

(U) NEAR EAST

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)

Huthi Spokesman Receives Update on Saudi Negotiating Positions

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) Huthi spokesman Muhammad Abd-al-Salam in mid-February received an update on Saudi negotiating positions with the Huthis. This update included directives from Saudi Ambassador to Yemen Muhammad Al Jabir to examine two options for the payment of Yemeni salaries that would exclude paying Huthi military salaries. The first option would be to pay public sector salaries based on the 2014 rosters for both Huthi- and Republic of Yemen-controlled areas for 2 months during the initial phase of a cease-fire agreement. The rest of the employees would receive payment during the "second phase," and these payments would begin during the fourth month of sovereign state revenues. For the second option, the Saudis could pay half of the salaries of public sector employees based on the 2014 budget during the initial phase. Once the Joint Economic Steering Committee completed determining Yemeni sovereign revenues and its review of employee rosters, full salary payments would be provided for all employees. Abd-al-Salam learned that because the Saudis expected the Huthis to make additional demands regardless of what proposal the Saudis presented to them, the Saudis were preparing a variety of different options for the proposal. A Huthi intelligence source apparently assessed that if the Huthis issued a "strong statement," it would increase pressure on the Saudis, as the Saudis intended to drag out negotiations and avoid making firm commitments. The consultant warned that the Huthis' patience was "misunderstood," and that the Saudis hoped to gradually decrease Huthi demands based on the belief that the Huthis were under pressure and in need of a détente on humanitarian issues before the beginning of Ramadan on 22 March.

(U) 3/00/121184-23

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)

Jordanian Government Officials, Orange Telecommunications Representatives Discuss 5G Bids

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) A Jordanian Royal Hashemite Court official exchanged updates on 26 February with a representative from the Orange Jordan telecommunications company on the status of Orange Jordan's selection of a provider for its rollout of 5G infrastructure in Jordan. According to the Orange Jordan representative, the bids they received from Ericsson and Nokia were \$61 to \$62 million higher than the bid they received from Chinese technology company Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. Furthermore, Nokia had not bridged the gap in bids for Orange Jordan as it had reportedly done for Jordanian telecommunications provider Zain. A likely Jordanian intelligence official was working to reduce the bid disparity and negotiate compensation with Ericsson and Nokia. The Orange Jordan representative remained optimistic that the disparity in bids could be reduced and that a solution would be found. Additionally, Jordanian government officials met the previous week to form a task force to handle matters related to the 5G bids, and additional meetings took place with the participation of the Jordanian Minister of Justice and the Jordanian Telecommunications Regulatory Commission to discuss the legal framework of related matters. The Orange CEO planned to meet with Ericsson representatives in Spain later that week.

(U) 3/55/121356-23

(U) AFRICA

(TS//SI-G//OC/NF/FISA)

UN Secretary-General Revels in Successful AU Summit

(TS//SI-G//OC/NF/FISA) UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres in mid-February revealed in what he considered a successful AU Summit. Guterres on 19 February updated the UN Deputy Secretary-General (DSG) on his perceived successes with regards to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, and Kenya, among other issues. In addition, Guterres and the DSG conversed about Africa and the Americas, the EU, Ukraine, Russia, Syria, Afghanistan, the G20, and climate change. Regarding the DRC, Guterres claimed that he managed to reconcile the UN Stabilization Mission in the DRC and DRC President Felix Tshisekedi. Guterres claimed that Tshisekedi loved his presentation to the AU Peace and Security Council, which Guterres followed up with separate meetings with Rwandan President Paul Kagame and Kenyan President William Ruto to further advance discussions on the DRC. Guterres added that Tshisekedi trusted Angolan President Joao Lourenco, but that Tshisekedi did not trust Ruto. Tshisekedi apparently wanted the mediation to be led by Angola but

**(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA) BURKINA FASO/COTE D'IVOIRE/MALI/
RUSSIA: ABIDJAN ASSESSES THREAT OF VAGNER PRESENCE ACROSS
BORDER; VAGNER STRENGTH IN MALI GROWS**

On 13 February, an Ivoirian Ministry of Interior and Security official assessed Russian private military company Vagner could use its presence in Burkina Faso and Mali to destabilize Cote d'Ivoire, according to signals intelligence. Separately, on 26 February, a Vagner employee reported to an associate the total number of Vagner contractors located in Mali had risen to 1,645. (CIA Intel Update, 28 Feb; 3/50/120952-23; 3/50/121089-23)

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

(S//NF) BOLIVIA: PRESIDENT WEAKENING DEMOCRACY

President Luis Arce is sidelining human rights observers, imprisoning opposition figures, and manipulating the timing of Bolivia's census to consolidate his political power and prevent competitive elections, accelerating democratic erosion in the country. Arce, who was handpicked by party heavyweight former President Morales, garnered support from his own faction within the Movement Toward Socialism and is probably taking these steps to shore up the party's dominance before elections in October 2025. Arce may be willing to curb future attempts to neuter the opposition if the US pressed him or Brazilian President Lula reached out to him, but Arce would probably resist reversing the steps he has already taken. (WIRe2023-02046)

CYBER

(S//NF) CHINA: SURVEILLANCE EQUIPMENT IN DOD SUPPLY CHAINS

Chinese state-owned video surveillance equipment maker Hikvision, which partners with Chinese intelligence entities, is using relationships with resellers to disguise its products for sale to government suppliers, which probably is creating vectors for Beijing to compromise DoD networks. This is consistent with DIA's October 2019 assessment that Hikvision products—banned by the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act—probably would persist in DoD supply chains because of the company's efforts to mask its exports to retain access to US and allies' markets. As of January 2023, white-labeled Hikvision products were still available to US Government customers. (DIA F 24NYH A)



Global Highlights (U)

Terrorism | ISIS Senior Leader Killed in Syria (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

On 24 Feb, ISIS senior leader and global administrator Abu Sara al-Iraqi was reportedly killed in Syria. Abu Sara was the last known figure with at least 3 years of executive experience in ISIS and a direct connection to previous senior leaders; since mid-2020, he led ISIS's General Directorate of Provinces and influenced its strategy, personnel assignments, and most sensitive global operations. (TS//SI//OC/NF)

- Abu Sara joined ISIS's predecessor organization in 2005 and had advised senior ISIS leaders since at least 2018, including former caliphs; he provided attack guidance to ISIS's 36 branches and networks (TS//SI//OC/REL TO USA, FVEY)
- Abu Sara directed financial transfers to regional offices for attack operations; in late Aug 2021, he directed the transfer of \$500k to ISIS in Afghanistan (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)

J2 ASSESSMENT: Abu Sara's removal very likely will disrupt ISIS's global cohesion, security, and financial transfers for at least the next 3 months. ISIS likely will rely on its archived institutional knowledge and a new leadership cadre who lack extensive relationships with the group's legacy senior leaders. (TS//SI//OC/NF)

(U) Coordinated with DIA (DCT, MARC), JSOC, NGA, NGIC, NSA, USCENTCOM, USEUCOM, USSOCOM
PCN: DIA_F_24OR2_A

PRC | LHA-31 Completes First Operational Activity (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

In late Feb, the PLAN's YUSHEN LHA-31 completed its inaugural naval activity after certifying in Nov 2022. Task Group-31 returned from the first extended area deployment (EAD) of 2023; this was the first EAD to integrate an LHA and the first time an LHA exited the First Island Chain. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

- The YUSHEN LHA is able to perform a variety of missions to include amphibious assault and HADR operations; it has similar missions and loadout capacity as the YUZHAO LPD, but its larger flight deck and aircraft hanger decks enable it to carry a much larger complement of helicopters (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
- Task Group-31 sailed as far east as the U.S. territory of Wake Island and conducted multiship AD exercises and emission control drills (S//NF)

J2 ASSESSMENT: The PLA very likely will utilize the increased air support capability and extensive medical facilities of the YUSHEN LHAs in amphibious exercises throughout the 2023 training cycle. Additionally, LHA participation in EADs likely increases opportunities for the PLA to incorporate expeditionary and HADR training with lift support and equipment. (S//NF)

(U) Coordinated with DIA (CMG), USINDOPACOM
PCN: DIA_F_24ON5_A

Graphic: (TS//SI//OC/NF)

ABU SARA AL-IRAQI



Potential successors who worked directly with Abu Sara include: spokesman Abu al-Fida and senior Syria-based leader Hudhayfah al-Shami.

Graphic: (TS//SI//OC/NF)

Classified By: Director for Intelligence, J2, FW74803
Derived From: Multiple Sources
Declassify On: 50X1-HUM

Graphic: (S//NF)

1k	55
Troops	Light amphibious tanks*
24	Helicopters
3	OOB
3	YUYI LCMA Landing Craft

*With loaded well deck and main deck

Graphic: (S//NF)

Classified By: Director for Intelligence, J2, FW74803
Derived From: Multiple Sources
Declassify On: 20481231

(TS//SI//NF) CHINA: PROBABLY DEVELOPING CYBER ATTACK CAPABILITIES THAT WILL THREATEN WESTERN SATELLITE SYSTEMS

The IC assesses China is developing cyber-attack capabilities to deny, exploit, and hijack satellite links and networks as part of its strategy to control information, which it considers a key warfighting domain. China's ability to infiltrate a core network or mimic a specific command link could allow it to seize control of a satellite, rendering it ineffective to support communications, weapons, or intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems. (CIA-DA-IA-2023-01779)

TOP SECRET//SI-GAMMA//ORCON//NOFORN//FISA
(TS//SI-G//OC//REL TO USA, FVEY)

Russian Officials Consider Response to Mogul Prigozhin's Public Accusations Regarding Munitions

(TS//SI-G//OC//REL TO USA, FVEY) Following a slew of public accusations from Russian mogul Yevgeniy Prigozhin in which he claimed his private military company (PMC) Wagner forces in Ukraine were not receiving munitions from the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), MoD officials in mid- to late February were considering what actions to take in response. The officials initially noted that, if the MoD was going to try to counter Prigozhin's public statements, they should find allies of equal status to fight Prigozhin rather than doing so itself; however, they were ultimately unsure how the MoD could successfully fight an information war with Prigozhin if the Russian government did not forbid Prigozhin from making public releases. The MoD officials also noted they could not decisively say whether or not Wagner was receiving munitions, acknowledging that Prigozhin's claims could be legitimate. They noted that Wagner's munitions were not distributed directly from the MoD but instead through the Grouping of Troops (Forces) in Bakhmut, Ukraine. Some MoD officials eventually proposed doubling the munitions supply to Wagner and then release public messaging of that fact. Later, Wagner affiliate Vladislav Andriyevskiy on 22 February indicated that Prigozhin was called into a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu, presumably that day. (COMMENT: The meeting almost certainly concerned, at least in part, Prigozhin's public accusations and resulting tension with Shoygu.) Separately, Federal Security Service officials in late February determined that Wagner's requests for munitions were fulfilled—though not in full—through 11 February; however, on 12 February Chief of the General Staff Valeriy Gerasimov reportedly ordered a stop to munitions supplies for Wagner and also to planned military transport flights, which were set to transport munitions designated for Wagner to Rostov-na-Donu, Russia.

(U) G/00/121475-23

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)

Russian Embassy in Austria Officials Claim U.S. Preventing Peace Talks in Ukraine

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) Aleksandr Zhuravlev, deputy director of the Russian Science and Culture Center in Austria and a second secretary at the Russian Embassy in Austria, made light of the Austrian government's decision to expel four Russian officials in early February and claimed the U.S. was preventing peace talks in Ukraine. Zhuravlev on 18 February noted that he agreed with the lighthearted assessment of his colleague, Moscow-based Sergey Sorokin, that the Austrian expulsion of four Russian officials met the Austrian expulsion quota for the year. Sorokin recalled that Austria also expelled four Russians in 2022. Zhuravlev reported that he believed Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs Alexander Schalenberg was "scrutinizing" the Russians in Austria. He also reported rumors that stated the conflict in Ukraine reached a point where Ukraine and Russia decided to "forget it," put things on hold, and negotiate, but that "the Americans" were not allowing anyone to talk with the Russians. Zhuravlev and Sorokin also noted that the exchange rate for U.S. dollars (USDs) on the black market in Russia was not terrible since one could buy \$1.00 for between 77 and 80 Russian rubles (between \$1.05 and \$1.09). Official bank rates were apparently not as favorable and USDs were hard to find in Moscow.

(U) 3/Z1/121393-23

(TS//SI-G//OC//NF//FISA)

SBU Chairman Claims Strike on Russian A-50 Aircraft in Belarus Conducted By Belarusian Opposition

(TS//SI-G//OC//NF//FISA) Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) Chairman Vasyl Malyuk in late February claimed that although the SBU wanted to strike a Russian A-50 AWACS in Belarus, possibly an SBU agent in Belarus conducted the strike on 26 February despite Malyuk's order not to do so. Malyuk was initially planning to strike the aircraft with an anti-missile system, but instead delivered combat UAVs to the area, noting that SBU had an agent there. He assured Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Presidential Office Chief of Staff Andriy Yermak prior to the strike that, if no Belarusians were harmed, the strike would be seen as legitimate sabotage directed at the Russians. Zelenskyy and Yermak, however, were concerned that an SBU strike would give Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka a reason to join Russia's war against Ukraine. After the aircraft was struck, Malyuk claimed that it was an agent in Belarus—possibly the SBU agent Malyuk previously referenced—who decided on his own to strike the aircraft. Malyuk assured Zelenskyy and Yermak that the SBU was ordered not to strike it and likely could not be connected to the strike.

(U) Z-G/00/121322-23

(U) RUSSIA

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) Russian PMC Vagner Officials Pursue Weapons Procurements from Turkey, Belarus, PRC, Syria

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) Russian private military company (PMC) Vagner arranged in early February for a meeting between Vagner personnel and Turkish contacts to coordinate the purchase of Turkish weapons and equipment, likely for use in Mali, Ukraine, or both. Vagner coordinated with Turkish contacts to send five affiliates to Ankara, Turkey, seeking to obtain UAVs (including quadcopters), EW systems, counter-battery systems, howitzer artillery, and optical instruments. Vagner's Turkish contacts revealed the inability to export some requested weapons and equipment, such as howitzers, counter-battery systems, and certain unspecified counter-drone weapons. According to Prigozhin affiliates, Malian Transition President Assimi Goita was involved in efforts to acquire weapons from Turkey for Vagner's interests. Additionally, Vagner personnel sought munitions and equipment in early 2023 from Belarus, the PRC, and Syria. Belarus already delivered 50 percent of unspecified weapons promised as of early January and offered in late January to send 300,000 VOG-17 grenade launcher rounds. The PRC had not sent Vagner any weapons, not even for testing, and had no contact with Vagner regarding weapons deliveries as of early January. Finally, Vagner purchased six SPG-9 grenade launchers and 180 grenades in Syria on Prigozhin's orders, but personnel were uncertain where they would be sent beyond Syria.

(U) 3/00/121157-23

(U) CHINA

(TS//SI-G//OC/REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA) PRC Foreign Affairs Officials Characterize International Reaction to HAB Incident as Impartial

(TS//SI-G//OC/REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA) PRC foreign affairs officials in February characterized the international community's reaction to the high-altitude balloon (HAB) incident as impartial and advised PRC diplomatic missions to counter perceived U.S. efforts to escalate the issue and influence public opinion. Although some countries reportedly took sides regarding the incident, the officials indicated that countries generally were more concerned about the stability of the PRC-U.S. relationship, which the international community allegedly criticized as being weak. The officials maintained that the HAB was a civilian air vehicle that did not pose a threat and that the U.S. response was an overreaction, claiming that the U.S. sought to sensationalize the incident to undermine the PRC. To prevent this, the foreign affairs officials recommended that PRC diplomatic missions clarify the alleged facts of the incident, expose U.S. hypocrisy by citing instances of U.S. surveillance operations, and highlight the impact of domestic U.S. politics on the U.S. response to the HAB.

