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Viewing cable 09STATE119085, WALK-IN GUIDANCE FOR 2009: HANDLING
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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|
09STATE119085 | 2009-11-18 17:05 | SECRET | Secretary of State |
S E C R E T STATE 00119085
VZCZCXRO1706
PP RUEHAG RUEHAO RUEHBC RUEHBI RUEHBZ RUEHCD RUEHCHI RUEHCI RUEHCN
RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDT RUEHDU RUEHFK RUEHFL RUEHGA RUEHGD RUEHGH
RUEHHA RUEHHM RUEHHO RUEHHT RUEHIHL RUEHKN RUEHKSO RUEHKUK RUEHKW
RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHMC RUEHMJ RUEHMR RUEHMRE RUEHMT RUEHNEH RUEHNG
RUEHNH RUEHNL RUEHNP RUEHPA RUEHPB RUEHPT RUEHPW RUEHRD RUEHRG RUEHRN
RUEHROV RUEHRS RUEHSL RUEHTM RUEHTRO RUEHVC
DE RUEHC #9085/01 3221739
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 181729Z NOV 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY 0913
RUEHRY/AMEMBASSY CONAKRY PRIORITY 2404
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC// PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC// PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC// PRIORITY
RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC// PRIORITY 6949
RHEFHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC// PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 11 STATE 119085
SECRET//NOFORN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2034
TAGS: ASEC CVIS PINR PREF
SUBJECT: WALK-IN GUIDANCE FOR 2009: HANDLING
FOREIGN NATIONAL WALK-INS, DEFECTORS, AND ASYLUM
SEEKERS
REF: (A) 08 STATE 061194
(B) 7 FAM 180
(C) 09 STATE 030541
(D) 04 STATE 061816
(E) 2 FAM 227
(F) 08 STATE 110175
(G) 09 STATE 110904
(H) 9 FAM 42.1 N4, PN2-5, and PN7
(U) Classified by: David Appleton, Director,
INR/CCS, Reason: 1.4 (c, d).
SUMMARY AND TABLE OF CONTENTS
¶1. (S/NF) This telegram replaces Ref A as the
Department's comprehensive guidance on handling
foreign national walk-ins, defectors, and asylum
seekers - all of whom are generally referred to in
this telegram as "walk-ins." This telegram was
coordinated with interagency partners, including
CIA, DHS, DIA, and the FBI. It explains the
procedures for receiving walk-ins; determining
whether they are of intelligence value and whether
defector, temporary refuge, protection,
resettlement, parole, or other status is
appropriate; and coordinating an appropriate
response. A link to this telegram will be included
in the Chief of Mission (COM) Guide on ClassNet
(http://diplomaps.state.sgov.gov/com). (For
guidance on handling U.S. citizens requesting
emergency protection ("temporary refuge") at posts,
see Ref B.)
¶2. (S/NF) COMs should ensure that all post
personnel are properly prepared to handle walk-ins.
Post management, RSO, and GRPO have the most
responsibility for ensuring proper handling of
walk-ins, but other officers may play critical
roles.
¶3. (S/NF) Correct handling of walk-ins is
important for three principal reasons. Walk-ins
(1) may be sources of invaluable intelligence; (2)
pose numerous security challenges; and (3) may need
protection. Improper handling of walk-ins can put
them and post personnel at risk and result in the
loss of important intelligence. Thus, post's
procedures must be clear, well-understood, and
workable at any hour, day or night.
¶4. (U) Questions or comments regarding the
guidance in this telegram should normally be
directed by telegram to INR/CCS, which will
coordinate a Department response. If additional
guidance is required in an emergency walk-in
situation, however, post should contact the
Department's Operations Center (202-647-1512),
which will alert the appropriate Department
personnel.
