Currently released so far... 220 / 251,287
Browse by release date
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Browse by tag
KPAL
KNNP
KU
KWBG
KJUS
KG
KSPR
KDEM
KHIV
KPRP
KZ
KN
KTFN
KCRM
KHLS
KGHG
KSCA
KMDR
KPAO
KCOR
KACT
KIRF
KS
KPKO
KUNR
KTIA
KWMN
Browse by classification
Community resources
Viewing cable 10LONDON131, SOURCE REMOVED] TARGETED BY IRANIAN REGIME
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others.
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #10LONDON131.
Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|
10LONDON131 | 2010-01-21 12:12 | CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN | Embassy London |
VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHLO #0131 0211217
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 211217Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4703
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
Thursday, 21 January 2010, 12:17
C O N F I D E N T I A L LONDON 000131
NOFORN
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 01/19/2020
TAGS PINR, PTER, PINS, UK, IR
SUBJECT: [SOURCE REMOVED] TARGETED BY IRANIAN REGIME
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Greg Berry, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (C/NF) SUMMARY: [DETAIL REMOVED] and prominent VOA commentator Ali Reza Nourizadeh recently told [NAME REMOVED] he had been targeted by Iranian intelligence, an allegation confirmed by London LEGATT. Nourizadeh was approached some months ago by Mohammad Reza Sadeqinia, an Iranian national who introduced himself as a “big fan” of Nourizadeh’s. Nourizadeh met Sadeqinia on several occasions in London and Washington, DC, but became suspicious when Sadeqinia took large numbers of photos, including of Nourizadeh’s vehicle. Sadeqinia was arrested in California on charges of soliciting murder after he attempted to hire a hitman to kill Iranian-American broadcaster Jamshid Sharmahd. Because his pattern of behavior towards Nourizadeh was similar to his interactions with Sharmahd, FBI shared the threat information with UK authorities, who subsequently warned Nourizadeh. END SUMMARY.
¶2. (C/NF) Ali Reza Nourizadeh [DETAILS REMOVED] had been visited by British anti-terrorism police who informed him he had been targeted by the Iranian regime. The UK authorities (who,[NAME REMOVED] later learned had received the threat information from the FBI) told Nourizadeh that Reza Sadeqinia, a man who had visited Nourizadeh several times in London and Washington, DC, was working for the Iranian intelligence services and gathering information on Nourizadeh’s habits. They advised Nourizadeh that Sadeqinia had been arrested in California for soliciting the murder of Iranian-American broadcaster Jamshid Sharmahd.
¶3. (C/NF) Nourizadeh, obviously shaken by this news, told [NAME REMOVED] Sadeqinia had contacted him several months before, claiming to be a “big fan” of Nourizadeh’s. Nourizadeh became suspicious after Sadeqinia insisted on taking large numbers of photos, including shots of Nourizadeh’s car and garage. His suspicions were confirmed after he received a message from a well-placed friend who told Nourizadeh he had seen dozens of photos of him on the desk of Iranian Deputy Intelligence Minister Alavi. At that point, Nourizadeh stopped taking Sadeqinia’s calls and heard nothing more about the matter until he was visited by UK anti-terror police January 14.
¶4. (C/NF) London LEGATT confirmed the arrest of Sadeqinia in the U.S. after he attempted to hire a man to kill Iranian-American broadcaster Jamshid Sharmahd of Tondar Radio. Prior to the solicitation of the hitman, videos of Sharmahd had begun to appear on YouTube with commentary that he was acting against Iran and an enemy of the state. Sadeqinia apparently admitted his surveillance of both Sharmahd and Nourizadeh and claimed he was working on behalf of Iranian intelligence. After similar videos of Nourizadeh were discovered, the FBI authorized UK authorities to share the threat information with Nourizadeh. UK authorities are working with Nourizadeh to improve his personal security, and Nourizadeh is cooperating by providing information about his interactions with Sadeqinia.
¶5. (C/NF) COMMENT: Nourizadeh is a well-known figure both inside and outside Iran, and is an outspoken critic of the Iranian regime, so it is unsurprising that the regime would want to keep a close eye on him. If, however, the regime has targeted Nourizadeh for assassination, as it appears to have done with Sharmahd, it marks a clear escalation in the regime’s attempts to intimidate critics outside its borders, and could have a chilling effect on journalists, academics and others in the West who until recently felt little physical threat from the regime. Nourizadeh, while clearly taking the threat seriously, will not be cowed -- he’s faced this type of threat before (many years ago when he first left Iran), and he has confidence in the British authorities’ ability to protect him. In fact, he has encouraged other prominent opposition leaders like Shirin Ebadi and Mohsen Makhmalbaf to relocate to London for their own safety. END COMMENT.
Visit London’s Classified Website: http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Unit ed_Kingdom
SUSMAN