(U) G/00/121516-23

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA) German MoD Rejects Deeper Cooperation With PRC Until PRC Becomes More Transparent

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA) The German Federal Ministry of Defense (MoD)'s Policy Directorate on 20 February hosted Defense Staff Talks with its PRC counterpart in Berlin. The Chief of the German MoD's Policy Division responsible for defense relations with the PRC asserted that Germany and the PRC agreed to hold another joint seminar at the German Federal Academy of Security Policy in Berlin and to work toward cooperative military assistance in support of the UN. The Germans, however, made clear to the PRC delegation that no further defense cooperation would be possible until Beijing became more open and transparent. The Germans were aware that the PRC was waging "a charm offensive" in Europe in the face of heavy U.S. pressure, and the Germans believed that they maintained solidarity with the U.S. by refusing more significant defense cooperation with the PRC. Separately, the German MoD sought to establish similar Staff Talks with the Indian MoD between 2020 and 2022, but to no avail.

(U) 3/00/121295-23



UK/PRC | Competing UK Visions for Counter-PRC Policy in Indo-Pacific (S//NF)


SECRET//NOFORN

ICOD: 28 0515 EST February 2023
PCN: DIA_F_2407N_A

In early Feb, UK DefMin Wallace tasked the MOD to explore the option to forward-deploy one of the UK's two Royal Navy aircraft carriers to the Indo-Pacific after 2025. However, the main opposition party has differing security priorities. (S//NF)

All: (S//NF)

Wallace's tasking calls for exploring the establishment of a jointly operated and forward-deployed carrier with Japan or the ROK or seeking U.S. permission to base a carrier in Japan with the U.S. Seventh Fleet; the Royal Navy currently has an access agreement at the British Defence Singapore Support Unit (BDSSU).



RULING CONSERVATIVE PARTY: EXPLORING EXPANDED COUNTER-PRC POLICY



- Wallace asserts that a persistent Indo-Pacific presence brings more value than episodic carrier visits
- Perceives an enduring UK naval presence as the long-term solution over sporadic deployments in the AOR

OPPOSITION LABOUR PARTY: SIGNALING PULLBACK ON COUNTER-PRC EFFORTS



- Shadow DefMin Healey laid out Labour's defense policy, which prioritizes European defense at the expense of an increased Indo-Pacific presence
- Agreed the PRC is a "systemic challenge" but argued against relying on deployment as the primary response due to resource constraints

PRC RESPONSE



- The PRC perceives the current UK government as "anti-China," but has limited its criticism as it conducts a charm offensive
- Beijing has reacted most harshly to regional military deals and deployments, including the 2021 HMS Queen Elizabeth CSG deployment and the AUKUS agreement

PRC RESPONSE



- The PRC has not reacted to the Labour policy, but state media historically has written more favorable articles about Labour than Conservative leaders

All: (S//NF)

ASSESSMENT: Wallace's exploratory directive signals the current administration remains committed to the Indo-Pacific tilt; however, defense budget strains, logistic hurdles, and manpower shortages likely would preclude forward basing options until at least 2025. Beijing likely would view a permanent CSG deployment as a failure of its UK policy while viewing a Labour-led pullback as a success. (S//NF)

(U) Coordinated with DIA (CMG, EERC), USEUCOM, USINDOPACOM

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA) An Ivorian Ministry of Interior and Security official on 13 February assessed Russian private military company Wagner could use its presence in Burkina Faso and Mali to destabilize Cote d'Ivoire, according to a signals intelligence report. Separately, a Wagner employee on 26 February reported to an associate the total number of Wagner contractors located in Mali had risen to 1,645, according to a signals intelligence report.^[6](3/50/120952-23)^[7]
(3/50/121089-23)

Belarus, Russia, Turkey: Turkish Companies Helped Minsk Evade Sanctions on Russian Trade (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) The Turkish trade attache in Belarus in October and November 2022 reported that Turkish companies purchased sanctioned goods from Belarus and sold them in European markets, resold goods from Europe to Russia, and used certain banks to mitigate the effects of Turkey's placement on the Financial Action Task Force grey list, according to a signals intelligence report.^[8](3/00/121111-23)

Israel, Turkey: Ankara Supports Bilateral Relations, Energy Cooperation With Jerusalem (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA)

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA) Turkish President Erdogan in mid-February stated Ankara would work with Israel to transfer Israeli natural gas to Europe, according to a signals intelligence report. Additionally, Erdogan encouraged collaboration between the two countries' foreign ministries.^[9](3/00/121022-23)

China, Jordan: Amman Attempts Damage Control After 5G Rollout Causes Friction With Huawei, Beijing
(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) The Jordanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in late February planned to assure Beijing that Amman wanted to continue their economic relationship after Beijing had reportedly complained Chinese companies were excluded from Jordan's 5G rollout, according to a signals intelligence report. Additionally, two of the three major Jordanian telecommunications operators had already eliminated Huawei from consideration.^[10](3/55/120969-23)

(TS//SI-G//OC/NF/FISA) RUSSIA: UN SECRETARY GENERAL ACCOMMODATING RUSSIA TO PRESERVE GRAIN DEAL

UN Secretary General Guterres is taking steps to accommodate Russia in an effort to protect the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI), which he considers a pivotal UN success and key to addressing global food insecurity, and his actions are undermining broader efforts to hold Moscow accountable for its actions in Ukraine. In early February, he urged Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov in a letter to renew the BSGI before its term expires on 18 March and Guterres emphasized his efforts to improve Russia's ability to export, even if that involves sanctioned Russian entities or individuals, according to FISA-derived signal intelligence. (WIRe2023-00815)

(S//NF) EU/UK: REACH AGREEMENT ON NORTHERN IRELAND

The agreement between the European Commission and the UK Government yesterday to modify the contentious Northern Ireland Protocol paves the way for improved relations between the UK and the EU, but it might fall short of restoring the Northern Ireland Executive. UK Prime Minister Sunak and European Commission President von der Leyen agreed to the Windsor Framework, which includes easing customs and regulatory checks on some goods moving between Great Britain and Northern Ireland and creating a greater role for the Northern Ireland government to weigh in on changes to EU laws affecting Northern Ireland.

- Northern Ireland Democratic Unionist Party leader Jeffrey Donaldson is probably inclined to accept the agreement, but hardliners in his party may hold him back.
- If the Democratic Unionist Party rejects the framework, the UK Government will probably call new elections in Northern Ireland—in the hope that moderate unionist voters punish Democratic Unionist Party intransigence—rather than jeopardize the agreement with the EU. (EU-UK EU, 28 Feb)

AFRICA

(U//FOUO) NIGERIA: INEC ANNOUNCES LEAD FOR RULING PARTY CANDIDATE, CONTINUES VOTE COUNTING

On 27 February, Nigeria's Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) continued counting votes from the 25 February presidential election and said so far ruling party candidate Tinubu had won 3.8 million votes and five states, opposition candidate Atiku had won 3 million votes and six states, and candidate Obi had won 1.6 million votes and three states, according to OSE reporting. Additionally, Tinubu publicly accepted his loss of Lagos State, where he had been governor from 1999 to 2007, to Obi. (CIA Intel Update, 28 Feb; EUW2023022805090399)

(TS//SI-G//OC/NF) RUSSIA/UKRAINE: FSB CLAIMS DEFENSE MINISTRY

UNDERREPORTING RUSSIAN CASUALTIES

Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) accused the Defense Ministry of obfuscating Russian casualties in Ukraine, highlighting the continuing reluctance of military officials to convey bad news up the chain of command. On 21 February, FSB officials claimed the Defense Ministry was excluding the deaths of soldiers fighting with the Russian National Guard, Vagner, Chechen leader Kadyrov's mercenaries, and other unofficial organizations. They calculated the actual number of Russians wounded and killed in action was closer to 110,000.

- The combination of high casualties, particularly along the Bakhmut axis, and inability to recruit more prisoners will probably force Vagner to draw down offensive operations after its eventual capture of Bakhmut.
- Vagner remains barred from restarting its recruiting of Russian prisoners and the company continues to struggle to replace losses via other recruitment pipelines.

(Russia-Ukraine EU, 28 Feb)

**(TS//SI-G//OC/NF/FISA) RUSSIA/BELARUS/UKRAINE: SBU CHAIRMAN CLAIMS
BELARUSIAN OPPOSITION CONDUCTED STRIKE ON RUSSIAN AIRCRAFT**

As of 27 February, Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) Chairman Malyuk claimed that, although the SBU had wanted to strike a Russian A-50 AWACS in Belarus, Belarusian partisans conducted the strike. Malyuk assured Ukrainian President Zelenskyy and Presidential Office Chief of Staff Yermak prior to the strike that, if no Belarusian was harmed, the strike would be seen as legitimate sabotage directed at the Russians. Zelenskyy and Yermak, however, were concerned an SBU strike would give Belarusian President Lukashenka a reason to join Russia's war against Ukraine. After the aircraft was struck, Malyuk claimed a local Belarusian opposition figure decided on his own to strike the aircraft. (Z-G/00/121322-23)

**(TS//HCS-P//SI-G//OC/NF/FISA) RUSSIA/UKRAINE: NATIONAL GUARD
PERSONNEL SHORTAGES IMPEDE OCCUPATION PLANS**

Russian National Guard personnel shortfalls in Ukraine will probably hinder Moscow's attempts to fully secure all of its annexed territories. In August, the Russian National Guard had at least 27,500 troops in Ukraine and has since suffered significant personnel losses. National Guard units have taken on numerous additional missions to hold territory behind the frontline of Russian forces in Ukraine, amplifying their personnel needs. (WIRe2023-01665)

upcoming preparatory meeting in March. Finally, Bibang Nchuchuma observed that Africa has "turned into a pretty girl with many suitors" with the U.S. and the West wanting to win over the "pretty girl."

(U) 3/IR/120965-23

(U) LATIN AMERICA

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA)

Colombian President Signs Cease-Fire Protocols Decree for Peace Talks With FARC-EP

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA) Colombian President Gustavo Francisco Petro Urrego as of mid-February signed the cease-fire protocols, which would facilitate peace talks with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People's Army (FARC-EP), though capture orders for the planned FARC-EP attendees remained in place. The FARC-EP's planned attendees remained on standby to relay their pick-up coordinates, though would continue moving to avoid death or capture until the capture orders were lifted and the signed cease-fire protocols were initiated. Meanwhile, the FARC-EP and the Colombian Armed Forces (COLAR) each claimed the other organization violated the cease-fire initiative and sought to meet in Cauca Department, Colombia to present evidence of the violations. The Colombian Ministry of Defense also initiated an investigation into an incident that occurred in Puerto Rico, Argelia, Cauca, which almost certainly involved the FARC-EP and the COLAR. The FARC-EP Western Joint Command (WJC) as of mid-February also persisted in attacking unidentified targets, switching from engaging in open-combat to conducting small raids. The switch in tactics resulted in multiple successful raids. The WJC also intended to solicit evidence from the local populace to prove their allegations that the COLAR collaborated with the FARC-Segunda Marquetalia and the National Liberation Army to attack the FARC-EP.

(U) 3/05/121275-23

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA)

GRULAC Invited to Meet With PRC Official Regarding Strategic Partnership in Latin America

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA) UN Group of Latin American and Caribbean Countries (GRULAC) member representatives in China were invited to meet with PRC Minister of Agriculture and Rural Affairs Tang Renjian in late March to discuss China's strategic partnership with Latin America and the Caribbean. Uruguayan Ambassador to China Fernando Lugris on 22 February informed GRULAC representatives that Tang planned to meet with any interested GRULAC representatives on 27 March. The purpose of the meeting was for GRULAC representatives to better understand Tang's views on China's strategic cooperative partnership with Latin America and the Caribbean, especially on matters related to agricultural cooperation. The meeting was scheduled to take place at the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences. As of 27 February, there was no indication as to which GRULAC member representatives, if any, accepted the invitation to attend the event.

(U) 3/OT/121407-23

NEAR EAST

(S//NF) ISRAEL/PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES: VIOLENCE INTENSIFIES

Ongoing unrest in the West Bank will probably continue to intensify and put at risk an agreement the Israeli Government and the Palestinian Authority reached in Al 'Aqabah, Jordan, on 26 February to reduce tension. After the parties signed the agreement—which included commitments to deescalate and address key issues, including Israeli unilateral raids into the West Bank—Israeli settlers attacked Huwwarah village near Nablus in the northern West Bank in response to a Palestinian killing two Israelis there earlier that day. On 27 February, an unidentified shooter killed an Israeli-American citizen near Jericho. Israeli and Palestinian Authority operations to locate Palestinian militants in the West Bank are ongoing, and additional Israeli settler and Palestinian reprisals are likely in the coming days.

- The continuing violence is likely to put pressure on Jerusalem to abandon the deal reached in Al 'Aqabah. Israeli officials will probably regard the recent Palestinian attacks as justification acting unilaterally and without notice to the Palestinian Authority.
- HAMAS blamed the Israeli Government for the settler violence and warned of unspecified consequences for policies supporting the building of Israeli settlements in the West Bank. Militant groups in the Gaza Strip are probably considering responding to Israeli-instigated violence by launching small-scale rocket attacks into Israel.

(Near East EU, 28 Feb)

(S//HCS-P//OC-USGOV/NF) JORDAN/CHINA/US: AMMAN FACING PRESSURE FROM THE PRC IN 5G DECISION

Jordanian Crown Prince Hussein, who is leading Jordan's 5G wireless technology effort, is wavering on Amman's assurance to Washington that its mobile network operators will not choose Huawei for their 5G networks, almost certainly because he is worried about the possibility of the PRC retaliating against Jordan's economy. In mid-February, Hussein said that while he and Jordanian King Abdallah II prefer to keep Huawei out of Jordan's 5G networks, Jordan needs financial assistance to close the gap between Huawei and a non-Huawei vendor.

(Near East EU, 28 Feb)



Global Highlights ^(U)

UAE | Negotiating Weapons Repair Facility With Russia ^(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)

In early Feb, a Russian defense firm reviewed a draft agreement to build a regional maintenance center in the UAE for Abu Dhabi's inventory of PANTSIR SA-22 AD systems, KORNET ATGMs, SA-24 MANPADS, and BMP-3 IFVs. By 2017, Abu Dhabi's warranty for its Russia-origin SA-22 systems had expired, creating gaps in expertise and vulnerabilities to defend against aerial threats. ^(TS//SI//NF)

- The regional maintenance center draft agreement included future plans to broaden access to service the Russia-origin equipment inventories of other countries ^(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA)
- Early 2022: The UAE signed a \$1.5B deal to modernize its 41 SA-22s to the more capable S1M variant systems by 2030 and included a phased upgrade for an initial tranche of 15 SA-22s in Russia ^(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)

J2 ASSESSMENT: The planned facility likely represents a complementary UAE effort to ensure modernization of its defense equipment, in addition to sending SA-22s to Russia for upgrades. The UAE likely aims to gain technical expertise for more sustainable domestic repair solutions that advance its aspirations of becoming a regional defense hub. ^(TS//SI//NF)

^(U) Coordinated with DIA (DRI, EERC, MARC), NGA, USCENTCOM
PCN: DIA_F_24OLT_A

UAE'S INVENTORY OF RUSSIA-ORIGIN EQUIPMENT ^(U)

Graphic: ^(TS//SI//TK//NF/FISA)

	INVENTORY	RANGE
SA-22 AD	42	20km
KORNET ATGM	800	10km
SA-24 MANPADS	36 launchers 193 missiles	6.5km
BMP-3 IFVS	707	N/A

Graphic: ^(TS//SI//TK//NF/FISA)

Classified By: Director for Intelligence, J2, FW74803
Derived From: Multiple Sources
Declassify On: 50X1-HUM

(U//FOUO) The below information is current as of 1200 ET/1700Z.