¶5. (U) This telegram contains the following
sections:
¶A. - Storage and dissemination of this telegram
(paragraph 6)
¶B. - Post preparation for handling walk-ins
(paragraphs 7-23)
¶C. - Procedures for handling walk-in arrivals
(paragraphs 24-33)
¶D. - Requirements for reporting on walk-ins
(paragraphs 34-39)
¶E. - Temporary refuge guidance and cautions
(paragraphs 40-52)
¶F. - Long-term options for walk-ins(paragraphs 53-
63)
¶G. - Travel assistance for walk-ins(paragraphs 64-
65)
END SUMMARY.
Section A. STORAGE AND DISSEMINATION OF THIS
TELEGRAM
¶6. (U) Posts should retain this telegram in the
RSO's files and in a location accessible to duty
officers, replacing and destroying Ref A and any
other prior versions. RSOs should ensure that all
officers have read this telegram and know where it
is retained.
Section B. POST PREPARATION FOR HANDLING WALK-INS
¶7. (S/NF) Each post's Counterintelligence Working
Group (CIWG) should meet upon receipt of this
telegram to review post's procedures for dealing
with walk-ins. The CIWG should ensure that post's
procedures are consistent with the guidance in this
telegram and local security concerns, include
appropriate defensive security measures, and allow
screened walk-ins to meet securely with appropriate
post officials.
¶8. (S/NF) Post's walk-ins procedures should
include (1) special procedures for the reception of
embassy (including consular section) walk-ins of
possible intelligence value; (2) procedures for
constituent posts, if any; and (3) procedures for
approaches at residences, in vehicles, on the
street, via telephone, and through both electronic
and hand-delivered mail. Heightened security at
USG installations increases the possibility of
approaches to USG officials outside USG facilities.
Because of the inherent risks, however, post
procedures should permit arranging substantive
meetings outside post only in exceptional
circumstances and only after approval of the COM
based on the recommendations of the RSO and GRPO.
¶9. (S/NF) Post's procedures must allow for
appropriately balancing the following
considerations which may come into play in walk-in
cases:
(a) post security;
(b) the safety of the individual;
(c) the intelligence value and bona fides of the
individual;
(d) whether the individual requires protection and,
if so, whether appropriate protection is available
from international organizations or host-country
sources;
(e) whether the individual should be resettled
outside the host-country and, if so, whether
resettlement in another country or the United
States is possible;
(f) the time available for resolution of the case;
and
(g) the need to safeguard the confidentiality of
any information that may have a bearing on a future
consular-related activity or possible resettlement
request.
¶10. (S/NF) Post's procedures must be cleared by
the RSO and coordinated with the GRPO and, at posts
with an FBI Legal Attache (LEGATT), with the
LEGATT. (All three should be on post's CIWG.)
Post's RSO should update post's walk-in plan with
the GRPO and LEGATT, if any, on a semi-annual basis
or as needed.
¶11. (S/NF) RSOs should ensure that all relevant
potential participants in handling walk-ins are
appropriately briefed and trained. Non-cleared
personnel can be told that a USG official will
interview walk-ins, because that fact is not
classified. The fact that a walk-in may be
referred to other post officials for a decision on
further actions is classified and may not be shared
with non-cleared personnel. All briefings should
emphasize the importance of ensuring that the walk-
in is fully screened, but should also convey that
legitimate walk-ins may exhibit nervous or anxious
behavior, particularly because access controls and
host nation security forces around many of our
diplomatic posts make it difficult for walk-ins to
approach our facilities discreetly. All briefings
should also stress the importance of not drawing
attention to the walk-in or alerting host nation
security personnel.
¶12. (S/NF) RSO briefings should include (1)
briefing those who may have first contact with a
walk-in - including non-USG local guards and
receptionists - on the procedures to follow at
first contact; (2) providing additional briefings
to MSGs, other USG security personnel, and USG duty
officers on a semi-annual basis or as needed on
more sensitive aspects of the program; (3) briefing
consular officers on handling walk-ins who approach
through a consular service window; and (4) briefing
all arriving cleared USG personnel on the
procedures for approaches that occur off post
premises (as part of the arrival briefing).
