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Viewing cable 09BERLIN1106, CHANCELLOR ANGELA "TEFLON" MERKEL TAKES LIMELIGHT
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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|
09BERLIN1106 | 2009-09-09 16:04 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Berlin |
VZCZCXRO1733
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHRL #1106/01 2521657
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 091657Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5130
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNFRG/FRG COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BERLIN 001106
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/09/2019
TAGS: GM PREL PGOV
SUBJECT: CHANCELLOR ANGELA "TEFLON" MERKEL TAKES LIMELIGHT
AS FDP WAITS IN THE WINGS
Classified By: MINISTER COUNSELOR FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS GEORGE GLASS FO
R REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)
SUMMARY
-------
¶1. (C) Less than two weeks after her party suffered losses
in two state elections, CDU Chancellor Angela Merkel found
her fighting spirit before 8,000 party faithful at a
September 6 election rally in Duesseldorf launching the "hot
phase" of the CDU/CSU electoral campaign. The CDU has been
shifting party tactics after its losses in the August 30
elections in Saarland and Thuringia, where the Social
Democratic Party (SPD) may now be in a position to form
coalitions with the Left Party. Merkel -- to great applause
-- focused in on the specter of a so-called red-red
government composed of the SPD and The Left Party. She
described the SPD as suffering from an "identity crisis," and
needing a vacation from political decision-making and time in
opposition. Along with the entire CDU leadership and
incumbent CDU/CSU Ministers-president, Merkel made her case
for a CDU/CSU coalition with the pro-business but socially
liberal FDP. She repeated the CDU/CSU's election mantra: "we
have the strength" throughout her speech, aiming to convince
the German electorate that a strong CDU/CSU is required for
Germany to emerge from its worst economic recession in
post-war history. CDU views on whether the issue of
Germany's role in Afghanistan would become a more prominent
campaign theme were mixed.
¶2. (C) With three weeks to go before the parliamentary
elections, all signs point to Chancellor Merkel returning to
office, although she and her party recognize that they face a
difficult campaign. It remains uncertain whether the CDU and
the FDP will gain enough support to form a majority
coalition. If not, another Grand Coalition (CDU/CSU-SPD) is
very likely; other options require a three-party
constellation that would force the ill-suited Greens and FDP
to work together. But, there seems to be an almost one
hundred percent certainty -- given the SPD's chronic slump in
the polls and limited coalition options -- that SPD Foreign
Minister and Chancellor-candidate Frank Walter Steinmeier
will not become Chancellor. End summary.
MERKEL CASTS ASIDE SPD, EMBRACES FDP
------------------------------------
¶3. (C) Chancellor Merkel -- to rapturous cries of "Angie,
Angie" and a standing ovation -- took to the floor at her
party's September 6 rally before some 8,000 supporters
affirming that the CDU/CSU "have the best chance to win the
parliamentary elections" but also cautioning that "the
election's outcome has not yet been decided." On the one
hand, she praised her Grand Coalition government's record,
noting its success in countering Germany's economic and
financial crisis. On the other hand, she called for a new
CDU/CSU coalition with the FDP after the upcoming elections--
casting aside the SPD. She asserted that such a coalition
would anchor Germany in the "middle" of the political
spectrum and take the country out of its current economic
crisis faster. Merkel said: "Our country needs a government
that will support growth, security and work for everyone."
In a swipe at the SPD (COMMENT: Merkel never mentioned
Steinmeier by name. END COMMENT.), she said the party is
currently plagued by an "identity crisis," adding that, "The
SPD is devoid of any reality and is distraught." She asked,
"How can a party that achieved 10, 18, and 24 percent at the
recent state elections in Saxony, Thuringia, and Saarland be
taken seriously?" Dismissing SPD warnings against a
so-called "black-yellow" (CDU/CSU-FDP) coalition, Merkel said
that the country should be more worried about the SPD's plans
to form coalitions with The Left Party on the state and
federal levels. (Note: The SPD has warned that a
black-yellow coalition would represent wealthy Germany and
business interest at the expense of the middle and lower
classes.)
¶4. (U) CDU leaders also tried to cast the CDU at the state
level in a positive light after its poor showing in the
Saarland and Thuringia state elections on August, causing the
Minister President of the latter state to resign. Lower
Saxony's CDU Minister President Christian Wulff asserted that
the most prosperous and successful "Laender" (states) in
Germany are those ruled by the CDU/CSU and FDP. He cited
Berlin, governed by SPD Mayor Klaus Wowereit's Berlin (NOTE:
in Berlin the SPD rules with The Left Party. END NOTE), as
being the worst case. Hesse's Minister President Roland Koch
-- to great applause -- noted that he could not understand
how the SPD could possibly cooperate on a state or national
level with a Left Party that is "anti-American and
anti-European." (Note: In Saarland and Thuringia the option
BERLIN 00001106 002 OF 003
exists for the SPD to form a governing coalition with the
Left Party. END NOTE.)