(U) RUSSIA/UKRAINE

(TS//SI-G//OC/REL TO USA, FVEY)

Russian GOU Provides Targeting Information for Oil Storage Facility for Potential Strikes

(TS//SI-G//OC/REL TO USA, FVEY) The Russian 3rd Directorate, Main Operations Directorate on 27 February provided targeting information for an oil storage facility and Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) equipment in Krivyi Rih, Ukraine that would be potentially struck on an unspecified date. The provided targeting information included the oil storage facility as well as UAF equipment located nearby. Additionally, a Russian Ministry of Defense official requested orders, further reconnaissance, and that the target coordinates be relayed to the Battlefield Command Group to destroy the target.

(U) G/RG/121340-23

(TS//SI-G//OC/REL TO USA, FVEY)

Russian GOU Reports Successful Operational Masking Operations in Belarus Against Ukraine

(TS//SI-G//OC/REL TO USA, FVEY) The Russian Main Operations Directorate (GOU) reported successful operational masking operations in Belarus against Ukraine between 3 and 10 February. The officials claimed they successfully convinced Ukrainian intelligence services of the possibility of a joint Russian-Belarusian offensive to occur from Belarusian territory. A Russian GOU official based this conclusion on a Russian Foreign Intelligence Service report on Ukrainian reactions to the deployment of Russian 6th Air Force and Air Defense Army units to airfields in Belarus, layering of air defense systems, transfer of Iskander-M divisions to Belarus and changing the focus of training activities from defensive to offensive. The Ukrainian Armed Forces reportedly considered the rotation of Russian military units and subunits of the 2nd Motorized Rifle Division (MSD) 1st Tank Army with the 6th MSD 3rd Army Corps as an attempt to covertly prepare combat-ready groups for rapid deployment in the Volynsk axis to disrupt support from Western countries. The Russian GOU recommended two phases of activity to further mislead Ukrainian forces about the possibility of offensive operations from Belarusian territory. The first phase would last until 6 March and the second from 6 to 11 March and plans for the two phases were being sent to the Belarusian Chief of General Staff for approval.

(U) G/00/121249-23

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)

Russian PMC Vagner to Resume Recruitment, Seek Medical Services for Project 42174 Prisoners

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) Russian private military company (PMC) Vagner planned in mid-February to resume its recruitment of prisoners for Project 42174, which is an ongoing Vagner effort to recruit, train, and integrate Russian convicts into Vagner units operating in Ukraine. Additionally, senior Vagner members would be dispatched to 70 prisoner unidentified distribution points in support of these efforts; meanwhile, the Russian Ministry of Defense was reportedly recalling its own recruiters from these locations. This planning occurred in tandem with attempts by senior Vagner members to address the disparities between the treatment of Vagner contractors wounded-in-action (WIA) and Project 42174 fighters WIA. Senior Vagner officials continued to advocate for equal treatment in regard to medical services rendered, while also updating the terms of the Project 42174 contracts to better address issues related to the WIA.

(U) 3/00/121297-23

(U) NEAR EAST

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)

Huthi Spokesman Receives Update on Saudi Negotiating Positions

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) Huthi spokesman Muhammad Abd-al-Salam in mid-February received an update on Saudi negotiating positions with the Huthis. This update included directives from Saudi Ambassador to Yemen Muhammad Al Jabir to examine two options for the payment of Yemeni salaries that would exclude paying Huthi military salaries. The first option would be to pay public sector salaries based on the 2014 rosters for both Huthi- and Republic of Yemen-controlled areas for 2 months during the initial phase of a cease-fire agreement. The rest of the employees would receive payment during the "second phase," and these payments would begin during the fourth month of sovereign state revenues. For the second option, the Saudis could pay half of the salaries of public sector employees based on the 2014 budget during the initial phase. Once the Joint Economic Steering Committee completed determining Yemeni sovereign revenues and its review of employee rosters, full salary payments would be provided for all employees. Abd-al-Salam learned that because the Saudis expected the Huthis to make additional demands regardless of what proposal the Saudis presented to them, the Saudis were preparing a variety of different options for the proposal. A Huthi intelligence source apparently assessed that if the Huthis issued a "strong statement," it would increase pressure on the Saudis, as the Saudis intended to drag out negotiations and avoid making firm commitments. The consultant warned that the Huthis' patience was "misunderstood," and that the Saudis hoped to gradually decrease Huthi demands based on the belief that the Huthis were under pressure and in need of a détente on humanitarian issues before the beginning of Ramadan on 22 March.

(U) 3/00/121184-23

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)

Jordanian Government Officials, Orange Telecommunications Representatives Discuss 5G Bids

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) A Jordanian Royal Hashemite Court official exchanged updates on 26 February with a representative from the Orange Jordan telecommunications company on the status of Orange Jordan's selection of a provider for its rollout of 5G infrastructure in Jordan. According to the Orange Jordan representative, the bids they received from Ericsson and Nokia were \$61 to \$62 million higher than the bid they received from Chinese technology company Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. Furthermore, Nokia had not bridged the gap in bids for Orange Jordan as it had reportedly done for Jordanian telecommunications provider Zain. A likely Jordanian intelligence official was working to reduce the bid disparity and negotiate compensation with Ericsson and Nokia. The Orange Jordan representative remained optimistic that the disparity in bids could be reduced and that a solution would be found. Additionally, Jordanian government officials met the previous week to form a task force to handle matters related to the 5G bids, and additional meetings took place with the participation of the Jordanian Minister of Justice and the Jordanian Telecommunications Regulatory Commission to discuss the legal framework of related matters. The Orange CEO planned to meet with Ericsson representatives in Spain later that week.

(U) 3/55/121356-23

(U) AFRICA

(TS//SI-G//OC/NF/FISA)

UN Secretary-General Revels in Successful AU Summit

(TS//SI-G//OC/NF/FISA) UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres in mid-February revealed in what he considered a successful AU Summit. Guterres on 19 February updated the UN Deputy Secretary-General (DSG) on his perceived successes with regards to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, and Kenya, among other issues. In addition, Guterres and the DSG conversed about Africa and the Americas, the EU, Ukraine, Russia, Syria, Afghanistan, the G20, and climate change. Regarding the DRC, Guterres claimed that he managed to reconcile the UN Stabilization Mission in the DRC and DRC President Felix Tshisekedi. Guterres claimed that Tshisekedi loved his presentation to the AU Peace and Security Council, which Guterres followed up with separate meetings with Rwandan President Paul Kagame and Kenyan President William Ruto to further advance discussions on the DRC. Guterres added that Tshisekedi trusted Angolan President Joao Lourenco, but that Tshisekedi did not trust Ruto. Tshisekedi apparently wanted the mediation to be led by Angola but

TOP SECRET//SI-GAMMA//ORCON//NOFORN//FISA
(TS//SI-G//OC//REL TO USA, FVEY)

Russian Officials Consider Response to Mogul Prigozhin's Public Accusations Regarding Munitions

(TS//SI-G//OC//REL TO USA, FVEY) Following a slew of public accusations from Russian mogul Yevgeniy Prigozhin in which he claimed his private military company (PMC) Wagner forces in Ukraine were not receiving munitions from the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), MoD officials in mid- to late February were considering what actions to take in response. The officials initially noted that, if the MoD was going to try to counter Prigozhin's public statements, they should find allies of equal status to fight Prigozhin rather than doing so itself; however, they were ultimately unsure how the MoD could successfully fight an information war with Prigozhin if the Russian government did not forbid Prigozhin from making public releases. The MoD officials also noted they could not decisively say whether or not Wagner was receiving munitions, acknowledging that Prigozhin's claims could be legitimate. They noted that Wagner's munitions were not distributed directly from the MoD but instead through the Grouping of Troops (Forces) in Bakhmut, Ukraine. Some MoD officials eventually proposed doubling the munitions supply to Wagner and then release public messaging of that fact. Later, Wagner affiliate Vladislav Andriyevskiy on 22 February indicated that Prigozhin was called into a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu, presumably that day. (COMMENT: The meeting almost certainly concerned, at least in part, Prigozhin's public accusations and resulting tension with Shoygu.) Separately, Federal Security Service officials in late February determined that Wagner's requests for munitions were fulfilled—though not in full—through 11 February; however, on 12 February Chief of the General Staff Valeriy Gerasimov reportedly ordered a stop to munitions supplies for Wagner and also to planned military transport flights, which were set to transport munitions designated for Wagner to Rostov-na-Donu, Russia.

(U) G/00/121475-23

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)

Russian Embassy in Austria Officials Claim U.S. Preventing Peace Talks in Ukraine

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) Aleksandr Zhuravlev, deputy director of the Russian Science and Culture Center in Austria and a second secretary at the Russian Embassy in Austria, made light of the Austrian government's decision to expel four Russian officials in early February and claimed the U.S. was preventing peace talks in Ukraine. Zhuravlev on 18 February noted that he agreed with the lighthearted assessment of his colleague, Moscow-based Sergey Sorokin, that the Austrian expulsion of four Russian officials met the Austrian expulsion quota for the year. Sorokin recalled that Austria also expelled four Russians in 2022. Zhuravlev reported that he believed Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs Alexander Schalenberg was "scrutinizing" the Russians in Austria. He also reported rumors that stated the conflict in Ukraine reached a point where Ukraine and Russia decided to "forget it," put things on hold, and negotiate, but that "the Americans" were not allowing anyone to talk with the Russians. Zhuravlev and Sorokin also noted that the exchange rate for U.S. dollars (USDs) on the black market in Russia was not terrible since one could buy \$1.00 for between 77 and 80 Russian rubles (between \$1.05 and \$1.09). Official bank rates were apparently not as favorable and USDs were hard to find in Moscow.

(U) 3/Z1/121393-23

(TS//SI-G//OC//NF//FISA)

SBU Chairman Claims Strike on Russian A-50 Aircraft in Belarus Conducted By Belarusian Opposition

(TS//SI-G//OC//NF//FISA) Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) Chairman Vasyl Malyuk in late February claimed that although the SBU wanted to strike a Russian A-50 AWACS in Belarus, possibly an SBU agent in Belarus conducted the strike on 26 February despite Malyuk's order not to do so. Malyuk was initially planning to strike the aircraft with an anti-missile system, but instead delivered combat UAVs to the area, noting that SBU had an agent there. He assured Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Presidential Office Chief of Staff Andriy Yermak prior to the strike that, if no Belarusians were harmed, the strike would be seen as legitimate sabotage directed at the Russians. Zelenskyy and Yermak, however, were concerned that an SBU strike would give Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka a reason to join Russia's war against Ukraine. After the aircraft was struck, Malyuk claimed that it was an agent in Belarus—possibly the SBU agent Malyuk previously referenced—who decided on his own to strike the aircraft. Malyuk assured Zelenskyy and Yermak that the SBU was ordered not to strike it and likely could not be connected to the strike.

(U) Z-G/00/121322-23

TOP SECRET//SI-GAMMA//ORC

Guterres indicated that involving former Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta was unavoidable. Guterres believed that Ruto was smart but demanding of Tshisekedi, which Guterres believed was necessary. The DSG retorted that Ruto was ruthless and that she did not trust him. Guterres maintained that the DRC needed a small number of professional special forces units to fight effectively. As for negotiating a cease-fire, Guterres saw himself as an intermediary. For Ethiopia, Guterres acknowledged that Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali apologized to him for denying Guterres' planned trip to the Tigray region. Abiy apparently extended an invitation to Guterres to visit Tigray in the future. On Kenya, Guterres indicated that he had a good discussion with the Kenyans and believed that the issue of fertilizers, likely meaning Russian fertilizer exports to Africa, and Kenya was resolved. Finally, on Russia and Ukraine, Guterres was dismayed at EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen's announcement on the need for Europe to produce more weapons and ammunition, presumably as a result of the conflict in Ukraine.

(U) Z-G/00/121288-23

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA)

DRC ANR Official Assesses DRC Split From EAC, Suspects EAC of Destabilization Plot

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA) Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) National Intelligence Agency (ANR) Deputy Provincial Director in South Kivu Province Kwalezitome Lilungi Dodo in mid-February assessed that the East Africa Community (EAC) were complicit in the balkanization of the DRC, especially with reported inaction from Kenyan contingents of the EAC Regional Force (EACRF) among other events that have resulted in the EAC reportedly losing the trust of the DRC population. Lilungi believed the DRC should address the aggression by Rwanda and the March 23 Movement (M23) rebel group without including other EAC members. Lilungi on 13 February noted that DRC citizens acknowledged that the EACRF's Kenyan contingent hesitated to take military action against the M23. Lilungi assessed that the Kenyan contingents ignored the recommendations from the Nairobi dialogues between the DRC government and local armed groups, which stipulated that regional forces would be deployed to control and combat any aggression within the DRC. Lilungi argued there was no excuse for the delay in applying the resolutions while instead establishing buffer zones where DRC Armed Forces (FARDC) would be denied entry. Lilungi declared these zones to be contrary to Nairobi Process recommendations. Lilungi recalled that DRC President Felix Tshisekedi declared in a recent speech that only Congolese could help the Congolese against Rwanda and the M23. Lilungi further argued that the DRC needed to expel the Kenyan and Ugandan people's Defense Forces troops whom he assessed were working as part of the destabilization plot against the DRC; this would leave the Congolese to resolve this issue alone. (COMMENT: Lilungi has been an advocate of increasing the DRC's aggressiveness against M23 and Rwandan incursions into the DRC. Lilungi initially recommended using Mai-Mai armed groups and other rebels against M23 and Rwandan Defense Forces to overthrow Rwandan President Paul Kagame in late January. Lilungi almost certainly views the international community's presence in eastern DRC as a hindrance to the DRC's ability to provide security as the international community would disapprove of the DRC working with Mai-Mai groups. Lilungi was almost certainly insisting that the DRC should seek to expedite the departure of all international forces so that the DRC could handle its own security or consider other international partners for military support.)