¶13. (S/NF) To ensure that walk-ins can communicate
their wishes clearly, post may wish to prepare
language cards that can be shown at first contact
to a walk-in who does not speak English, giving
options from which the walk-in can select. One
option should be "I wish to speak with an American
official." Other options should be plausible
alternatives, such as "I wish to obtain information
about travel requirements." In addition to the
local language, post should consider having such
cards available in priority interest languages such
as Russian, Spanish, Arabic, Farsi, Mandarin, and
Korean, as appropriate in light of the local
environment.
¶14. (S/NF) The RSO should incorporate post's
procedures into the MSG and local guard orders as
necessary.
¶15. (S/NF) Posts should designate a room,
preferably outside the Public Access Control (PAC)
hard-line, for conducting the initial interview of
a walk-in.
¶16. (S/NF) Post should have an interview guide
that can be used during the initial interview, and
should maintain a current roster of cleared USG
personnel who can provide interpretation services
to assist the RSO and others in interviewing walk-
ins as required.
¶17. (S/NF) Post procedures should clearly identify
the officer who will do the initial interview of a
walk-in, and a backup for when that officer is
absent. (These are normally the RSO and Assistant
RSO.) These officials should have a prearranged
signal and appropriate contact numbers for
notifying GRPO of a walk-in of possible
intelligence value.
¶18. (S/NF) MSGs, local guards, and receptionists
should have a codeword or pre-arranged signal to
alert the RSO (or other designated officer) of a
person requesting to speak with a U.S. officer.
¶19. (U) Post should verify that current phone
numbers, addresses, and directions for host
government offices that handle refugee claims and
the local offices of the UNHCR and UNDP are
included in post's walk-in procedures and the duty
officer handbook. This information should also be
readily available as a handout for walk-ins.
¶20. (U) Post procedures should contain current
information on the host government's legal
obligations towards persons claiming to be refugees
or to be in danger of being tortured. These
obligations may arise from the host country's
domestic law and/or treaty obligations. States
party to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status
of Refugees, its 1967 Protocol, and the 1969
African Union Convention Governing the Specific
Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa have agreed
not to expel or return refugees, as defined in
those instruments, from their territory under
certain circumstances. States party to the 1987
Convention Against Torture and other Cruel,
Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment have
agreed not to expel or return an individual from
their territory to another country where there are
substantial grounds for believing that he/she would
be in danger of being subjected to torture.
¶21. (S/NF) RSO and GRPO should coordinate any
operational tests of walk-in procedures.
¶22. (S/NF) RSOs should review walk-in procedures
with constituent posts and ensure that they are
properly prepared to handle walk-ins. This should
include ensuring that constituent post's procedures
are also incorporated into local guard orders as
necessary.
¶23. (S/NF) Posts without an RSO, GRPO, or
UNHCR/UNDP presence in-country should promptly
develop additional post-specific guidance to ensure
that the guidance in this telegram is adjusted to
fit their situation.
Section C. PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING WALK-IN
ARRIVALS
¶24. (S/NF) The MSG, local guard, receptionist, or
other employee or official who first makes contact
with the walk-in should ascertain whether the walk-
in wishes to talk with the USG official, using the
language cards as necessary. If so, they should
use the pre-arranged signal to inform the USG
official designated to deal with walk-ins (normally
the RSO or Assistant RSO) as soon as possible.
Posts with MSGs may wish to instruct non-USG local
guards, receptionists, and others likely to be a
walk-in's first point of contact to refer a walk-in
who wishes to speak with a USG official to the MSG,
and then have the MSG involve the RSO.
¶25. (C) Post's first priority must be to determine
whether the individual is carrying a weapon,
device, or hazardous material that endangers post
personnel. Walk-ins must be screened and searched
before being permitted within the security
perimeter. If a walk-in possesses any object or
item that appears suspicious or potentially
hazardous, security personnel should deny access
even if the walk-in presents the item as evidence
of some intelligence he offers, e.g., red mercury
presented as proof of plutonium enrichment.
