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Viewing cable 07BERLIN242, AL-MASRI CASE -- CHANCELLERY AWARE OF USG CONCERNS
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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|
07BERLIN242 | 2007-02-06 17:05 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Berlin |
VZCZCXYZ0015
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHRL #0242 0371748
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 061748Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6940
S E C R E T BERLIN 000242
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
FOR S/ES-O, EUR AND L
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2017
TAGS: KJUS PTER PREL PGOV GM
SUBJECT: AL-MASRI CASE -- CHANCELLERY AWARE OF USG CONCERNS
REF: A. BERLIN 230
¶B. BERLIN 200
Classified By: DCM John M. Koenig for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (S/NF) In a February 6 discussion with German Deputy
National Security Adviser Rolf Nikel, the DCM reiterated our
strong concerns about the possible issuance of international
arrest warrants in the al-Masri case. The DCM noted that the
reports in the German media of the discussion on the issue
between the Secretary and FM Steinmeier in Washington were
not accurate, in that the media reports suggest the USG was
not troubled by developments in the al-Masri case. The DCM
emphasized that this was not the case and that issuance of
international arrest warrants would have a negative impact on
our bilateral relationship. He reminded Nikel of the
repercussions to U.S.-Italian bilateral relations in the wake
of a similar move by Italian authorities last year.
¶2. (S/NF) The DCM pointed out that our intention was not to
threaten Germany, but rather to urge that the German
Government weigh carefully at every step of the way the
implications for relations with the U.S. We of course
recognized the independence of the German judiciary, but
noted that a decision to issue international arrest warrants
or extradition requests would require the concurrence of the
German Federal Government, specifically the MFA and the
Ministry of Justice (MOJ). The DCM said our initial
indications had been that the German federal authorities
would not allow the warrants to be issued, but that
subsequent contacts led us to believe this was not the case.
¶3. (S/NF) Nikel also underscored the independence of the
German judiciary, but confirmed that the MFA and MOJ would
have a procedural role to play. He said the case was subject
to political, as well as judicial, scrutiny. From a judicial
standpoint, the facts are clear, and the Munich prosecutor
has acted correctly. Politically speaking, said Nikel,
Germany would have to examine the implications for relations
with the U.S. At the same time, he noted our political
differences about how the global war on terrorism should be
waged, for example on the appropriateness of the Guantanamo
facility and the alleged use of renditions.
¶4. (S/NF) Nikel also cited intense pressure from the
Bundestag and the German media. The German federal
Government must consider the "entire political context," said
Nikel. He assured the DCM that the Chancellery is well aware
of the bilateral political implications of the case, but
added that this case "will not be easy." The Chancellery
would nonetheless try to be as constructive as possible.
¶5. (S/NF) The DCM pointed out that the USG would likewise
have a difficult time in managing domestic political
implications if international arrest warrants are issued. He
reiterated our concerns and expressed the hope that the
Chancellery would keep us informed of further developments in
the case, so as to avoid surprises. Nikel undertook to do
so, but reiterated that he could not, at this point "promise
that everything will turn out well."
TIMKEN JR