(U) 3/00/121204-23

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)

Equatoguinean Official Stresses Importance of Security in Advance of Russia-Africa Summit

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) Equatorial Guinea's Minister of External Security Juan Antonio Bibang Nchuchuma stressed the importance of security as a theme for an upcoming preparatory meeting in advance of the July Russia-Africa Summit, and assessed that Russian security training was of a higher quality than that of the West, according to mid-February information. Equatoguinean Ambassador to Russia Luciano Ncogo Ndong Ayecaba on 11 February notified Bibang Nchuchuma that the four proposed themes for an upcoming gathering in mid- to late March to prepare for the upcoming Russia-Africa Summit were food security, energy security, public health issues, and human resources training. Bibang Nchuchuma surmised that food security was a product of energy security, which in turn was linked to the human resources issue and was therefore tied to the overall security of the African continent. Bibang Nchuchuma also noted that Russia and the U.S. were currently caught up in a "concurrent fight" in Africa due to the terrorism situation, which he believed was stirred up by the West to pressure African regimes. Moreover, Bibang Nchuchuma added that security training differed between Russia and the West, specifically calling out the Russian Special Forces training system as a higher-quality compared to the West due to its experience with training special counterterrorism units. As such, Ndong Ayecaba suggested that Equatorial Guinea add a fifth theme of fighting the neocolonialism of Western countries in Africa to the

TOP SECRET//SI-GAMMA//ORC

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Nigeria: INEC Announces Lead for Ruling Party Candidate, Continues Vote Counting (U//FOUO)

(U//FOUO) Nigeria's Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) on 27 February continued counting votes from the 25 February presidential election and said so far ruling party candidate Bola Tinubu had won 3.8 million votes and six states, opposition candidate Atiku Abubakar had won 3 million votes and five states, and candidate Peter Obi had won 1.1 million votes and three states, according to an OSE report. Additionally, Tinubu publicly accepted his loss of Lagos State, where he had been governor from 1999 to 2007, to Obi.[1](EUW2023022805090399)

Israel, Palestinian Territories: Netanyahu Denies Settlement Freeze, Deploys More Troops to West Bank (U//FOUO)

(U//FOUO) Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu on 27 February denied agreeing to pause settlement expansion in the West Bank despite a joint statement issued after a US-sponsored meeting between top Israeli and Palestinian officials on 26 February in Jordan, according to an OSE report. Separately, Jerusalem on 27 February deployed additional troops to the West Bank after new unrest resulted in the deaths of two Israelis and one Palestinian, according to an OSE report.[2](W2023022765287144)[3](IMW2023022774700345)

Israel: Deputy Minister Resigns Over Failure To Uphold Coalition Agreements (U//FOUO)

(U//FOUO) Deputy Minister and head of the Noam Party Maoz on 27 February resigned in protest of Prime Minister Netanyahu's "failure to fulfill coalition agreements," according to an OSE report. Additionally, Maoz stated there was "no real intention" to uphold the coalition agreement regarding the Jewish National Identity Authority.[4](LIW2023022771195902)

Russia, Ukraine: Wagner Plans To Resume Prisoner Recruitment (TS//SI-G//OC/NF)

(TS//SI-G//OC/NF) Russian private military company Wagner in mid-February planned to resume its recruitment of convicts for Wagner units deployed to Ukraine, according to a signals intelligence report. Additionally, Wagner owner Prigozhin wanted prisoners returning home to join the recruitment effort in place of recalled Ministry of Defense service members previously tasked with recruiting prisoners. [11](3/00/121297-23)

Mali, Russia, Turkey: Wagner Seeks Weapons From Ankara (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) Russian private military company Wagner personnel in early February met with Turkish contacts to purchase weapons and equipment from Turkey for Wagner's efforts in Mali and Ukraine, according to a signals intelligence report. Additionally, Malian Transition President Goita had confirmed that Mali could acquire weapons from Turkey on Wagner's behalf.[5](3/00/121157-23)

Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, Russia: Abidjan Assesses Threat of Wagner Presence Across Border; Wagner Strength in Mali Grows (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA)

(U) RUSSIA

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) Russian PMC Vagner Officials Pursue Weapons Procurements from Turkey, Belarus, PRC, Syria

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) Russian private military company (PMC) Vagner arranged in early February for a meeting between Vagner personnel and Turkish contacts to coordinate the purchase of Turkish weapons and equipment, likely for use in Mali, Ukraine, or both. Vagner coordinated with Turkish contacts to send five affiliates to Ankara, Turkey, seeking to obtain UAVs (including quadcopters), EW systems, counter-battery systems, howitzer artillery, and optical instruments. Vagner's Turkish contacts revealed the inability to export some requested weapons and equipment, such as howitzers, counter-battery systems, and certain unspecified counter-drone weapons. According to Prigozhin affiliates, Malian Transition President Assimi Goita was involved in efforts to acquire weapons from Turkey for Vagner's interests. Additionally, Vagner personnel sought munitions and equipment in early 2023 from Belarus, the PRC, and Syria. Belarus already delivered 50 percent of unspecified weapons promised as of early January and offered in late January to send 300,000 VOG-17 grenade launcher rounds. The PRC had not sent Vagner any weapons, not even for testing, and had no contact with Vagner regarding weapons deliveries as of early January. Finally, Vagner purchased six SPG-9 grenade launchers and 180 grenades in Syria on Prigozhin's orders, but personnel were uncertain where they would be sent beyond Syria.

(U) 3/00/121157-23

(U) CHINA

(TS//SI-G//OC/REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA) PRC Foreign Affairs Officials Characterize International Reaction to HAB Incident as Impartial

(TS//SI-G//OC/REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA) PRC foreign affairs officials in February characterized the international community's reaction to the high-altitude balloon (HAB) incident as impartial and advised PRC diplomatic missions to counter perceived U.S. efforts to escalate the issue and influence public opinion. Although some countries reportedly took sides regarding the incident, the officials indicated that countries generally were more concerned about the stability of the PRC-U.S. relationship, which the international community allegedly criticized as being weak. The officials maintained that the HAB was a civilian air vehicle that did not pose a threat and that the U.S. response was an overreaction, claiming that the U.S. sought to sensationalize the incident to undermine the PRC. To prevent this, the foreign affairs officials recommended that PRC diplomatic missions clarify the alleged facts of the incident, expose U.S. hypocrisy by citing instances of U.S. surveillance operations, and highlight the impact of domestic U.S. politics on the U.S. response to the HAB.

(U) G/00/121516-23

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA) German MoD Rejects Deeper Cooperation With PRC Until PRC Becomes More Transparent

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA) The German Federal Ministry of Defense (MoD)'s Policy Directorate on 20 February hosted Defense Staff Talks with its PRC counterpart in Berlin. The Chief of the German MoD's Policy Division responsible for defense relations with the PRC asserted that Germany and the PRC agreed to hold another joint seminar at the German Federal Academy of Security Policy in Berlin and to work toward cooperative military assistance in support of the UN. The Germans, however, made clear to the PRC delegation that no further defense cooperation would be possible until Beijing became more open and transparent. The Germans were aware that the PRC was waging "a charm offensive" in Europe in the face of heavy U.S. pressure, and the Germans believed that they maintained solidarity with the U.S. by refusing more significant defense cooperation with the PRC. Separately, the German MoD sought to establish similar Staff Talks with the Indian MoD between 2020 and 2022, but to no avail.

(U) 3/00/121295-23

(TS//SI//OC/NF) SYRIA: ISIS SENIOR LEADER KILLED IN SYRIA

On 24 February, ISIS senior leader and global administrator Abu Sara was reportedly killed in Syria. Abu Sara led ISIS's General Directorate of Provinces and influenced its strategy, personnel assignments, and most sensitive global operations. *J2 Assessment:* Abu Sara's removal very likely will disrupt ISIS's global cohesion, security, and financial transfers for at least the next 3 months. ISIS likely will rely on its archived institutional knowledge and a new leadership cadre who lack extensive relationships with the group's legacy senior leaders.
(DIA Intel Update, 28 Feb)

RUSSIA, EUROPE, & EURASIA

(TS//SI-G//OC/NF) RUSSIA/MOLDOVA/TURKEY: PLANNING FOR DESTABILIZATION OF MOLDOVA CONTINUES

At least some figures behind Russian plotting against Moldova intend to continue their efforts despite recent public revelations about their activities. The general director of the Russian private military company Vagney Strategy Services coordinated with an employee of Vagner-linked influence group, "The Farm," in mid-February to adjust their planning for likely destabilization activities in Moldova.

- The organizers originally planned to hold protest training in Turkey from 24 to 28 February but changed the location to an unspecified special training center in Russia because of travel restrictions and Turkish intelligence attention on Russian males. They also extended the total training time to one to two months.
- The employees said that more than 150 participants would attend the protest training, which would include lessons on starting protests, security service reaction to riots, first aid, and psychological training for what to do if caught. (Russia-Ukraine EU, 28 Feb)

(S//NF) RUSSIA/UKRAINE: BATTLEFIELD UPDATE

Russian forces made minor territorial gains around Bakhmut yesterday and continued to press Ukrainian forces elsewhere in the region, even as Ukraine expanded its access to key supply lines running westward out of the city. Separately, Russia conducted one-way UAV attacks against targets near Kyiv and Zhytomyr—all of which Ukraine claimed it intercepted—and against a Ukrainian military unit in western Ukraine, which killed two and injured three.
(Russia-Ukraine EU, 28 Feb)

upcoming preparatory meeting in March. Finally, Bibang Nchuchuma observed that Africa has "turned into a pretty girl with many suitors" with the U.S. and the West wanting to win over the "pretty girl."

(U) 3/IR/120965-23

(U) LATIN AMERICA

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA)

Colombian President Signs Cease-Fire Protocols Decree for Peace Talks With FARC-EP

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA) Colombian President Gustavo Francisco Petro Urrego as of mid-February signed the cease-fire protocols, which would facilitate peace talks with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People's Army (FARC-EP), though capture orders for the planned FARC-EP attendees remained in place. The FARC-EP's planned attendees remained on standby to relay their pick-up coordinates, though would continue moving to avoid death or capture until the capture orders were lifted and the signed cease-fire protocols were initiated. Meanwhile, the FARC-EP and the Colombian Armed Forces (COLAR) each claimed the other organization violated the cease-fire initiative and sought to meet in Cauca Department, Colombia to present evidence of the violations. The Colombian Ministry of Defense also initiated an investigation into an incident that occurred in Puerto Rico, Argelia, Cauca, which almost certainly involved the FARC-EP and the COLAR. The FARC-EP Western Joint Command (WJC) as of mid-February also persisted in attacking unidentified targets, switching from engaging in open-combat to conducting small raids. The switch in tactics resulted in multiple successful raids. The WJC also intended to solicit evidence from the local populace to prove their allegations that the COLAR collaborated with the FARC-Segunda Marquetalia and the National Liberation Army to attack the FARC-EP.

(U) 3/05/121275-23

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA)

GRULAC Invited to Meet With PRC Official Regarding Strategic Partnership in Latin America

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA) UN Group of Latin American and Caribbean Countries (GRULAC) member representatives in China were invited to meet with PRC Minister of Agriculture and Rural Affairs Tang Renjian in late March to discuss China's strategic partnership with Latin America and the Caribbean. Uruguayan Ambassador to China Fernando Lugris on 22 February informed GRULAC representatives that Tang planned to meet with any interested GRULAC representatives on 27 March. The purpose of the meeting was for GRULAC representatives to better understand Tang's views on China's strategic cooperative partnership with Latin America and the Caribbean, especially on matters related to agricultural cooperation. The meeting was scheduled to take place at the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences. As of 27 February, there was no indication as to which GRULAC member representatives, if any, accepted the invitation to attend the event.

(U) 3/OT/121407-23

(U//FOUO) CIA Operations Center Intelligence Update

TOP SECRET//SI//SI-G//ORCON//NOFORN//FISA

This version of CIA Operations Center Intelligence Update is from 04:42, 2 March 2023

How to print this Update

Russia: Defense Officials Contemplate Responses to Prigozhin's Claim of Not Receiving Munitions (TS//SI-G//OC/REL FVEY)

(TS//SI-G//OC/REL FVEY) Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) officials as of late February considered possible actions to counter Wagner owner Prigozhin's public accusations that the MOD was not supplying munitions to his troops in Ukraine, according to a signals intelligence report. Defense officials noted Prigozhin's allegations could be legitimate and proposed doubling munitions supplied to Wagner forces followed by a public statement.

[12](G//OO/121475-23)

Russia, Haiti: Wagner Seeks Possible Security Contracts With Port-au-Prince (S//NF/DSEN)

(S//NF/DSEN) Wagner associates as of late February planned to discreetly travel to Haiti to assess the potential for contracts with the Haitian Government to fight against local gangs, according to a law enforcement report. [13](DEA-NN-IIR-3998-23)

Hungary, US: Budapest Identifies Washington as Adversary (C//NF)

(C//NF) Hungarian Prime Minister Orban on 22 February identified the US as one of his party's top three adversaries during a political strategy session, according to the US Embassy in Budapest. *Comment: Orban's inclusion of the US in his list of top three adversaries constitutes an escalation of the level of anti-American rhetoric in his discourse.* [23 BUDAPEST 51]

Iran: Tehran Prepares for Early March SLV Launch (TS//SI//REL FVEY)

(TS//SI//REL FVEY) The IRGC Aerospace Force as of 28 February is was likely preparing to launch a Gha'em-100 space launch vehicle (SLV) equipped with a Nahid-1 satellite probably in early March, according to a signals intelligence report and imagery analysis. [3](3//OO/121457-23)[4](CA0045)

Iran: IAEA Rescinds Tehran's Voting Rights, Director To Visit Tehran for Enrichment Discussions (TS//SI//REL FVEY/FISA)

(TS//SI//REL FVEY/FISA) The IAEA as of late February informed Tehran it lost voting rights at the IAEA for 2023 due to errors in contributions in 2021 and 2022 and required Tehran to pay a sum more than \$1.4 million to restore its voting rights, according to a signals intelligence report. Separately, IAEA Director

Bakhmut Topographic Tactical Map


As of 01 0000 EST Mar 2023

0-170

- ### Bakhmut Axis
- UAF: 12 BDEs
- 12 BDEs (represented by green squares)

- ### Bakhmut Axis
- RF: 35 Total MVR Bns ~29,000 Total Russian Personnel
~7,000 Regular/Res, RLF, and TDF
~22,000 PMC Wagner
- 19 Combat Effective MVR Bns (regular and reserve)
 - 6 Combat Ineffective MVR Bns (regular and reserve)
 - 15 Combat Effective RLF Bns
 - 10 Combat Ineffective RLF Bns
 - 6 Combat Effective TDF Bns
 - 6 Combat Ineffective TDF Bns
 - 12 Wagner PMC DETs

- ### Distances
- Bakhmut to Soledar ~4 km (2.5 mi)
 - Soledar to Krasna Hora ~5 km (3 mi)
 - Krasna Hora to Bakhmut ~8 km (5 mi)
 - Bakhmut to Chasiv Yar ~12 km (7.5 mi)
 - Soledar to Siversk ~20 km (12 mi)
 - Siversk to Lyman ~25 km (15 mi)
 - Chasiv Yar to Kramatorsk ~25 km (15 mi)
 - Krasna Hora to Sloviansk ~35 km (22 mi)
 - Bakhmut to Kramatorsk ~80 km (48 mi)



Location: Bakhmut Area

Scale: 1:50,000

Copyright: 2012

Projection: UTM, Zone 18N

Source: SRTM30 PLUS

Scale: 1:50,000

Scale: 1:50,000

Scale: 1:50,000

Nigeria: INEC Announces Lead for Ruling Party Candidate, Continues Vote Counting (U//FOUO)

(U//FOUO) Nigeria's Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) on 27 February continued counting votes from the 25 February presidential election and said so far ruling party candidate Bola Tinubu had won 3.8 million votes and six states, opposition candidate Atiku Abubakar had won 3 million votes and five states, and candidate Peter Obi had won 1.1 million votes and three states, according to an OSE report. Additionally, Tinubu publicly accepted his loss of Lagos State, where he had been governor from 1999 to 2007, to Obi.[1](EUW2023022805090399)

Israel, Palestinian Territories: Netanyahu Denies Settlement Freeze, Deploys More Troops to West Bank (U//FOUO)

(U//FOUO) Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu on 27 February denied agreeing to pause settlement expansion in the West Bank despite a joint statement issued after a US-sponsored meeting between top Israeli and Palestinian officials on 26 February in Jordan, according to an OSE report. Separately, Jerusalem on 27 February deployed additional troops to the West Bank after new unrest resulted in the deaths of two Israelis and one Palestinian, according to an OSE report.[2](W2023022765287144)[3](IMW2023022774700345)

Israel: Deputy Minister Resigns Over Failure To Uphold Coalition Agreements (U//FOUO)

(U//FOUO) Deputy Minister and head of the Noam Party Maoz on 27 February resigned in protest of Prime Minister Netanyahu's "failure to fulfill coalition agreements," according to an OSE report. Additionally, Maoz stated there was "no real intention" to uphold the coalition agreement regarding the Jewish National Identity Authority.[4](LIW2023022771195902)

Russia, Ukraine: Wagner Plans To Resume Prisoner Recruitment (TS//SI-G//OC/NF)

(TS//SI-G//OC/NF) Russian private military company Wagner in mid-February planned to resume its recruitment of convicts for Wagner units deployed to Ukraine, according to a signals intelligence report. Additionally, Wagner owner Prigozhin wanted prisoners returning home to join the recruitment effort in place of recalled Ministry of Defense service members previously tasked with recruiting prisoners. [11](3/00/121297-23)

Mali, Russia, Turkey: Wagner Seeks Weapons From Ankara (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) Russian private military company Wagner personnel in early February met with Turkish contacts to purchase weapons and equipment from Turkey for Wagner's efforts in Mali and Ukraine, according to a signals intelligence report. Additionally, Malian Transition President Goita had confirmed that Mali could acquire weapons from Turkey on Wagner's behalf.[5](3/00/121157-23)

Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, Russia: Abidjan Assesses Threat of Wagner Presence Across Border; Wagner Strength in Mali Grows (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA)

(TS//SI-G//OC/NF) RUSSIA/UKRAINE: FSB CLAIMS DEFENSE MINISTRY

UNDERREPORTING RUSSIAN CASUALTIES

Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) accused the Defense Ministry of obfuscating Russian casualties in Ukraine, highlighting the continuing reluctance of military officials to convey bad news up the chain of command. On 21 February, FSB officials claimed the Defense Ministry was excluding the deaths of soldiers fighting with the Russian National Guard, Vagner, Chechen leader Kadyrov's mercenaries, and other unofficial organizations. They calculated the actual number of Russians wounded and killed in action was closer to 110,000.