Security personnel are not required to prove that
an object, item, or material is hazardous to refuse
entry to the walk-in. Only DS-supplied and/or DS-
approved instruments should be used to examine
suspect material. Posts should follow established
DS and Department procedures for screening and
reporting suspect materials, e.g., white powder
incidents. In the event post encounters material
or information relating to alleged radioactive
materials, please refer to Ref C for comprehensive
interagency approved guidance.
¶26. (C) The walk-in's identification and/or travel
documents should be copied as soon as the walk-in
is screened in, if at all possible. Otherwise, the
papers should be copied before the end of the walk-
in's initial interview. Identifying and keeping
records of walk-ins is important for security and
intelligence reasons; copying their identity
documents early is advisable because walk-ins may
get cold feet and leave if kept waiting for an
interview.
¶27. (S/NF) After the walk-in has been searched,
the RSO or designated alternate must interview the
walk-in, using post's interview guide. The RSO
should attempt to establish the individual's bona
fides. (Walk-ins may in fact be mentally disturbed
persons, intelligence vendors, fabricators,
provocateurs from hostile intelligence services, or
persons gathering information on behalf of
terrorist organizations.) Once the subject's bona
fides are established to the RSO's satisfaction,
the RSO should establish what the walk-in wants,
whether the walk-in appears to be of possible
intelligence or counterintelligence interest, how
much time the walk-in has, and methods for future
contact, among other information. The RSO must
also attempt to determine whether the individual is
in imminent danger, including (1) immediate
physical danger, (2) danger of involuntary
repatriation to a country where the individual's
life or freedom would be threatened for reasons of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion, or
(3) danger of involuntary repatriation to a country
where it is more likely than not that the
individual will be subjected to torture. Finally,
the RSO may have reason to interview the individual
for information regarding potential threats to USG
personnel and facilities. (If such information is
obtained, the RSO generally should advise the
LEGATT and should consider flagging the individual
for the Rewards for Justice Program.)
¶28. (S/NF) Monitoring of foreign nationals in
walk-in rooms overseas is permitted only in
accordance with guidelines set forth in Ref D. All
other recording or monitoring conducted by post
employees, including those in cover positions, must
be consistent with the Department Notice of January
24, 1977 ("the Vance Memorandum"), which states
that "No officer or employee of the State
Department . . . shall direct, arrange for, permit,
or undertake the monitoring or mechanical or
electronic recording of any conversation, including
any telephone conversation, without the express
consent of all persons involved in the
conversation," unless advance approval is granted
by the Secretary or the Deputy Secretary of State.
(Reproduced at Tab U, Special Agent's Legal
Authorities, available at
http://intranet.state.gov.)
¶29. (C) Post personnel should never leave a walk-
in unattended. If possible, two or more post
officials should work together during the interview
phase.
¶30. (S/NF) If the RSO finds the walk-in credible
and to be of possible foreign intelligence or
counterintelligence interest, the RSO should follow
post procedures to ensure transfer of the walk-in
to the GRPO as quickly as possible with minimal
exposure to other post personnel. The GRPO will
determine further actions (interview, contact again
at a later date, etc.).
¶31. (C) Post must strictly limit disclosure of the
fact of any request for temporary refuge, departure
from the host country, asylum in the United States,
third-country visa assistance, issuance or refusal
of visas or permits to enter the United States, and
requests to resettle elsewhere. Only USG personnel
with a need-to-know should be made aware of such
requests.
¶32. (C) Post should provide no comment in response
to press inquiries, unless otherwise instructed by
the Department.
¶33. (C) Post must consult with the Department
prior to responding to congressional inquiries on
specific walk-in cases.