CSU Truce with FDP?
-------------------
¶5. (C) CSU Bavarian Minister-President Horst Seehofer threw
his party's support behind a CDU/CSU coalition with the FDP,
despite his well-publicized doubts about the FDP's real
coalition intentions after the parliamentary elections. Even
as Seehofer pronounced his support for the FDP in
Duesseldorf, however, media reports from Munich confirmed
that the CSU had decided to continue attacking the FDP. The
CSU has been buffing its economic bona fides by attacking the
FDP on its own themes while basking in the reflected glory
from popular Economics Minister zu Guttenberg, the new CSU
champion. Seehofer has publicly suspected that FDP Chairman
Guido Westerwelle -- in an attempt to enter government at all
costs -- might support a "traffic light" coalition with the
SPD and the Greens, although this political constellation
appears unlikely at present. In addition, Bavarian politics
trump national politics, especially during a time when the
CSU longs for the days when their party alone wielded
political power in Munich, rather than as it does today, in a
coalition with the FDP. Seehofer is also aware that the CSU
needs to be strong and the FDP proportionally more weak for
the CSU to win more and better ministerial posts in a
CDU/CSU-FDP coalition. He did not use his appearance in
Duesseldorf to chide the FDP, to the great delight of those
pleading that recent CDU/CSU-FDP bickering had been harmful
and counter-productive during the campaign.
AFGHANISTAN - A DOMESTIC CAMPAIGN ISSUE?
----------------------------------------
¶6. (C) The September 4 air strike against two fuel tankers
near Kunduz, Afghanistan hit the press right before the
CDU/CSU rally. In light of the German media's frenzy, PolOff
asked the CDU's Head of International Relations Klemens
Moemkes whether Germany's ISAF commitment might emerge as a
potential domestic campaign issue. Moemkes noted that the
SPD could make Afghanistan an issue but this would be very
odd given Foreign Minister Steinmeier's support for Germany's
military role in ISAF. However, the prospect of Afghanistan
becoming a major theme clearly had the CDU's xxxxx
spooked. He told PolOff that it would be very difficult for
the Chancellor not to address Germany's role in Afghanistan
in the coming weeks. Given the German public's overwhelming
support for a withdrawal of German troops from Afghanistan,
this was not an issue the Chancellor wanted to address in the
run-up to the parliamentary elections.
COMMENT
-------
¶7. (C) While it is all but certain that Chancellor Merkel
will return to office as Chancellor after the next
parliamentary elections on September 27, it is too close to
call whether she will achieve a coalition with the FDP.
Bavarian MP Seehofer's attacks on the FDP in Bavaria could
weaken that party there and further undermine the chances of
a coalition. The FDP wants the same but political bickering
over future ministerial positions and CSU attacks on the FDP
in Bavaria and on FDP Chairman Guido Westerwelle suggest that
a possible CDU/CSU-FDP coalition will not be a marriage made
in heaven. Some FDP contacts admit that they harbor doubts
about the Chancellor's promise to form a coalition with the
FDP. They insinuate that in reality she may prefer another
Grand Coalition with the SPD, although Chancellor Merkel has
used every public opportunity to advertise for a CDU/CSU-FDP
coalition. Backing down on this pledge would call into
question her reputation.
¶8. (C) Paradoxically, however, it is the CDU/CSU's relative
weakness in the polls (35-36 percent) that threatens a
possible CDU/CSU-FDP coalition. The FDP is clearly riding on
a high with double-digit successes in the state elections of
Saarland, Saxony, and Thuringia, but this may not be enough.
The CDU refuses to engage in any self-introspection after its
defeats in Saarland and Thuringia and the party can really
only take comfort from the SPD's perennial weakness. The
fear in the CDU is acute that the Chancellor's high
popularity ratings may not be enough to ensure a comfortable
win for the CDU/CSU at the parliamentary elections.
¶9. (C) Merkel, once again, vehemently denies any intention
to form a Grand Coalition with the SPD but the electoral math
on September 27 may force her -- despite intense CDU/CSU
reservations, not to mention those of the German public -- to
look at the SPD as a partner. As for the SPD, Steinmeier is
BERLIN 00001106 003 OF 003
looking desperate. The SPD has failed to reach over 25
percent in the last six elections and Steinmeier's unlikely
path to the chancellorship is only possible if he reneges on
a campaign promise not to form a coalition with The Left
Party. This will not happen in 2009 but the CDU/CSU will not
tire of raising the fear of a red-red coalition in 2009 or in
¶2013. The Chancellor appears to be in a win-win situation
but three weeks on the campaign trail can be an eternity.
End comment.
Murphy