- The combination of high casualties, particularly along the Bakhmut axis, and inability to recruit more prisoners will probably force Vagner to draw down offensive operations after its eventual capture of Bakhmut.
- Vagner remains barred from restarting its recruiting of Russian prisoners and the company continues to struggle to replace losses via other recruitment pipelines.

(Russia-Ukraine EU, 28 Feb)

**(TS//SI-G//OC/NF/FISA) RUSSIA/BELARUS/UKRAINE: SBU CHAIRMAN CLAIMS
BELARUSIAN OPPOSITION CONDUCTED STRIKE ON RUSSIAN AIRCRAFT**

As of 27 February, Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) Chairman Malyuk claimed that, although the SBU had wanted to strike a Russian A-50 AWACS in Belarus, Belarusian partisans conducted the strike. Malyuk assured Ukrainian President Zelenskyy and Presidential Office Chief of Staff Yermak prior to the strike that, if no Belarusian was harmed, the strike would be seen as legitimate sabotage directed at the Russians. Zelenskyy and Yermak, however, were concerned an SBU strike would give Belarusian President Lukashenka a reason to join Russia's war against Ukraine. After the aircraft was struck, Malyuk claimed a local Belarusian opposition figure decided on his own to strike the aircraft. (Z-G/00/121322-23)

**(TS//HCS-P//SI-G//OC/NF/FISA) RUSSIA/UKRAINE: NATIONAL GUARD
PERSONNEL SHORTAGES IMPEDE OCCUPATION PLANS**

Russian National Guard personnel shortfalls in Ukraine will probably hinder Moscow's attempts to fully secure all of its annexed territories. In August, the Russian National Guard had at least 27,500 troops in Ukraine and has since suffered significant personnel losses. National Guard units have taken on numerous additional missions to hold territory behind the frontline of Russian forces in Ukraine, amplifying their personnel needs. (WIRe2023-01665)

**(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA) BURKINA FASO/COTE D'IVOIRE/MALI/
RUSSIA: ABIDJAN ASSESSES THREAT OF VAGNER PRESENCE ACROSS
BORDER; VAGNER STRENGTH IN MALI GROWS**

On 13 February, an Ivoirian Ministry of Interior and Security official assessed Russian private military company Vagner could use its presence in Burkina Faso and Mali to destabilize Cote d'Ivoire, according to signals intelligence. Separately, on 26 February, a Vagner employee reported to an associate the total number of Vagner contractors located in Mali had risen to 1,645. (CIA Intel Update, 28 Feb; 3/50/120952-23; 3/50/121089-23)

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

(S//NF) BOLIVIA: PRESIDENT WEAKENING DEMOCRACY

President Luis Arce is sidelining human rights observers, imprisoning opposition figures, and manipulating the timing of Bolivia's census to consolidate his political power and prevent competitive elections, accelerating democratic erosion in the country. Arce, who was handpicked by party heavyweight former President Morales, garnered support from his own faction within the Movement Toward Socialism and is probably taking these steps to shore up the party's dominance before elections in October 2025. Arce may be willing to curb future attempts to neuter the opposition if the US pressed him or Brazilian President Lula reached out to him, but Arce would probably resist reversing the steps he has already taken. (WIRe2023-02046)

CYBER

(S//NF) CHINA: SURVEILLANCE EQUIPMENT IN DOD SUPPLY CHAINS

Chinese state-owned video surveillance equipment maker Hikvision, which partners with Chinese intelligence entities, is using relationships with resellers to disguise its products for sale to government suppliers, which probably is creating vectors for Beijing to compromise DoD networks. This is consistent with DIA's October 2019 assessment that Hikvision products—banned by the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act—probably would persist in DoD supply chains because of the company's efforts to mask its exports to retain access to US and allies' markets. As of January 2023, white-labeled Hikvision products were still available to US Government customers. (DIA F 24NYH A)

(TS//SI//OC/NF) SYRIA: ISIS SENIOR LEADER KILLED IN SYRIA

On 24 February, ISIS senior leader and global administrator Abu Sara was reportedly killed in Syria. Abu Sara led ISIS's General Directorate of Provinces and influenced its strategy, personnel assignments, and most sensitive global operations. *J2 Assessment:* Abu Sara's removal very likely will disrupt ISIS's global cohesion, security, and financial transfers for at least the next 3 months. ISIS likely will rely on its archived institutional knowledge and a new leadership cadre who lack extensive relationships with the group's legacy senior leaders.
(DIA Intel Update, 28 Feb)

RUSSIA, EUROPE, & EURASIA

(TS//SI-G//OC/NF) RUSSIA/MOLDOVA/TURKEY: PLANNING FOR DESTABILIZATION OF MOLDOVA CONTINUES

At least some figures behind Russian plotting against Moldova intend to continue their efforts despite recent public revelations about their activities. The general director of the Russian private military company Vagney Strategy Services coordinated with an employee of Vagner-linked influence group, "The Farm," in mid-February to adjust their planning for likely destabilization activities in Moldova.

- The organizers originally planned to hold protest training in Turkey from 24 to 28 February but changed the location to an unspecified special training center in Russia because of travel restrictions and Turkish intelligence attention on Russian males. They also extended the total training time to one to two months.
- The employees said that more than 150 participants would attend the protest training, which would include lessons on starting protests, security service reaction to riots, first aid, and psychological training for what to do if caught. (Russia-Ukraine EU, 28 Feb)

(S//NF) RUSSIA/UKRAINE: BATTLEFIELD UPDATE

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(Russia-Ukraine EU, 28 Feb)

(TS//SI-G//OC/NF/FISA) RUSSIA: UN SECRETARY GENERAL ACCOMMODATING RUSSIA TO PRESERVE GRAIN DEAL

UN Secretary General Guterres is taking steps to accommodate Russia in an effort to protect the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI), which he considers a pivotal UN success and key to addressing global food insecurity, and his actions are undermining broader efforts to hold Moscow accountable for its actions in Ukraine. In early February, he urged Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov in a letter to renew the BSGI before its term expires on 18 March and Guterres emphasized his efforts to improve Russia's ability to export, even if that involves sanctioned Russian entities or individuals, according to FISA-derived signal intelligence. (WIRe2023-00815)

(S//NF) EU/UK: REACH AGREEMENT ON NORTHERN IRELAND

The agreement between the European Commission and the UK Government yesterday to modify the contentious Northern Ireland Protocol paves the way for improved relations between the UK and the EU, but it might fall short of restoring the Northern Ireland Executive. UK Prime Minister Sunak and European Commission President von der Leyen agreed to the Windsor Framework, which includes easing customs and regulatory checks on some goods moving between Great Britain and Northern Ireland and creating a greater role for the Northern Ireland government to weigh in on changes to EU laws affecting Northern Ireland.

- Northern Ireland Democratic Unionist Party leader Jeffrey Donaldson is probably inclined to accept the agreement, but hardliners in his party may hold him back.
- If the Democratic Unionist Party rejects the framework, the UK Government will probably call new elections in Northern Ireland—in the hope that moderate unionist voters punish Democratic Unionist Party intransigence—rather than jeopardize the agreement with the EU. (EU-UK EU, 28 Feb)

AFRICA

(U//FOUO) NIGERIA: INEC ANNOUNCES LEAD FOR RULING PARTY CANDIDATE, CONTINUES VOTE COUNTING

On 27 February, Nigeria's Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) continued counting votes from the 25 February presidential election and said so far ruling party candidate Tinubu had won 3.8 million votes and five states, opposition candidate Atiku had won 3 million votes and six states, and candidate Obi had won 1.6 million votes and three states, according to OSE reporting. Additionally, Tinubu publicly accepted his loss of Lagos State, where he had been governor from 1999 to 2007, to Obi. (CIA Intel Update, 28 Feb; EUW2023022805090399)

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(3/50/121089-23)

Belarus, Russia, Turkey: Turkish Companies Helped Minsk Evade Sanctions on Russian Trade (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) The Turkish trade attache in Belarus in October and November 2022 reported that Turkish companies purchased sanctioned goods from Belarus and sold them in European markets, resold goods from Europe to Russia, and used certain banks to mitigate the effects of Turkey's placement on the Financial Action Task Force grey list, according to a signals intelligence report.^[8](3/00/121111-23)

Israel, Turkey: Ankara Supports Bilateral Relations, Energy Cooperation With Jerusalem (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA)

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA) Turkish President Erdogan in mid-February stated Ankara would work with Israel to transfer Israeli natural gas to Europe, according to a signals intelligence report. Additionally, Erdogan encouraged collaboration between the two countries' foreign ministries.^[9](3/00/121022-23)

China, Jordan: Amman Attempts Damage Control After 5G Rollout Causes Friction With Huawei, Beijing
(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) The Jordanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in late February planned to assure Beijing that Amman wanted to continue their economic relationship after Beijing had reportedly complained Chinese companies were excluded from Jordan's 5G rollout, according to a signals intelligence report. Additionally, two of the three major Jordanian telecommunications operators had already eliminated Huawei from consideration.^[10](3/55/120969-23)

NEAR EAST

(S//NF) ISRAEL/PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES: VIOLENCE INTENSIFIES

Ongoing unrest in the West Bank will probably continue to intensify and put at risk an agreement the Israeli Government and the Palestinian Authority reached in Al 'Aqabah, Jordan, on 26 February to reduce tension. After the parties signed the agreement—which included commitments to deescalate and address key issues, including Israeli unilateral raids into the West Bank—Israeli settlers attacked Huwwarah village near Nablus in the northern West Bank in response to a Palestinian killing two Israelis there earlier that day. On 27 February, an unidentified shooter killed an Israeli-American citizen near Jericho. Israeli and Palestinian Authority operations to locate Palestinian militants in the West Bank are ongoing, and additional Israeli settler and Palestinian reprisals are likely in the coming days.

- The continuing violence is likely to put pressure on Jerusalem to abandon the deal reached in Al 'Aqabah. Israeli officials will probably regard the recent Palestinian attacks as justification acting unilaterally and without notice to the Palestinian Authority.
- HAMAS blamed the Israeli Government for the settler violence and warned of unspecified consequences for policies supporting the building of Israeli settlements in the West Bank. Militant groups in the Gaza Strip are probably considering responding to Israeli-instigated violence by launching small-scale rocket attacks into Israel.

(Near East EU, 28 Feb)

(S//HCS-P//OC-USGOV/NF) JORDAN/CHINA/US: AMMAN FACING PRESSURE FROM THE PRC IN 5G DECISION

Jordanian Crown Prince Hussein, who is leading Jordan's 5G wireless technology effort, is wavering on Amman's assurance to Washington that its mobile network operators will not choose Huawei for their 5G networks, almost certainly because he is worried about the possibility of the PRC retaliating against Jordan's economy. In mid-February, Hussein said that while he and Jordanian King Abdallah II prefer to keep Huawei out of Jordan's 5G networks, Jordan needs financial assistance to close the gap between Huawei and a non-Huawei vendor.

(Near East EU, 28 Feb)

(U//FOUO) The below information is current as of 1200 ET/1700Z.

(U) RUSSIA/UKRAINE

(TS//SI-G//OC/REL TO USA, FVEY)

Russian GOU Provides Targeting Information for Oil Storage Facility for Potential Strikes

(TS//SI-G//OC/REL TO USA, FVEY) The Russian 3rd Directorate, Main Operations Directorate on 27 February provided targeting information for an oil storage facility and Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) equipment in Krivyi Rih, Ukraine that would be potentially struck on an unspecified date. The provided targeting information included the oil storage facility as well as UAF equipment located nearby. Additionally, a Russian Ministry of Defense official requested orders, further reconnaissance, and that the target coordinates be relayed to the Battlefield Command Group to destroy the target.

(U) G/RG/121340-23

(TS//SI-G//OC/REL TO USA, FVEY)

Russian GOU Reports Successful Operational Masking Operations in Belarus Against Ukraine

(TS//SI-G//OC/REL TO USA, FVEY) The Russian Main Operations Directorate (GOU) reported successful operational masking operations in Belarus against Ukraine between 3 and 10 February. The officials claimed they successfully convinced Ukrainian intelligence services of the possibility of a joint Russian-Belarusian offensive to occur from Belarusian territory. A Russian GOU official based this conclusion on a Russian Foreign Intelligence Service report on Ukrainian reactions to the deployment of Russian 6th Air Force and Air Defense Army units to airfields in Belarus, layering of air defense systems, transfer of Iskander-M divisions to Belarus and changing the focus of training activities from defensive to offensive. The Ukrainian Armed Forces reportedly considered the rotation of Russian military units and subunits of the 2nd Motorized Rifle Division (MSD) 1st Tank Army with the 6th MSD 3rd Army Corps as an attempt to covertly prepare combat-ready groups for rapid deployment in the Volynsk axis to disrupt support from Western countries. The Russian GOU recommended two phases of activity to further mislead Ukrainian forces about the possibility of offensive operations from Belarusian territory. The first phase would last until 6 March and the second from 6 to 11 March and plans for the two phases were being sent to the Belarusian Chief of General Staff for approval.

(U) G/00/121249-23

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)

Russian PMC Vagner to Resume Recruitment, Seek Medical Services for Project 42174 Prisoners

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) Russian private military company (PMC) Vagner planned in mid-February to resume its recruitment of prisoners for Project 42174, which is an ongoing Vagner effort to recruit, train, and integrate Russian convicts into Vagner units operating in Ukraine. Additionally, senior Vagner members would be dispatched to 70 prisoner unidentified distribution points in support of these efforts; meanwhile, the Russian Ministry of Defense was reportedly recalling its own recruiters from these locations. This planning occurred in tandem with attempts by senior Vagner members to address the disparities between the treatment of Vagner contractors wounded-in-action (WIA) and Project 42174 fighters updating the terms of the Project 42174 contracts to better address issues related to the WIA.

(U) 3/00/121297-23

(TS//SI//NF) CHINA: PROBABLY DEVELOPING CYBER ATTACK CAPABILITIES THAT WILL THREATEN WESTERN SATELLITE SYSTEMS

The IC assesses China is developing cyber-attack capabilities to deny, exploit, and hijack satellite links and networks as part of its strategy to control information, which it considers a key warfighting domain. China's ability to infiltrate a core network or mimic a specific command link could allow it to seize control of a satellite, rendering it ineffective to support communications, weapons, or intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems. (CIA-DA-IA-2023-01779)

TOP SECRET//SI-GAMMA//ORCON//NOFORN//FISA

Forces' capabilities were superior to Russia's and cautioned that Russia would suffer heavy casualties were it to proceed with the offensive. Bohutska on 22 February indicated that Gerasimov reportedly planned to continue his efforts to sabotage the offensive, noting that he promised to "throw" the so-called special military operation by 5 March, when Putin was allegedly scheduled to start a round of chemotherapy and would thus be unable to influence the war effort.