Section D. REQUIREMENTS FOR REPORTING ON WALK-INS
¶34. (S/NF) If a walk-in is of intelligence
interest, the case will be handled by the
Intelligence Community (IC) once that interest is
established, and reporting on the case will occur
in IC channels. Post must notify the Department of
all/all cases not handled within the IC and
involving the following, using the reporting
channels described in paragraphs 37-39 below except
where otherwise indicated:
(a) A person who may have information on immediate
threats to USG personnel or facilities. See
paragraph 35 below for reporting channel
instructions.
(b) A person who possesses information regarding
plans and intentions of governments and/or
organizations hostile to the United States.
(c) A person who may have information on weapons
proliferation, weapons of mass destruction,
counterterrorism, counternarcotics, or any
significant new intelligence or military-related
subjects.
(d) A foreign diplomat, foreign consular officer,
other foreign government official (including
members of the national police and the military),
or political party official, regardless of his/her
country of nationality.
(e) A person who appears threatened by involuntary
repatriation to a country where the person's life
or freedom would be threatened for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion, or where it is
more likely than not that the person would be
tortured. See paragraph 36 below for reporting
channel instructions.
(f) Persons seeking resettlement (including
"asylum") in the United States. See Section E
(paragraphs 40-52) below and Ref E for additional
guidance on such cases.
(g) Persons granted temporary refuge. See
paragraphs 50-52 for instructions on reporting such
cases.
¶35. (S/NF) Security threat information reportable
per paragraph 34(a) above should be reported via
TERREP or TERREP exclusive channel telegram (as
appropriate) as soon as possible. Threat
information of an extremely urgent nature should be
provided to the RSO and other appropriate post
officials immediately and relayed to the DS Command
Center (DSCC) at (571) 345-3146 or via DSCC secure
line at (571) 345-7793.
¶36. (S/NF) Cases involving threats of involuntary
return as described in paragraph 34(e) above should
be brought to the Department's attention
immediately, by phone, email or cable slugged for
PRM/A, with U.S. Mission Geneva, attention Refugee
and Migration Affairs (RMA), as an info addressee.
¶37. (S/NF) Except as specified above for threat
and involuntary return cases, telegrams should be
sent through normal channels, be slugged for
INR/CCS, P, DS/CI, and the appropriate regional
bureau, and describe the time-sensitivity of the
case. INR/CCS is the action office and will
distribute to other bureaus as appropriate. In
extremely sensitive cases, post should send a Roger
Channel telegram to INR/CCS, which will ensure
appropriate, limited distribution.
¶38. (S/NF) If the case may require consideration
of U.S. resettlement options, posts may also wish
to slug PRM/A, DRL/MLGA, L/HRR, and CA/VO, and to
add DHS/USCIS WASHDC as an info addressee.
¶39. (S/NF) All telegrams should use the PINR and
ASEC tags. CVIS and PREF tags also should be used
in potential resettlement cases. All telegrams
referring to UNHCR should add U.S. Mission Geneva,
attention Refugee and Migration Affairs (RMA), as
an info addressee.
Section E. TEMPORARY REFUGE - CAUTIONS AND
GUIDANCE
¶40. (S/NF) Walk-ins sometimes request that they be
permitted to remain in an embassy or other USG
facility beyond closing hours. The Department
considers this a request for temporary refuge, not
a request for asylum, and post officials should be
particularly careful not to equate the two. In
U.S. immigration law, asylum is a status granted to
qualified refugees, and an application for "asylum"
can only be made in the United States. A walk-in
may request "asylum" in an embassy based on the
erroneous belief that safe passage out of the host
country will be assured if the request is granted.
While a few mostly Latin American countries
recognize such a right of "diplomatic asylum," the
United States and most other countries do not
recognize that concept or accept that the granting
of refuge in an embassy is an authorized use of
diplomatic facilities. A walk-in who requests
"asylum" may also in substance be requesting an
opportunity to resettle in the United States;
guidance on such requests is below under long-term
options.
