and appreciated that 
Russia recognized that Iran is still trying to acquire 
technology from Russia.  He said he would pass on to U.S. 
security services the FSB's interest in continued 
cooperation.  He added that the U.S. would want to work with 
Russia in those channels as well as in diplomatic channels as 
the need arose to address specific shipments of concern. 
 
¶72. (S) Raikevich replied that discussing these issues with 
the U.S. will help Iran and North Korea to "boil in their own 
oil."  He said Iran and North Korean may have small successes 
here and there with procurement, but the FSB will see to it 
that their successes remain small.  The FSB is grateful for 
information the U.S. passes along regarding various Russian 
organizations that may be working with Iran or North Korea, 
and wants continue to work together to prevent the spread of 
this technology from Russia and other countries. 
 
---------------------- 
(U) Concluding remarks 
---------------------- 
 
¶73. (S) Yermakov said that Russia thought the discussions had 
been productive and cooperative.  He noted that both sides 
have significant homework assignments to complete before the 
next round and can test the results at the end of 
March/beginning of April.  He then offered concluding remarks 
on behalf of the Deputy Secretary of Russia's National 
Security Council: 
-- With regard to Iran, Russia believes the possibility of 
improvement of its liquid propellant missiles is nil. 
 
--It is impossible from the Russian point of view for Iran to 
put a nuclear device on existing missiles with an improved 
range and throw weight. 
 
--Iran has no ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear 
weapons at this time, and Russia sees no threat from missiles 
in Iran. 
 
--In Russia's view, Iran presents a missile challenge. 
 
--A missile threat would only develop if Iran seceded from 
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and successfully 
developed an MRBM with a 3,000 km range and a warhead of one 
ton. 
 
--Iran does not have the military-industrial capability to 
develop such a program.  If Iran could gain access to foreign 
technology, it might develop such a program but this is 
unlikely due to export controls. 
 
--In any case, even with the assistance of foreign 
technology, Russia assesses it will take Iran 6-8 years to 
gain the ability to launch an MRBM with a nuclear warhead. 
 
--With regard to an ICBM, Russia considers this purely 
hypothetical and does not see the possibility of Iran having 
this capability for the next 10 years. 
 
--For North Korea, Russia assesses that its only real 
capabilities are outdated missiles with ranges of no more 
than 3,500 km. 
 
--While it is possible to develop missiles with greater 
ranges based on an SLV program, that would take many years, 
even with a successful program. 
 
¶74. (C) Yermakov said these were the basic conclusions Russia 
wanted to make.  If the conclusions are agreeable to the U.S. 
side this could be noted.  If not, they can be discussed 
again at a later date and will be the basis for future work, 
to continue successful bilateral cooperation.  He said Russia 
is not at all concerned about differences regarding various 
aspects of these programs.  Russia sees this as natural. 
Having differences just means that we need to meet more often 
and exchange information through appropriate channels. 
Russia looks forward to a U.S. interagency delegation coming 
to Moscow.  Until then the two sides can communicate through 
diplomatic channels or even just by telephone. 
 
¶75. (S) Van Diepen thanked the Russia side, especially 
Nazarov, for its thorough preparation and professionalism. 
He said the U.S. was pleased with the interagency character 
of the Russian delegation and appreciated that Russia had 
given a lot of thought to both conceptual issues and 
technical matters.  The challenge going forward - as shown in 
the contrast between the technical discussions and Russia's 
concluding remarks - will be to come to a greater shared 
understanding of the issues.  On the technical side, there is 
a fair amount of agreement, but as we go up in range, our 
views diverge.  Based on common data, we have different 
perceptions.   The conclusions the U.S. would draw would be 
different in each case from the conclusions Yermakov 
outlined.  That is not bad, but both sides need to work to 
understand the conceptual and technical basis for these 
views.  There is a great deal to discuss, and we will need to 
be well prepared for fruitful and informative discussions in 
Moscow in the spring.  The U.S. 
will study the Russian papers and follow up through 
diplomatic channels.  The U.S. also will do its homework 
assignments, propose specific dates for the next round of 
talks, and be prepared for "our exams" next time in Moscow. 
 
--------------------- 
(U) Participants 
--------------------- 
 
¶76. (SBU) U.S. Delegation: 
 
Vann H. Van Diepen, Acting Assistant Secretary, ISN 
(Head of Delegation) 
 
Frank Rose, Deputy Assistant Secretary, VCI 
 
Pamela Durham, Director, ISN/MTR 
 
Kimberly Hargan, ISN/MTR 
 
Michael Kerley, ISN/MTR 
 
David Hoppler, ISN/MDSP 
 
Steve Rosenkrantz, ISN/MDSP 
 
Kathleen Morenski, Deputy Director, EUR/PRA 
 
Caroline Savage, EUR/RUS 
 
Michael Fogo, EUR/RUS 
 
Joshua Handler, INR/SPM 
 
Anita Friedt, Director for Arms Control and 
Non-Proliferation, National Security Council (NSC) 
 
Daniel Menzel, Intelligence Analyst 
 
Michael Barnes, OSD Office of Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia 
Policy, Defense/OSD 
 
Dimitry Zarechnak, Interpreter 
 
¶77. (SBU) Russian Delegation: 
 
Vladimir Nazarov, Deputy Secretary of Russia's Security 
Council (Head of Delegation) 
 
Vyacheslav Kholodkov, Deputy Department Director, Security 
Council 
 
Oleg Khodyrev, Senior Counselor, Security Council 
 
Vladimir Yermakov, Director for Strategic Capabilities 
Policy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
 
Andrey Shabalin, Second Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
 
Yuriy Korolev, Expert, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
 
Anatoliy Raikevich, First Deputy Department Director, Federal 
Security Service 
 
Alexander Novikov, Deputy Department Director, Ministry of 
Defense 
 
Evgeny Zudin, Office Director, Ministry of Defense 
 
Alexander Derevlev, Senior Officer, Ministry of Defense 
 
Alexander Serenko, Deputy Department Director, Roscosmos 
 
Evgeny Bobrovskiy, Counselor, Russian Embassy 
 
Oleg Pozdnyakov, First Secretary, Russian Embassy 
 
Vadim Sergeev, Interpreter, Russian Embassy 
CLINTON 
 
 
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