(U) [3/00/122254-23](#)

Russian MoD Provides Plan to Strike UAF Locations in Odesa, Mykolaiv for 3 March

(TS//SI-G//OC//REL TO USA, FVEY) The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) provided plans for the Combined Grouping of Troops to conduct missile strikes against Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) locations in Odesa and Mykolaiv for 3 March. All of the strikes were to take place when the unit was ready and would utilize a weapon system to be decided by the commander. The location in Mykolaiv was a workshop on the grounds of an armored vehicle factory used to repair UAF armored vehicles. The following additional locations were targeted in Odesa: an aviation factory used for storing and updating Ukrainian Tu-141 "Strizh" UAVs; an alleged location of a Gepard self-propelled anti-aircraft gun system in between healthcare facilities; and a temporary deployment point for UAF "Pravyy Sektor" subunits reportedly containing up to 100 personnel.

(U) [6/00/122643-23](#)

(TS//SI-G//OC//REL TO USA, FVEY)

Russian GOU Provides Potential Targeting Information for Ukrainian Energy Infrastructure, Bridges

(TS//SI-G//OC//REL TO USA, FVEY) The Russian 3rd Directorate, Main Operations Directorate (GOU) provided targeting information as of 28 February on 12 energy infrastructure facilities and 12 bridges in Ukraine, which would potentially be struck on an unspecified date. The type of munitions to be used was unspecified. (COMMENT: The potential strikes were only in the planning or approval process.) The potential targets provided were as follows: seven thermoelectric power plants near Shostka, Chernihiv, Sumy, Eskhar, Kamianske, Mykolaiv, and Odesa; five electric substations near Liubotyn, Zolohrad, Lozova, Piatykhvatky, and Kryvyi Rih; ten railroad bridges near Novomoskovsk, Balivka, Pidhorodne, Pavlohrad, and Vasylykivka, and Zaporizhzhia; and two vehicle bridges near Zaporizhzhia and Dnipro.

(U) [6/00/122297-23](#)

(TS//SI-G//OC//REL TO USA, FVEY)

Ukrainian President Suggests Striking Unspecified Russian Deployment Locations in Rostov, Russia

(TS//SI-G//OC//REL TO USA, FVEY) Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in late February suggested striking Russian deployment locations in Russia's Rostov Oblast using UAVs. Zelenskyy on 28 February expressed concern to Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) Commander-in-Chief Gen. Valeriy Zaluzhnyy and an unidentified Ukrainian official that Ukraine does not have long-range missiles capable of reaching Russian troop deployments in Rostov with unspecified UAVs. Zaluzhnyy responded that Ukraine attack unspecified deployment locations in Rostov with unspecified UAVs. Zelenskyy assessed that Ukraine could reach Tuapse, Russia—which Zelenskyy believed was unnecessary—and noted that, after Russian troops arrived in Rostov, they would be on the move. Zelenskyy added that the Russian forces were traveling to Avdiivka, Ukraine. The unidentified official calculated that the troops would arrive in Avdiivka as soon as 5 or 10 March. (According to BBC Monitoring on 28 February, local media reported that an oil facility in the southern Russian Black Sea port of Tuapse was slightly damaged by a fire following an apparent attack by UAVs. Local residents heard two explosions seconds apart, after which a fire broke out.)

(U) [6/00/122318-23](#)

(TS//SI-G//OC//REL TO USA, FVEY)

Russia Devises Plans to Combat NATO Tanks Going to Ukraine Beginning April 2023

(TS//SI-G//OC//REL TO USA, FVEY) The Russian General Staff and Ground Forces in February developed measures to combat NATO tanks that were expected to be delivered to Ukraine beginning in April. The strategy called for establishing three fire zones based on range—long, medium, and short—with each zone covered by specific weaponry and unit types. At the same time, personnel training efforts would be administered to educate on the vulnerabilities of NATO tanks, and to develop morale and psychological fortitude within the personnel units confronting them.



(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) Russia-Ukraine: Battle for the Donbas Region Likely Heading for a Stalemate Throughout 2023


22 February 2023

(TS//SI//TK//REL TO USA, FVEY) **Russia's grinding campaign of attrition in the Donbas region is likely heading toward a stalemate, thwarting Moscow's goal to capture the entire region in 2023.** We have moderate confidence in this assessment based on analysis of NRO-collected and commercial imagery, LAPIS time-series video, and OPIR data; and of SIGINT, open sources, and liaison reporting showing a sustained high rate of artillery fires, high combat losses among Russian forces, and diminishing rates of Russian territorial gains over the past seven months. We would have higher confidence in our assessment if we could accurately estimate the endurance of Ukraine's operations on the Kharkiv-Luhansk and Donetsk fronts. We also cannot fully account for the toll Ukraine's August-September-2022 counteroffensives in eastern and southern Ukraine have taken on Russian troop morale, or the amount of time Russia needs to replenish munitions and equipment and to reconstitute units. Since April 2022, Russia's company Wagner fighters settled into a campaign of attrition in the Donbas region, slowly overwhelming Ukrainian defenses with a daily deluge of artillery fires, airstrikes, and repeated multi-pronged, small-unit ground assaults. These tactics have diminished Russian forces and munition stockpiles to a level that, barring an unforeseen recovery, can exhaust Russian units and frustrate Moscow's war aims, resulting in a protracted war beyond 2023.

↖ Main direction of Russian offensive
 🗺 Donbas region
 🟡 Area of Russian advance/occupation* as of 31 Jan. 2023
 *GEOINT cannot confirm Russian control of areas of past advance.

(U//FOUO) This warning statement applies only to NSA information. (U//FOUO) The information on this graphic is provided for intelligence purposes only but may be used to develop potential investigative leads. No information contained in this report, nor any information derived therefrom, may be used in any proceeding (whether criminal or civil), including any trial, hearing, or other proceeding before any court, department, agency, regulatory body, or other authority of the United States without the advance approval of the Attorney General and/or the agency or department that originated the information contained in this report. These restrictions apply to any information extracted from this graphic and used in derivative publications or briefings.

Projection: Lambert Conic Conformal
 Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative
 0 25 50 Miles
 0 25 50 Kilometers



Briefer Comment:
 • Unshaded area roughly the size of Connecticut

Map is classified S//REL TO USA, FVEY




Consolidated UAF Air Defense


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BLUF: Current UKR Air Defense (AD) plan balances limited resources to protect critical national infrastructure (CNI), population centers, front line of troops (FLOT), and other key assets across Ukraine. UKRs ability to provide medium range air defense to protect the FLOT will be completely reduced by MAY 23. UKR assessed to withstand 2-3 more wave strikes. As 1st Layer Defense munitions run out, 2nd and 3rd Layer expenditure rates will increase, reducing the ability to defend against Russian aerial attacks from all altitudes.

Assessment	Risks	Courses of Action
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> SA-10 and SA-11 comprise 89% of Ukraine's Air Defense medium/high-range, medium/high-range protection (>20,000 ft). Based on <u>current</u> interceptor consumption: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> BUK (SA-11) will be completely depleted by 31 MAR 2023 S300 (SA-10) will have been completely depleted by 02 MAY 2023 AD systems with remaining interceptor inventory (SA-3, SA-12, NASAM, IRIS-T, etc.) have a limited quantity of systems, which means that only select assets can be covered. They are unable to match the Russian volume and cannot be layered US/A&P SHORAD contributions (Stinger, Avenger, Gepard, Crotale, etc.) continue to mitigate the expenditure of Strategic and Tactical SAMs. However, short-range, low-altitude systems do not have the same deterrent effect on the threat of Russian multi-role aircraft to the FLOT and CNI. Limited or no Ukrainian Air-to-Air Defense (A2AD) Multiple mitigating options must be simultaneously pursued to increase decision for more sustainable solutions 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> Increased Russian capabilities: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Air Superiority: AZAD, and Bomber freedom of aerial maneuver (i.e. unguided munitions, etc.) Ground attack capabilities against the Ukrainian FLOT and counteroffensive (i.e. localized air superiority, CAS, ISR, etc.) Improved accuracy, range, and survivability, of Long-range munitions as they are no longer required to fly terrain contouring flight paths Quantity and duration of strikes, and no longer dependent on ALCMs and Shaheed UAS. Gained ability to strike, support, and resupply via fixed and rotary wing (i.e. Airborne Operations, Air Assault, UAS, ISR, CASEVAC, Aerial Resupply, etc.) Decreased Ukrainian capabilities: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Inability to prevent Russian air superiority Loses the ability to strike, support, and resupply via fixed and rotary wing (i.e. JDAM-ER, UAS, ISR, CASEVAC, Aerial Resupply, etc.) Loses the ability to mass ground forces on the FLOT and counteroffensive Ukraine will have to choose what CNI to protect Increased consumption rates: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> SA-10 consumption rate will increase to cover SA-11 as it goes down 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> (S//NF) Near Term (0-3 Months) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Resupply FSU SA-10 and SA-11 munitions from allies and partners Firing Policy Change: SA-10 and SA-11 only engage TACAIR Assist with repair of NMC FSU Interceptors (S//NF) Offensive Counter-Air (OCA) (joint fires to include one-way attack UAS, surface fires, SOF, etc.) (S//NF) Military Deception Firing doctrine adjustment (weapon-to-target pairing) (S//NF) Mid Term (3-6 Months) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Solicit contributions of Western AD systems (IRIS-T, NASAMS, Patriot, I-Hawk etc.) (S//NF) Expedite Program "FrankenSAM" Mobile Missile depots to repair non-operational missiles Long Term (6-9 months) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Deliver NATO Air Defense systems at required capacity Establish digital integration solution for Air Defense



Current



~May 2023

Threats	ADA Systems	Systems On-Hand	Systems Res.	Missiles On-Hand	Missile Exp. Rate (Monthly)	Expected Missile Exhaustion	Notes
*EUCOM J5 Assessment							
	Patriot	0	12*	0	TBD; Est 100		2x BTRFS for delivery in APR 23 (USA BLD/USL 2x Launchers Only (NLD))
	SAMP/T	0		0	TBD		1x BTRY (ITA) May 23 (Partial TBM capability)
9x Additional Strategic SAM Batteries Required							
	SA-10	25	25	421	180	03 MAY 23	Primary population center and infrastructure defense
	SA-12	3	3	55	20	NOV 24	Firing rates will increase once SA-10 and SA-11 depleted
	SA-11	57	50	111	69	13 APR 23	Primary FLOT defense
	NASAMS	2		105	40	MAY 23	Remaining: 6x (US); 1x (CAN); 2x (NOR)
	IRIS-T	1	16*	10	24	MAR 23	4x Remain in Commitment (DEU)
	HAWK	0		0	TBD		Bahrain, Egypt, France, Greece, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Taiwan, Turkey, UAE
	SA-B	67	67	90	20	JUNE 23	Firing rates will increase once SA-11s are depleted
	SA-5	3	3	UNK	UNK		Non-mobile, fixed sites. Legacy SAM system
	SA-3	5	2	698	33	DEC 26	Non-mobile, fixed sites. Least capable SAM system.
13x Additional Tactical SAM Batteries Required (Minimum Goal should be ~111 for SA-11s)							
	MANPADS	N/A	2928*	192	340	MAR 23	Stinger, Iglu, Strela-10
	SPADA-2000/Aspide	1		11	UNK		1x Transferred (Spain); 2x Committed (Italy)
	Crotale	2		22	UNK		FRA 2x Delivered
	Avenger	0		-190	TBD; Est 25	DEC 23	12x Committed (US)
	ZSU-23	UNK		UNK finds	UNK		2x FEB; 5x APR (DEU)
	Gepard	20		13,800 Rnds	280	MAR 27	
*100x Additional SHORAD Firing Units Required							


Source: Wiesbaden 7.0, Annex 1 G3 AMD UKR Running Estimates 17FEB, Building UAF Capability 12FEB23, USAREUR-AF OPSUM 09FEB23, DSG Paper on Air Defense, Program FrankenSAM 2DEC

Assessed Operations in Kharkiv


As of 01 0600 EST Mar 2023
D-370




Kharkiv Axis
RF: 160 Total MVR BNs ~48,600 Total Personnel
37 Combat-Effective MVR BNs (regular and reserve)
44 Combat-Ineffective MVR BNs (regular and reserve)
40 Combat-Effective RLF BNs
1 Combat-Ineffective RLF BNs
38 Combat-Effective TDF BNs
1 Combat-Ineffective TDF BNs
Total Personnel (w/ MVR BNs) 7,250 - 14,500 Total Personnel



- River/Waterway
- Oblast boundary
- Major road
- Rail line
- RUS FLOT
- UKR FLOT
- Contested
- RF Combat Effective
- RF Combat Ineffective
- UAF
- National/Assessed Location
- City/Town
- Minefield
- RUS Defensive Line
- RUS Emitters past 24
- UKR Emitters past 24





Bakhmut Axis
As of 01 0600 EST Mar 2023
D+370

Off Map

TOP SECRET//HCS P//SI//G//TK//FGI//RSEN//ORCON//NOFORN

Decisive Operation: Southwest Attack

- Task: Attack SW of Bakhmut
- Purpose: Defeat UAF
- Endstate: Encircle Bakhmut to the West, control Chasiv Yar
- Current FLOT: ~7 KM SE of Chasiv Yar

Shaping Operation 1: Northern Attack


- Endstate: Control all lines of communication (LOC) north of Bakhmut
- Current FLOT: ~2 KM north of Bakhmut

SO 2: Eastern Attack

- Endstate: Control all LOCs east of Bakhmut
- Current FLOT: ~1 KM east of Bakhmut

SO 3: Southern Attack

- Endstate: Control all LOCs south of Bakhmut
- Current FLOT: ~1 KM south of Bakhmut



Bakhmut Axis

RF: 35 Total MVR BNs ~29,000 Total Russian Personnel
~7,000 Regular/Res, RLF, and TDF
~22,000 PMC Wagner

- 10 Combat-Effective MVR BNs (regular and reserve)
- 0 Combat-Ineffective MVR BNs (regular and reserve)
- 15 Combat-Effective RLF BNs
- 10 Combat-Ineffective RLF BNs
- 0 Combat-Effective TDF BNs
- 0 Combat-Ineffective TDF BNs
- 12 Wagner PMC DETs

UAF: 12 BDEs (61 MVR BNs), ~15,250 – 30,500 Total Personnel

	RUS FLOT
	UKR FLOT
	Contested
	RUS Emitters Past 24
	UKR Emitters Past 24

offered for the capture or destruction of foreign tanks, and videos of tanks being destroyed would be widely distributed to reduce the confidence of Ukraine and the West and reassure Russian troops of their ability to overcome this new weaponry. The General Staff expected the proposed measures to undermine any desires by Ukrainian leadership to launch counterattacks, damage the image of NATO members that lend support due to the destruction or capture of their so-called modern tanks, and discourage the West from rendering additional assistance to Ukraine.

(U) G/00/122542-23

(TS//SI-G//OC/REL TO USA, FVEY)

Russian Armed Forces Tasked With Mine-Clearing Operations in Luhanska for Gazprom Pipeline

(TS//SI-G//OC/REL TO USA, FVEY) Russian state energy conglomerate Gazprom officials in early February requested mine-clearing support from Russian Armed Forces for an area in Luhanska Oblast, Ukraine where they would be building a pipeline between different gas distribution networks. The Gazprom officials specified that the pipeline would be constructed between Raihorodka and Trokhizbenka. (COMMENT: Despite this projected location, additional coordinates and engineering reconnaissance reports detailed below indicate the area being cleared of mines is between Krymske and Trokhizbenka.) In response to the request from Gazprom officials, the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) Chief of Engineering Forces was expected to have a proposal outlining the actions required to fulfill the request by 10 February. A Russian MoD official on 6 February reported results of engineering reconnaissance around the area of the projected pipeline, which was defined as an area between Trokhizbenka and Krymske. The overall inspection area consisted of 18 hectares, of which 7 hectares had already been cleared of mines as of 6 February, and was noted to contain hard-to-traverse areas because of plots containing dense vegetation. Preliminary reconnaissance revealed that there were mixed mine fields within the inspection area, specifically PMN and TM-62 mines. It was also specified that to properly conduct mine-clearing operations, a BMP-3M vehicle would need to be allocated. Additionally, an element from the 2nd Army Corps 36th Separate Engineering and Construction Battalion would be tasked with mine-clearing a reinforced concrete vehicle bridge over the Severskiy Donets River near Trokhizbenka.