¶41. (S/NF) Granting a walk-in temporary refuge in
an embassy or other USG facility may actually
increase the danger to an individual, particularly
in hostile countries and if the individual is a
host-country national. The longer the person
remains, the more likely the host government will
become aware of the request for temporary refuge
and possibly take retaliatory action. In hostile
countries, the United States generally is unable
either to assure a walk-in's safe conduct out of
the country or continued safety in the country once
they leave post premises. Thus granting temporary
refuge may lead to a protracted stalemate, with the
walk-in effectively residing in post premises.
"Residence within a post" of persons hostile to the
host government could be a continuing source of
controversy and lead to serious adverse effects on
U.S. interests and unexpected financial
implications for the post.
¶42. (U) In light of these factors, all foreign
national walk-ins seeking refuge in a USG facility
should be informed that post cannot ensure (a)
their safe conduct out of the host country; (b)
their future safety within the host country; or (c)
their entry into the United States. They should
also be informed that they may actually endanger
their own welfare or interests by remaining at
post.
¶43. (S/NF) Temporary refuge may never be granted
to foreign nationals who simply wish to immigrate
to the United States or evade local criminal law;
if granting refuge would put post security in
jeopardy; or if the Department instructs post not
to do so.
¶44. (S/NF) Post should use appropriate measures to
remove a person seeking refuge from the premises
when temporary refuge is not warranted.
¶45. (S/NF) Only the COM or Principal Officer, or a
person designated to act on their behalf in their
absence, may grant a request for temporary refuge.
¶46. (S/NF) Temporary refuge may be granted only if
there is compelling evidence that the walk-in is in
imminent physical danger for any reason, or in
imminent danger of persecution for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion.
¶47. (S/NF) Within the kinds of cases described in
paragraph 46, post should grant temporary refuge in
those rare situations in which an individual faces
not just imminent physical danger, but immediate
and exceptionally grave physical danger, i.e.,
possible death or serious bodily injury, either in
the host country or in another country to which the
individual will be summarily returned by host-
country authorities.
¶48. (S/NF) Also within the kinds of cases
described in paragraph 46, post may at its
discretion grant temporary refuge if the physical
danger or the danger of involuntary repatriation as
defined above is less serious but appears imminent.
In determining if granting temporary refuge is
appropriate in such instances, post should consider
the following questions:
(a) How serious and immediate is the threat to the
walk-in?
(b) Will the threat to the individual increase or
decrease if the walk-in is allowed to remain at
post?
(c) Can the individual leave or be required to
leave post without being noticed?
(d) If detection by host government authorities is
inevitable and the alleged threat is from the host
government, can the walk-in's presence and
subsequent departure be explained in a manner that
will not further endanger the individual?
(e) What are the likely consequences of allowing
the individual to temporarily remain at the post
with regards to the individual, other persons in
the host country, the security of the post, and the
safety of U.S. Government personnel?
(f) Is the individual of intelligence value to the
United States?
(g) Is the person facing immediate and
exceptionally grave physical danger on account of
peaceful political, religious, or humanitarian
activities consistent with U.S. values and
policies?
¶49. (C/NF) Temporary refuge generally should not
be granted at residential diplomatic or consular
premises. The inviolability of diplomatic
residences (except the COM's) is linked to the
diplomat's residency and may be lost if the host
government declares persona non grata (PNG) the
diplomat whose residence is involved. Consular
residences do not enjoy inviolability (unless it is
provided by special agreement). As a practical
matter all residences, whether diplomatic or
consular, are generally less secure than the
embassy or consulate.
¶50. (C) If temporary refuge is granted, post
should notify the Department in an appropriately
classified "NIACT Immediate" precedence telegram
and should notify other relevant overseas posts by
immediate precedence telegram. Telegrams to the
Department should be slugged for INR/CCS, P, PRM/A,
L/HRR, L/DL, DSCC, DRL/MLGA, CA/VO, and the
appropriate regional bureau. DHS/USCIS WASHDC
should be a direct telegraphic info addressee.
Post also should notify the Department by telegram
if temporary refuge is requested but denied, unless
the case is clearly without merit, e.g., appeals by
a drunken or deranged person.
