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Viewing cable 10STATE10900, S) ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR CHINA ON THE
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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|
10STATE10900 | 2010-02-03 15:03 | SECRET | Secretary of State |
VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHC #0900 0341556
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 031549Z FEB 10
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0000
INFO MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
S E C R E T STATE 010900
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/2035
TAGS: MTCRE PARM PREL MNUC ETTC KSCA IR CH MY
SUBJECT: (S) ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR CHINA ON THE
MALAYSIA-BASED COMPANY ELECTRONICS COMPONENT LIMITED
REF: A. 09 STATE 130917
¶B. 09 BEIJING 003476
Classified By: ISN/MTR DIRECTOR PAM DURHAM, REASON: 1.4 (C).
¶1. (U) This is an action request. Embassy Beijing, please
see paragraph 4.
¶2. (S) Background/Objective: In December 2009, the United
States shared with China information regarding attempts by
the Malaysia-based firm Electronics Component Limited (ECL)
to buy TRS-500 gyroscopes from the Chinese firm VibTel
Industrial Co. Inc. (Ref A). These gyroscopes, which are
controlled by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)
and China's missile-related export controls, would be
suitable for use in the guidance systems of ballistic
missiles, cruise missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles. We
requested China investigate this information because ECL is
associated with a network of Iranian-controlled front
companies that procure sensitive goods on behalf of a number
of Iranian entities of proliferation concern.
¶3. (S) Chinese officials agreed to investigate this
information, but asked for additional details on ECL's
relationships with firms in Iran (Ref B). To support their
efforts in this case, we would like to inform them that ECL
is part of a network of Iranian-controlled front companies
that includes the Iranian firm Shahin Sefid Esta and the
Malaysia-based front company Skylife Worldwide Sdn Bhd. This
network procures sensitive goods on behalf of a number of
Iranian entities of proliferation concern, including the
United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR)
1737-designated entities Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group
(SHIG) and Ya Mahdi Industries. We want to provide this
information to Chinese officials and emphasize that we
believe the transfer of this controlled equipment to a
company linked to UNSCR-designated entities would be
prohibited pursuant to UNSCR 1737.
¶4. (S) Action Request: Request Embassy Beijing approach
appropriate host government officials to deliver talking
points/non-paper in paragraph 5 below and report response.
Talking points also may be provided as a non-paper.
¶5. (S) Begin talking points/non-paper:
(SECRET//REL CHINA)
--In December 2009, we shared with you information regarding
attempts by the Malaysia-based firm Electronics Component
Limited (ECL) to buy TRS-500 gyroscopes from the Chinese firm
VibTel Industrial Co. Inc.
--TRS-500 gyroscopes are controlled by the Missile Technology
Control Regime (MTCR) and China's missile-related export
controls, and can be used in the guidance systems of
ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and unmanned aerial
vehicles.
--We also noted that ECL is associated with a network of
Iranian-controlled front companies that procure sensitive
goods on behalf of a number of Iranian entities of
proliferation concern.
--In response to this information, you agreed to look into
this matter, but asked if the United States could provide
additional details on ECL's relationships with firms in Iran.
--We now want to provide you with additional information
indicating that ECL is part of a network of
Iranian-controlled front companies that includes the Iranian
firm Shahin Sefid Esta and the Malaysia-based front company
Skylife Worldwide Sdn Bhd.
--This network procures sensitive goods on behalf of a number
of Iranian entities of proliferation concern, including the
Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG), which is Iran's
primary developer of liquid propellant ballistic missiles,
and Heavy Metal Industries, a front company for the tactical
missile developer Ya Mahdi Industries.
--Both SHIG and Ya Mahdi Industries are sanctioned under
United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1737.
--Additionally, the TRS-500 gyroscopes are controlled items
that would be prohibited from being exported to Iran under
UNSCR 1737.
--We hope this information is useful in supporting your
efforts in this case and assists your ability to prevent the
transfer of these gyroscopes by VibTel Industrial Co. to ECL.
--We look forward to future cooperation on nonproliferation
issues and to hearing the results of your investigation into
this activity at the earliest possible time.
End talking points/non-paper
¶6. (U) Washington POC is ISN/MTR John Paul Herrmann (Phone:
202-647-1430). Please slug any reporting on this issue for
ISN/MTR and EAP/CM.
¶7. (U) A word version of this document will be posted at
www.state.sgov.gov/demarche.
CLINTON