(U) G/1, 222383-23

(TS//SI-G//OC/REL TO USA, FVEY)

Russia Reports Insufficient Personnel, Equipment Levels of Eastern GTF Subunits

(TS//SI-G//OC/REL TO USA, FVEY) The Russian National Defense Command Center in February disseminated a report on the decreased combat capability of military units operating under the Eastern Grouping of Troops (Forces) (GTF) due to an insufficient quantity of specialized personnel, functioning military equipment, weapons and ammunition as of 15 February. The Russian Federal Security Service Department for Military Counterintelligence reported security and munition storage protocol violations at field army warehouses within the 36th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade, 29th Combined Arms Army that could possibly lead to incidents. Specifically, over-watch posts at the brigade's combat positions were not fully deployed, security for the field army warehouse was not assigned, fake warehouse positions were not equipped, and munitions storage locations were not camouflaged. Additionally, vehicles were not being inspected for explosives, man-made barriers with ground sensors for the most dangerous areas of the artillery warehouse were not installed, and artillery ammunition was being stored outside of its packaging in an open field.

(U) G/00/122329-23

(TS//SI-G//OC/REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA)

UNSG Considering Early March Travel to Ukraine to Meet With Ukrainian President

(TS//SI-G//OC/REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA) UN Secretary-General (UNSG) Antonio Guterres and UN Office of the Secretary-General Director Miguel Graca on 28 February discussed the possibility of Guterres traveling to Ukraine in early March to meet with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Guterres disclosed that Ukrainian Presidential Office Chief of Staff Andriy Yermak notified him that Zelenskyy wanted to speak with Guterres in person, which seemed to annoy Guterres. Nonetheless, Guterres wanted Graca to explore possible scenarios for a trip to Kyiv. While Guterres clearly was not happy about going to Kyiv, he asserted that if this was what it took to "disentangle the situation," then it was necessary to make the trip. Guterres instructed Graca to keep the possible trip confidential, and did not want the Ukrainians to know that the UN was exploring the possibilities of a trip there at that time. Shortly thereafter, Graca alerted Assistant Secretary-General for Department of Safety and Security Unalsi Lutu Vuniwaqa about Guterres's possible trip to Ukraine. He

TOP SECRET//SI-GAMMA//ORCON/NOFORN/FISA

presented two travel scenarios for the trip: leave New York on 6 March after the opening of the annual Commission on the Status of Women and return by 9 March in time for the afternoon session of the UN General Assembly; or leave New York in the afternoon of 10 March and return on 14 March. Graca added that the travel into Kyiv would be by either car or train, and emphasized that they were just looking at the possibilities of travel at this point and doing internal groundwork without reaching out to any external entities or countries, including Ukraine.

(U) G/00/122293-23

Almost Certainly IAEA DG Upset About Probable UN Refusal of ZNPP Visit Amid Fighting

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) officials in mid-February shared that "he," almost certainly referring to IAEA Director-General (DG) Rafael Grossi, was upset over the reluctance of unidentified individuals, probably UN officials, to allow an IAEA mission to travel to or from the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) amid battles in the area and reportedly wanted to push back probably on the hesitancy. Grossi's Senior Adviser Diego Candano Laris on 17 February disclosed to IAEA Chief of Cabinet Jacek Bylica that Candano received a map detailing battles in "the area," probably referring to the area surrounding or along the route that the IAEA used to rotate inspectors to the ZNPP. Candano explained that the map was shared as a way to justify why "no one" wanted to cross this area. According to Candano, almost certainly Grossi explained that he did not understand the logic and believed that if Ukraine and Russia both guaranteed the route and voiced that they would not attack presumably the IAEA mission, then it should not matter if there was fighting happening. Candano revealed that almost certainly Grossi believed that the IAEA should be pushing back and that almost certainly Grossi was already "very upset." Bylica agreed with Candano and shared that there were a lot of people that were upset. However, Bylica alleged that the UN had not yet received a "positive message" in writing from either of the countries, that the Russians' message was only made orally, and that the Russians had not responded to the UN.

3/00/122310-23

South Korea Mired in End User Concerns Related to U.S. Push to Obtain Ammunition for Ukraine

(TS//SI-G//OC/NF)

Yi Mun-hui, Secretary to the President for Foreign Affairs at South Korea's National Security Office (NSO), 1 March informed NSO Director Kim Sung-han that the South Korean National Security Council (NSC) was mired in concerns that the U.S. would not be the end user if South Korea were to comply with a U.S. request for ammunition. The NSC reportedly was also worried that the U.S. President would call South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol directly. Yi stressed that South Korea was not prepared to have a call between the heads of state without having a clear position on the issue, adding that South Korea could not violate its policy against supplying lethal aid, so officially changing the policy would be the only option. Yi urged Kim to solicit the thoughts of Im Ki-hun, Secretary to the President for National Defense at the NSO, since Im pledged to determine a final stance by 2 March. Yi advised that Kim should then discuss the matter further with the NSC if it were still necessary. Kim expressed his concern over how the issue would be perceived domestically: if the announcement of Yoon's state visit to the U.S. were to coincide with an announcement that South Korea changed its stance on providing lethal aid to Ukraine, the public would think the two had been done as a trade. Kim then suggested the possibility of selling the 330,000 rounds of 155-mm ammunition to Poland since getting the ammunition to Ukraine quickly was the ultimate goal of the United States. Yi agreed that it may be possible for Poland to agree to being called the end user and send the ammunition on to Ukraine. Yi noted that the draft legislation on allowing advanced countries to be named as end users for arms exports was in the process of becoming law, but South Korea would need to verify what Poland would do.

(U) Z-G/00/122198-23

(U) **RUSSIA**

(TS//SI-G//OC/REL TO USA, CAN, GBR)

Russian MoD Concerned Over Potential NATO Naval Forces Navigating Internal Channels of NSR

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) in early February provided an assessment discussing the Northern Sea Route (NSR) and the threat of U.S. and NATO military assets in the region. According to the

(U) RUSSIA/UKRAINE

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA)

UAF in Bakhmut Almost Encircled; HUR Plans to Send in Elite Unit to Stabilize Catastrophic Situation

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA) Ukrainian forces as of 25 February were almost operationally encircled by Russian forces in Bakhmut, Ukraine and Ukrainian Main intelligence Directorate (HUR) Chairman Kyrylo Budanov on 28 February ordered that an elite HUR combat unit be deployed there for 2 weeks to stabilize what he considered a "catastrophic" situation. Ukrainian Presidential Office Deputy Roman Mashovets on 25 February provided Ukrainian Presidential Office Chief of Staff Andriy Yermak with an update, which assessed that the situation in Bakhmut was rather difficult. According to Mashovets, there was only one UAF supply road to Bakhmut, which was subject to shelling, as well as a couple of foot crossings to the left bank of an unspecified river in Bakhmut. He asserted that the contested area had a "204.8 elevation" and that, if the Russian forces gained full control of it, then they would have almost the entire section west of Bakhmut and a direct line of sight to the UAF supply road. Also, if Russian forces were to take control of an unspecified filtration station, then the supply road would again be under a direct line of fire. Mashovets reported that, for those reasons, the morale in Bakhmut was low, with the Ukrainian forces under the impression that they were almost operationally encircled. Budanov on 28 February explained to UAF Ground Forces Commander Lt. Gen. Oleksandr Syrskyy, HUR First Deputy Chief Maj. Gen. Oleh Ivashchenko, and a HUR officer identified only as Vova that HUR would bring in units to Bakhmut for a brief time to stabilize the situation. Budanov later relayed to Vova that the situation in Bakhmut was "catastrophic" and Syrskyy declared a need for HUR's Kraken unit to prevent the UAF from losing Bakhmut. Also that day, Syrskyy asserted to Budanov that Ukrainian forces desperately needed to reach Yahidne, Ukraine because an unspecified road was the UAF's "last breathing tube." (COMMENT: This is possibly the supply road that Mashovets referenced.) Budanov ordered Vova to send one of "Shaman's" units to Bakhmut for no more than 2 weeks, instructing him to bring in only the unit's combat element and not its command post. (COMMENT: "Shaman" likely refers to the call sign for HUR officer Ihor Polonskyy. It is unclear if "Shaman's" unit and the Kraken unit are the same.) Vova criticized UAF leadership for insisting on sending a "combat element" to the front lines in Bakhmut without proper command and control, noting that the UAF needed clear control on the ground and that the Kraken unit has demonstrated that it has enough power and resources to establish it.


(U) 3/00/122312-23

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA)

Ukraine Learns of Alleged Russian Plot to "Throw" So-Called Special Military Operation By 5 March

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA) Ukrainian Presidential Office Chief of Staff Andriy Yermak on 17 February learned of an alleged Russian plot to "throw" the so-called "special military operation," presumably in an attempt to sabotage Russian President Vladimir Putin. According to Verkhovna Rada (Ukrainian Parliament) member Yelyzaveta Bohutska, who received the information from an unidentified Russian source with access to Kremlin officials, Russia planned to divert resources from Taganrog, Russia to Mariupol, Ukraine and focus its attention on the southern front. According to Bohutska's source, the plan for "the offensive" (no further information) was suspected to be a strategy devised by Russian...

Assessed Operations in the South
 As of 01 0600 EST Mar 2023
 D+370



96 km - Melitopol to Novooleksivka
 123 km - Melitopol to Kherson
 123 km - Zaporizhzhia to Melitopol
 125 km - Zaporizhzhia to Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant
 128 km - Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant to Melitopol
 203 km - Kherson to Odesa

Off-Front (Belarus, Belgorod, Crimea, Kyiv, etc.)
 RF: 23 Total MVR BNs, ~5,850 Total Personnel
 10 Combat-Effective MVR BNs (regular and reserve)
 11 Combat-Ineffective MVR BNs (regular and reserve)
 2 Combat-Effective TDF BNs
 UAF: 4 BDEs (17 MVR BNs), 4,250 - 8,500 Total Personnel

Zaporizhzhia Axis
 RF: 83 Total MVR BNs, ~23,250 Total Personnel
 22 Combat-Effective MVR BNs (regular and reserve)
 9 Combat-Ineffective MVR BNs (regular and reserve)
 36 Combat-Effective RLF BNs
 3 Combat-Ineffective RLF BNs
 13 Combat-Effective TDF BNs
 0 Combat-Ineffective TDF BNs
 UAF: 3 BDEs (16 MVR BNs), 4,000 - 8,000 Total Personnel

Kherson Axis
 RF: 42 Total MVR BNs, ~15,650 Total Personnel
 13 Combat-Effective MVR BNs (regular and reserve)
 7 Combat-Ineffective MVR BNs (regular and reserve)
 0 Combat-Effective RLF BNs
 5 Combat-Ineffective RLF BNs
 17 Combat-Effective TDF BNs
 0 Combat-Ineffective TDF BNs
 UAF: 1 BDEs (5 MVR BNs), 1,250 - 2,500 Total Personnel

- River/Waterway
- Object boundary
- Major road
- Rail line
- RUS FLOT
- RF Combat Effective
- RF Combat Ineffective
- UAF
- National/Assessed Location
- City/Town
- RUS Emitters post 24
- UKR Emitters post 24
- Airfield
- Dam
- Rail Line
- Nuclear Power Plant
- Bridge (Rail)
- Bridge (Road)
- Bridge (Coast/Rail)
- Multi/Partoon Bridge
- Undamaged
- Damaged, Possible
- Impassible



TOP SECRET//SI//NF//SI//G//TC//FGI//RSEN//ORCON//NOFORN

FISA

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NATIONAL GEOSPATIAL-INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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

Ukraine: Disposition of Ukraine Armed Forces Around Bakhmut, 24 February 2022

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) *The Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) defending Bakhmut almost certainly lost ground to Russian forces on their northern (left) flank and maintained at least one ground line of communication (GLOC) to the west of the city between 16 and 23 February 2022, according to imagery analysis, OPIR, SIGINT, and USEUCOM Ukraine Coordination Cell Information.* The UAF reportedly withdrew from a village north of Bakhmut on 23 February that would effectively sever a secondary GLOC between Bakhmut and the E40/M-03 and potentially compromise the northern flank of the city. NGA could not confirm the report due to a lack of imagery coverage on 24 February. In addition, the UAF continued construction on fallback positions west of the city in case of a retrograde

1. (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) The UAF almost certainly lost control of the village of Paraskoviivka, resulting in a new front line on the Bakhmut northern (left) flank that shifted south of the intersection of the E40/M-03 and the T0513.
2. (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) The UAF maintained control of the center of Bakhmut and the paved O0506 road west of the city to Kostiantynivka through Chasiv Yar. In addition, the UAF continued construction of new fallback positions in the area west of Bakhmut in case of a retrograde from the city.
3. (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) According to USEUCOM Ukraine Coordination Cell Information from 24 February, the UAF withdrew from Berkhivka, a village on the Bakhmut northern flank, on 23 February. If the UAF withdrew from Berkhivka, it would effectively sever the unpaved O0508 GLOC connecting Bakhmut and the E40/M-03. In addition, NGA assesses that if the O0508 is severed, the UAF positions along the O0508 would lose their GLOC with Bakhmut.

- Imagery-derived Ukraine forces location (17 to 24 Feb.)
- Ukraine-affiliated TACREP ellipse center (17 to 24 Feb.)
- - - Trenching (all time)
- Recent trenching (17 to 24 Feb.)
- UAF line of communication
- Line of communication UAF no longer controls
- Line of communication reportedly no longer controlled by UAF

OPIR Detections (17 to 24 Feb.)



