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Viewing cable 10BERLIN180, CHANCELLOR MERKEL ANGERED BY LACK OF GERMAN MEP

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Reference ID Date Classification Origin
10BERLIN180 2010-02-12 17:05 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Berlin
VZCZCXRO2876
PP RUEHAG RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHRL #0180/01 0431709
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 121709Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6546
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERLIN 000180 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR, L, S/CT, EEB, INL 
TREASURY FOR TFI 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2020 
TAGS: PTER KTFN PGOV PREL PINR ETTC EAIR EFIN KCRM
KJUS, KHLS, GM 
SUBJECT: CHANCELLOR MERKEL ANGERED BY LACK OF GERMAN MEP 
SUPPORT FOR TFTP 
 
REF: A. BERLIN 176 
     B. BERLIN 128 
 
Classified By: ROBERT A. POLLARD, Minister-Counselor for Economics Affa 
irs, for Reasons 1.4 (b and d). 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY: Chancellor Merkel is privately angry over the 
lack of support German members of the European Parliament 
gave the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (TFTP) interim 
agreement and is worried that Washington will view the EP's 
veto as a sign that Europe does not take the terrorist threat 
seriously.  Merkel is particularly irritated with German MEPs 
from her Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and sister 
Christian Social Union (CSU) parties, most of whom reportedly 
voted against the agreement despite previously indicating 
they would support it.  Public German reactions to the EP 
vote have come exclusively from TFTP detractors who portrayed 
the veto as a sign that the European Parliament has won a 
victory over an arrogant Commission/Council, as well as 
delivering a rebuke to U.S. counterterrorism policies that 
undervalue data privacy.  These events suggest the need to 
intensify our engagement with German government 
interlocutors, Bundestag and European parliamentarians, and 
opinion makers to demonstrate that the U.S. has strong data 
privacy measures in place.  END SUMMARY 
 
 
2. (C) Hamburg Mayor Ole von Beust (CDU) told Ambassador 
today (2/12) that he had met with Chancellor Merkel last 
night and she was "very, very angry - angrier than he had 
ever seen her" with the outcome of the vote.  Beust said that 
the Chancellor had personally lobbied German MEPs from the 
CDU/CSU parties to support the agreement, but that most of 
these MEPs ended up voting against the agreement anyway. 
Merkel expressed concerns to Beust that Washington will view 
the EP veto as a sign that Europe does not take the terrorist 
threat seriously.  Merkel also worried about the 
ramifications (presumably within Europe and for transatlantic 
relations) that might follow were a terrorist attack to occur 
that could have been prevented had SWIFT data been exchanged. 
 
 
 
3. (C) Federal Justice Minister Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger, 
a strong proponent of data privacy rights from the Free 
Democratic Party (FDP; see reftels), quickly welcomed the 
TFTP veto.  She said "the citizens of Europe have won a 
victory today that strengthened not just data protection, but 
democracy in all of Europe."  The Minister has been a vocal 
critic of the TFTP and in interviews today stressed that the 
EP veto will lead to a change of European policy in which 
"data protection is no longer just an appendix of security 
policy."  She also restated her understanding that German 
investigators believe TFTP data has not/not contributed 
meaningfully to terrorism investigations.  She said the EP 
decision paves the way for new negotiations that take into 
account European notions of data protection. 
 
 
4. (C) Some German members of the European Parliament 
likewise applauded the TFTP veto.  Green Party MEP Jan 
Philipp Albrecht stated that the vote would not cause a 
"transatlantic ice-age" because President Obama has more 
important concerns and would not "emphasize this defeat too 
much at home."  Werner Langen, head of the EP CDU/CSU group, 
said that his group did not vote against the United States, 
but rather against the European Commission and the Council 
who had "negotiated a bad agreement."  Martin Schulz, head of 
the Social Democratic faction, said that the "negotiating 
position of the EU is now better."  FDP MEP Alexander Graf 
Lambsdorff acknowledged that the decision could be a 
temporary irritation in transatlantic relations, but believed 
that this would not last long and the time would soon come to 
"negotiate a reasonable agreement."  Bavarian State Minister 
Mueller told Munich CG that the CSU is interested in moving 
forward with the negotiation of a new agreement that meets US 
and European needs. 
 
 
5. (C) COMMENT:  Why did so many German MEPs oppose TFTP? 
 
BERLIN 00000180  002 OF 002 
 
 
First, the debate was not just about TFTP.  Germans across 
the political spectrum adamantly support data protection ) 
whether it has to do with Passenger Name Records, Google,s 
supposed &monopoly8 on data searches, or individual credit 
ratings.  Recent scandals in which major firms such as 
Deutsche Telekom and Deutsche Bahn illegally tapped phones or 
files of tens of thousands of employees and customers 
reinforced Germans, concerns about the misuse of data 
technology.  Historical memory also plays a part, as stories 
about how the Stasi abused information to destroy people,s 
lives still regularly circulate in the press.  Paranoia runs 
deep especially about U.S. intelligence agencies.  We were 
astonished to learn how quickly rumors about alleged U.S. 
economic espionage ) at first associated with the new U.S. 
air passenger registration system (ESTA), then with TFTP ) 
gained currency among German parliamentarians in the run-up 
to the February 11 vote in Strasbourg.  Moreover, the fact 
that the libertarian Free Democratic Party (FDP) made data 
privacy a central plank of the pact with its coalition 
partners, the CDU/CSU ) and more importantly, captured the 
Justice Ministry ) made it very difficult for TFTP advocates 
like Interior Minister de Maiziere to speak up.  None of this 
may excuse the behavior of certain German MEPs, but it says 
something about the challenge ahead. 
 
 
6. (C) COMMENT CONT.: The overwhelming rejection of the 
interim agreement by German MEPs from all political parties 
nonetheless is surprising.  Although we anticipated that the 
FDP and Greens would come out strongly against the interim 
agreement, the broad lack of support it received from the 
CDU/CSU and Social Democrats was unexpected.  We believe a 
number of factors contributed to this including the fact that 
MEPs of all stripes saw this as an early opportunity to exert 
their new post-Lisbon powers and send a message to the 
Commission and Council.  Specific to Germany, the almost 
complete absence of public statements by German leadership in 
support of the agreement resulted in a situation in which 
MEPs received no political coverage supporting a positive 
vote and saw little political cost for a no vote. 
Furthermore, the German public and political class largely 
tends to view terrorism abstractly given that it has been 
decades since any successful terrorist attack has occurred on 
German soil.  This week's TFTP vote demonstrates that we need 
to intensify our engagement with German government 
interlocutors, Bundestag and European parliamentarians and 
opinion makers to get our views across.  We need to also 
demonstrate that the U.S. has strong data privacy measures in 
place so that robust data sharing comes with robust data 
protections. 
Murphy