¶51. (S/NF) If the host government (or the
government of the alien's nationality, if the
individual is a third-country national) requests an
interview with a walk-in who is granted temporary
refuge, post should notify the Department and await
guidance. Post should not/not comply with such
interview requests unless explicitly authorized to
do so by the Department.
¶52. (SBU) If granted, temporary refuge should be
terminated as soon as circumstances permit (e.g.,
when the period of active danger ends), but only
with Department authorization. Post management
should inform the Department (to the same
addressees listed in paragraph 50) when temporary
refuge is terminated. A person who has been
granted temporary refuge may, of course, leave
voluntarily whenever he/she wishes. Post
management should reasonably ensure that the
decision to leave is voluntary.
Section F. LONG-TERM OPTIONS
¶53. (U) Walk-ins often wish to resettle in the
United States, but this may not be appropriate or
possible. The United States encourages local or
regional resettlement of refugees and international
resettlement burden-sharing among many governments.
¶54. (C/NF) In routine cases involving walk-ins
from third countries who may be refugees, the walk-
in should be referred to the host government for
adjudication of his or her status as long as the
host country has satisfactory asylum or refugee-
processing procedures. In most cases, potential
refugees should also be referred to the local
office of the UNHCR, especially if local
refugee/asylum procedures are not available. UNHCR
is mandated to provide protection for refugees and
has primary international responsibility for
seeking durable solutions for refugees, including
possible opportunities for third-country
resettlement. This mandate extends to UNHCR even
in countries that are not party to any of the
treaties just mentioned. Where there is no UNHCR
office, UNHCR's responsibilities are normally
handled by the local UNDP office. Beware, however,
that in some countries UNHCR (or UNDP) may be
placed in an awkward position if it is notified of
a case and there is a need to conceal the case from
the host government. If this possibility exists,
post should approach UNHCR or UNDP discreetly.
¶55. (C/NF) If it appears that entry into the
United States is the appropriate long-term solution
to a walk-in's situation, the walk-in should not be
issued a non-immigrant visa except in unusual
circumstances after consultation with the
Department. Non-immigrant admission will generally
not be appropriate because the circumstances that
lead an individual to become a walk-in normally
lead also to ineligibility under section 214(b) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) as an
intending immigrant. Admission to the United
States therefore normally should be as a refugee or
parolee. In some circumstances an immigrant visa
may also be available.
REFUGEE ADMISSION
¶56. (U) A person outside the United States may be
granted refugee admission if he or she qualifies as
a "refugee" as defined in U.S. law and meets other
applicable requirements. DHS has sole
responsibility for adjudicating applications for
refugee admission outside the United States.
DHS/USCIS officers determine whether or not an
individual is a refugee on a case-by-case basis
after a personal interview. To qualify, a person
must normally be outside his country. Given
adequate justification, however, DHS may adjudicate
an "in country" refugee application when requested
by a U.S. Ambassador with the concurrence of PRM/A
and DHS/USCIS in Washington. See Ref F, entitled
"How a post can refer cases to the U.S. refugee
admissions program", and Ref G, entitled "Worldwide
processing priority system for FY 2010", for more
information.
¶57. (U) The U.S. definition of "refugee"
encompasses a person who, under the 1951 Convention
relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967
Protocol, is outside his or her country of
nationality (or, if he or she has no nationality,
the country of last habitual residence) and has
experienced past persecution or has a well-founded
fear of persecution in that country on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion.
U.S. law deems the following persons to have been
persecuted on account of political opinion: a
person who has been forced to abort a pregnancy or
to undergo involuntary sterilization, or who has
been persecuted for failure or refusal to undergo
such a procedure, or for other resistance to a
coercive population control program; a person who
has a well-founded fear that he or she will be
forced to undergo such a procedure or be persecuted
for such failure, refusal, or resistance.
¶58. (U) Persons admitted to the United States as
refugees are eligible for initial reception and
placement assistance from non-government
organizations (NGOs) funded under cooperative
agreements with PRM and for other publicly funded
benefits.
¶59. (U) If the host government cannot or will not
protect the individual from involuntary
repatriation and UNHCR is unable to intervene, and
post believes that the person may qualify as a
refugee, post should contact PRM/A for guidance on
how to proceed.
PAROLE
¶60. (S/NF) Foreign nationals may also travel to
the United States pursuant to the Secretary of
Homeland Security's parole authority under Section
212(d)(5) of the INA. Parole may be granted based
on humanitarian or significant public benefit
grounds. Authority over humanitarian parole
requests rests with DHS/USCIS/RAIO/HAB. Authority
over Significant Public Benefit Parole (SPBP) rests
with DHS/ICE. DHS/ICE/OIA-LEPB has developed
guidelines in consultation with the Department for
the processing of SPBP cases. Guidelines for both
types of parole are contained in Ref H.
¶61. (S/NF) Use of parole for a walk-in may be
warranted in extraordinary cases, such as when no
other resolution appears feasible and a walk-in is
of special interest to the United States, when a
walk-in is in immediate danger, or when the case is
politically sensitive. If post wishes to pursue
parole for a walk-in, it must submit a request by
telegram, slugged for INR/CCS, CA/VO/F/P, DRL/MLGA,
P, and the appropriate regional bureau. An info
copy should go to the appropriate DHS bureau. The
telegram must provide justification for the
request; include a certification by the COM or the
Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) that the information
provided is complete and accurate; and identify all
interested agencies at post that were involved in
reviewing and endorsing the request. A "CLASS"
name check must be completed, and all required
Security Advisory Opinion requests (SAOs) must be
submitted. The results of the "CLASS" name check
should be indicated in the cable.
¶62. (U) All financial arrangements for parolees
must be made in advance. Post should not make any
guarantees of such assistance, but should maintain
a list of possible local sponsors that might be
willing to assist (e.g., church groups or social
service agencies in the United States), to contact
in urgent situations if the parolee first agrees
and signs a statement authorizing disclosure of
his/her identity and situation to persons outside
the U.S. Government. In some cases the Department
may also be able to help by contacting private
organizations in the United States to assist
parolees upon arrival.
DEFECTORS
¶63. (S/NF) For the purpose of this telegram, the
term "defector" refers to a person of any
nationality (usually from a country whose interests
are hostile or inimical to those of the United
States) who has escaped from the control of their
home country and is of special interest to the U.S.
Government. Defector cases generally are handled
under parole procedures. The GRPO will work out
these arrangements with DHS/ICE and/or post's
consular section once Washington's approval is
obtained. The LEGATT should be notified of
defector status as soon as practicable.
Section G. TRAVEL ASSISTANCE
¶64. (S/NF) If the appropriate agencies decide that
a walk-in should be allowed to travel to the United
States (in any of the capacities described above),
transportation out of the host country and to the
United States must be arranged. Transportation out
of friendly countries should not pose a problem.
Post should take appropriate steps, in coordination
with the host government, to ensure that the
individual is permitted to travel and protected
from possible adverse actions (e.g., by their
country of nationality). If the individual lacks
means to pay for transportation, post should
consult with the Department regarding options.
Approved refugees are eligible for a transportation
loan administered by the International Organization
for Migration (IOM) (the recipient will be
responsible for eventual repayment). In
exceptional circumstances, USG-funded
transportation assistance for parolees may also be
possible through IOM. Requests for such assistance
should be sent to the Department (specifically
PRM/A) for consideration.
¶65. (S/NF) In unfriendly countries, transportation
out of the country may prove impossible or
impractical. In such cases, the individual should
be informed that if he/she makes their way to a
more friendly country, the United States will
consider them for admission. To the extent
possible without compromising the confidentiality
of the individual's request, post should monitor
the situation and ensure that, if the individual
leaves the country, he/she is met by USG or UNHCR
officials at the first possible transit point.
¶66. (U) Minimize considered.
CLINTON