Russia/Ukraine | Status of the Conflict as of 28 Feb (S//RELID)

As of 28 Feb, Russian (RUS) and PMC Wagner forces continued to focus on seizing Bakhmut while the UAF consolidated gains IVO Kherson and reinforced defenses IVO Bakhmut to protect its remaining GLOC from potential RUS advances in eastern Ukraine (UKR). RUS forces continued ground operations in Donetsk and were establishing a defense-in-depth between Kherson and Zaporizhzhia; the Central and Western Groupings of Troops (GoTs) were IVO Bakhmut and Kreminna, while the Southern and Eastern GoTs were IVO Kherson and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts. (TS//SI//NF)

GROUND
 27 Feb: UAF reported that PMC Wagner seized 2 platoon-sized fighting positions and 17 firing positions IVO Bakhmut (S//REL TO USA, FIN, SWE, UKR, FVEY, NATO)
 27 Feb: The UAF conducted five airstrikes and regained control of two firing positions IVO Avdiivka (S//REL TO USA, FIN, SWE, UKR, FVEY, NATO)

MARITIME
 27 Feb: A RUS BLKFLT KIL0 class submarine departed Sevastopol naval base (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)

AIR/AIR DEFENSE
 27 Feb: Ukrainian forces shot down 11 out of 14 SHAHED UAVs targeting Kyiv and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts (U//FOUO REL TO USA, FIN, SWE, FVEY, NATO)

SPACE/CYBER/EW
 27 Feb: RUS-aligned hacktivists published online instructions detailing methods to interfere with the U.S. CIA's official website (U//FOUO)

POLITICAL/MISCELLANEOUS
 27 Feb: Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov stated that the latest U.S. sanctions were intended to undermine RUS's industrial and financial potential and to shut off Moscow from international economic relations (U)
 27 Feb: UKR President Zelenskyy announced that he planned to meet with PRC President Xi on an unspecified future date (U)

AT (TS//HCS-P//SI-G//TK//FGI//RSEN/ORCON/NOFORN/FISA)
 Map ICOD: 28 0200 EDT FEB 2023

Ukrainian Forces
 Maneuver: 34 BDEs | Fires: 13 Units
 x3 x13 x7 x7 x2 x2 x7 x1 x1 x3 x1

Territorial Defense Forces (TDF): 27 BDEs
 x27


Russian Battalion (BN) Count
 Potential Maximum Combat Power: 543 BNs**
 Committed to Conflict: 526 of 543 BNs (97%)

	Regular MVR BNs	Reserve BNs	Auxiliary* BNs	Total
Committed	217	41	268	526
Located inside UKR: 473 of 526 BNs (90% of Committed)				
	Regular MVR BNs	Reserve BNs	Auxiliary BNs	Total
Combat Effective	93	29	241	363
Deployed Combat Ineffective	72	11	27	110
Total	165	40	268	473

TOTAL ASSESSED LOSSES

RUSSIA
 Assessed Combat Sustainability: MODERATE
 • 35.5k-43k KIA
 • 72 fighter/bomber; 82 rotary-wing
 • 6,002 ground vehicles

UKRAINE
 Assessed Combat Sustainability: MODERATE
 • 15.5k-17.5 KIA
 • 60 fighter/bomber; 32 rotary-wing
 • 11 strategic SAMs; 34 tactical SAMs



COMBAT EFFECTIVE BATTALIONS (BNs)

93 Regular MVR BNs | 29 Reserve BNs | 241 AUX* BNs

Eastern Grouping of Troops
 10 Regular MVR BNs | 9 Reserve BNs | 10 AUX BNs
 x14 x2 x2 x2 x2 x2 x2 x2 x2 x2

Central Grouping of Troops
 14 Regular MVR BNs | 7 Reserve BNs | 10 AUX BNs
 x10 x3 x7 x8 x10 x2 x2 x2 x2 x2

Western Grouping of Troops
 17 Regular MVR BNs | 9 Reserve BNs | 57 AUX BNs
 x12 x4 x5 x4 x5 x10 x4 x2 x2 x2

Southern Grouping of Troops
 46 Regular MVR BNs | 5 Reserve BNs | 174 AUX BNs
 x24 x8 x14 x8 x21 x19 x2 x2 x2 x2

FORCE UNIT SYMBOLOLOGY

XXX Corps
 XXXX Army

Assault Infantry (mountain)
 Assault landing

Artillery (self-propelled)

Air defense (long range)

Airborne Infantry

Armor

C2

CBRN

Engineers

Infantry

Electronic warfare

Motorized rifle

Multiple rocket launcher

Naval Infantry

Reconnaissance

SAMs

SIGINT

MTO

Mechanized Infantry

Missile

FORCES & AOs

Russian forces
 Russian reserve forces
 Combat effective auxiliary forces

Auxiliary (AUX) includes Russia-led Forces (RLF), Territorial Defense Forces (TDF), and P...
 Deployed combat ineffective forces
 Deployed combat ineffective reserve forces
 Deployed combat ineffective Auxiliary

Contested areas
 Russian-controlled territory
 Russian-occupied pre-invasion

Ukrainian forces
 Ukrainian reserve forces
 Ukrainian force concentration (last 48 hours)
 High-explosive events (last 24 hours)

(U) Coordinated with DIA (EERC)
 (U) Note: Updated items in blue



J-32 | Black Sea ISR Sorties, 29 Sep 22 – 26 Feb 23


Historical Black Sea Sorties, 29 Sep 22 – 26 Feb 23						
Date	GBR RC-135	FRA Mirage + E-3	USA RQ-4	NATO RQ-4	USA RQ-170	USA MQ-9
Sep	0	0	2	0	0	0
Oct	3	0	10	0	0	0
Nov	2	0	9	5	5	0
Dec	1	2	8	2	0	0
Jan	3	0	6	3	3	0
Feb	3	2	7	2	1	10
Total	12	4	42	12	9	10
Total manned: 16			Total Unmanned: 73			
Next 24 Hours						
27 Feb	0	0	0	0	0	2

- **BLUF:** 15 Feb was most recent UK RJ 41BLK flight
- GBR/FRA sorties are flown under national authorities and NOT NATO or EUROM
- **Next GBR Sortie: 28 Feb**
- 29 Sep: Near-shoot down of UK RJ
- Since 29 Sep five sorties reacted to
 - 01 Oct – USA RQ-4, 6 NM CPA
 - 15 Oct – USA RQ-4, 6 NM CPA
 - 21 Dec – FRA 2x Mirage 2000, 27 NM CPA
 - 30 Dec – GBR RJ + 2x Typhoon, 100 ft CPA
 - 11 Jan – GBR RJ + 2x Typhoon, 2 NM CPA
 - 22 Feb – USA MQ-9, 1000 ft CPA
- CSAR responsibilities retained by individual nation(s)
 - No CSAR bilateral agreements in place
 - No NATO C2 included
- Russian Advisory Area expired 24 Jan
 - Active from 10 Dec – 23 Jan
 - NOT issued as a NOTAM, posted to website



Typical ISR Tracks

- RQ4 NATO
- RQ-4 BLK40
- UK RC-135 V/W
- French Mirage
- SECDEF Directed Standoff
- Inactive Advisory Area
- ISR OPAREA





BDA From Recent Strike? 15Feb23 KP0041 - Severe REI# 750 | Damage GBU BBCARD



Target: KP0041 / C2 NODE
 GRID: 47.834949 37.655150
 Pre-Strike Image ID: 10FEB23221109084000E000
 Post-Strike Image ID: OSINT
 Date of Assessment: 15FEB23
 Organization: SAG-U

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY

Overall Assessment is: **Confirmed Severe Damage**
 US-Produced / US-Mensurated Target



(SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY) On 15FEB23 0430Z, UAF engaged 1x C2 NODE with 3x GBU munitions, located IVO Marinka; likely associated with 8th CAA. **PHYSICAL DAMAGE ASSESSMENT: CONFIRMED SEVERE DAMAGE** The strike destroyed the northeastern building causing 45% damage to the target resulting in windows to be blown out, debris scattered, walls to fall, panels to be blown off the walls, as well as the roof, and a collapse of the northern center segment of the building. There is a vehicle north of the target that appears to be loaded up with scavenged equipment left over. The Targeted building in the south was not damaged. There is observable historic damage in the area. Only 1x of the 3x GBU rounds has observable damage. The weaponized aim point is approximately 6 km from the FLOT. **INITIAL FUNCTIONAL ASSESSMENT: CONFIRMED SEVERE FUNCTIONAL DAMAGE** The targeted northeastern structure suffered total functional damage due to the mass amount physical damage, debris, and collapse of portions of the building. The southern target suffered no physical damage therefor has sustained no functional damage.



Global Highlights (U)

Terrorism | ISIS Senior Leader Killed in Syria (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

On 24 Feb, ISIS senior leader and global administrator Abu Sara al-Iraqi was reportedly killed in Syria. Abu Sara was the last known figure with at least 3 years of executive experience in ISIS and a direct connection to previous senior leaders; since mid-2020, he led ISIS's General Directorate of Provinces and influenced its strategy, personnel assignments, and most sensitive global operations. (TS//SI//OC/NF)

- Abu Sara joined ISIS's predecessor organization in 2005 and had advised senior ISIS leaders since at least 2018, including former caliphs; he provided attack guidance to ISIS's 36 branches and networks (TS//SI//OC/REL TO USA, FVEY)
- Abu Sara directed financial transfers to regional offices for attack operations; in late Aug 2021, he directed the transfer of \$500k to ISIS in Afghanistan (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)

J2 ASSESSMENT: Abu Sara's removal very likely will disrupt ISIS's global cohesion, security, and financial transfers for at least the next 3 months. ISIS likely will rely on its archived institutional knowledge and a new leadership cadre who lack extensive relationships with the group's legacy senior leaders. (TS//SI//OC/NF)

(U) Coordinated with DIA (DCT, MARC), JSOC, NGA, NGIC, NSA, USCENTCOM, USEUCOM, USSOCOM
PCN: DIA_F_24OR2_A

PRC | LHA-31 Completes First Operational Activity (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

In late Feb, the PLAN's YUSHEN LHA-31 completed its inaugural naval activity after certifying in Nov 2022. Task Group-31 returned from the first extended area deployment (EAD) of 2023; this was the first EAD to integrate an LHA and the first time an LHA exited the First Island Chain. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

- The YUSHEN LHA is able to perform a variety of missions to include amphibious assault and HADR operations; it has similar missions and loadout capacity as the YUZHAO LPD, but its larger flight deck and aircraft hanger decks enable it to carry a much larger complement of helicopters (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
- Task Group-31 sailed as far east as the U.S. territory of Wake Island and conducted multiship AD exercises and emission control drills (S//NF)

J2 ASSESSMENT: The PLA very likely will utilize the increased air support capability and extensive medical facilities of the YUSHEN LHAs in amphibious exercises throughout the 2023 training cycle. Additionally, LHA participation in EADs likely increases opportunities for the PLA to incorporate expeditionary and HADR training with lift support and equipment. (S//NF)

(U) Coordinated with DIA (CMG), USINDOPACOM
PCN: DIA_F_24ON5_A

Graphic: (TS//SI//OC/NF)

ABU SARA AL-IRAQI



Potential successors who worked directly with Abu Sara include: spokesman Abu al-Fida and senior Syria-based leader Hudhayfah al-Shami.

Graphic: (TS//SI//OC/NF)

Classified By: Director for Intelligence, J2, FW74803
Derived From: Multiple Sources
Declassify On: 50X1-HUM

Graphic: (S//NF)

1k	55	Light amphibious tanks*
Troops	24	Helicopters
	3	OOB
	3	YUYI LCMA Landing Craft


*With loaded well deck and main deck

Graphic: (S//NF)

Classified By: Director for Intelligence, J2, FW74803
Derived From: Multiple Sources
Declassify On: 20481231



Russia-Ukraine: Russian Advance Against Bakhmut Between July 2022 and January 2023



Briefer Comments:

- The RGF/Vagner assault from east to west IVO Bakhmut over the last 7 months has been sluggish movement averaging 2.7 KM of western progress per month.
- At that rate, with no change in conditions, it would take 11+ months for the Russians to reach Kramatorsk (~30 KM NW west of Bakhmut)



UK/PRC | Competing UK Visions for Counter-PRC Policy in Indo-Pacific (S/INF)


SECRET//NOFORN

ICOD: 28 0515 EST February 2023
PCN: DIA_F_2407N_A

In early Feb, UK DefMin Wallace tasked the MOD to explore the option to forward-deploy one of the UK's two Royal Navy aircraft carriers to the Indo-Pacific after 2025. However, the main opposition party has differing security priorities. (S/INF)

All: (S/INF)

Wallace's tasking calls for exploring the establishment of a jointly operated and forward-deployed carrier with Japan or the ROK or seeking U.S. permission to base a carrier in Japan with the U.S. Seventh Fleet; the Royal Navy currently has an access agreement at the British Defence Singapore Support Unit (BDSSU).



RULING CONSERVATIVE PARTY: EXPLORING EXPANDED COUNTER-PRC POLICY



- Wallace asserts that a persistent Indo-Pacific presence brings more value than episodic carrier visits
- Perceives an enduring UK naval presence as the long-term solution over sporadic deployments in the AOR

OPPOSITION LABOUR PARTY: SIGNALING PULLBACK ON COUNTER-PRC EFFORTS



- Shadow DefMin Healey laid out Labour's defense policy, which prioritizes European defense at the expense of an increased Indo-Pacific presence
- Agreed the PRC is a "systemic challenge" but argued against relying on deployment as the primary response due to resource constraints

PRC RESPONSE



- The PRC perceives the current UK government as "anti-China," but has limited its criticism as it conducts a charm offensive
- Beijing has reacted most harshly to regional military deals and deployments, including the 2021 HMS Queen Elizabeth CSG deployment and the AUKUS agreement

PRC RESPONSE



- The PRC has not reacted to the Labour policy, but state media historically has written more favorable articles about Labour than Conservative leaders


All: (S/INF)

ASSESSMENT: Wallace's exploratory directive signals the current administration remains committed to the Indo-Pacific tilt; however, defense budget strains, logistic hurdles, and manpower shortages likely would preclude forward basing options until at least 2025. Beijing likely would view a permanent CSG deployment as a failure of its UK policy while viewing a Labour-led pullback as a success. (S/INF)

(U) Coordinated with DIA (CMG, EERC), USEUCOM, USINDOPACOM



Russia-Ukraine: Bakhmut Holds As Russian Forces Attempt to Capture the Town of Berkhivka, North of Bakhmut





Global Highlights ^(U)

UAE | Negotiating Weapons Repair Facility With Russia ^(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)

In early Feb, a Russian defense firm reviewed a draft agreement to build a regional maintenance center in the UAE for Abu Dhabi's inventory of PANTSIR SA-22 AD systems, KORNET ATGMs, SA-24 MANPADS, and BMP-3 IFVs. By 2017, Abu Dhabi's warranty for its Russia-origin SA-22 systems had expired, creating gaps in expertise and vulnerabilities to defend against aerial threats. ^(TS//SI//NF)

- The regional maintenance center draft agreement included future plans to broaden access to service the Russia-origin equipment inventories of other countries ^(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA)
- Early 2022: The UAE signed a \$1.5B deal to modernize its 41 SA-22s to the more capable S1M variant systems by 2030 and included a phased upgrade for an initial tranche of 15 SA-22s in Russia ^(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)

J2 ASSESSMENT: The planned facility likely represents a complementary UAE effort to ensure modernization of its defense equipment, in addition to sending SA-22s to Russia for upgrades. The UAE likely aims to gain technical expertise for more sustainable domestic repair solutions that advance its aspirations of becoming a regional defense hub. ^(TS//SI//NF)

^(U) Coordinated with DIA (DRI, EERC, MARC), NGA, USCENTCOM
PCN: DIA_F_24OLT_A

UAE'S INVENTORY OF RUSSIA-ORIGIN EQUIPMENT ^(U)

Graphic: ^(TS//SI//TK//NF/FISA)

	INVENTORY	RANGE
SA-22 AD	42	20km
KORNET ATGM	800	10km
SA-24 MANPADS	36 launchers 193 missiles	6.5km
BMP-3 IFVS	707	N/A


Graphic: ^(TS//SI//TK//NF/FISA)

Classified By: Director for Intelligence, J2, FW74803
Derived From: Multiple Sources
Declassify On: 50X1-HUM

SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY



Ukraine | Freeze Favorable To Vehicle Maneuver (~16 INCHES) Projections



Sourced and/or coordinated with: 557WW, TWS, USACE TTPs, JIOCEUR JAC, LIS, GALWEM, GFS, and climatology

** CURRENT INTEL: NOT FULLY IC COORDINATED OR SOURCED **

SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY

Consolidated UAF Air Defense

BLUF: Current UKR Air Defense (AD) plan balances limited resources to protect critical national infrastructure (CNI), population centers, front line of troops (FLOT), and other key assets across Ukraine. UKRs ability to provide medium range air defense to protect the FLOT will be completely reduced by MAY 23. UKR assessed to withstand 2-3 more wave strikes. As 1st Layer Defense munitions run out, 2nd and 3rd Layer expenditure rates will increase, reducing the ability to defend against Russian aerial attacks from all altitudes.

Delivered, in country
Delivery on track
No Delivery timeline
No commitment



Medium to Long Range SAM systems (>90,000 ft)

Short Range (<12,000 ft)

Russian Activity
• Wave 15: 10 FEB23 - 61 of 71 munitions downed
• Additional Lancet strike on 21FEB damaged 1x UKR S300
• Wave 16: Expected ~24FEB-04MAR
• Delayed Wave 16 increased SA-10 expenditure to 03MAY and SA-11 to 13APR

Ongoing Collective Training
• 16JAN-27MAR Patriot (CONUS)
• 31JAN-APR Patriot (DEU)
• 06FEB-07MAR IRIS-T (DEU)
• 13-26 FEB Avenger (DEU)
• 20-23 FEB Patriot Planning Workshop

Equipment/Trans Window Operational Window Non-Operational Window Air Defense Training Expected Munition Depletion At Risk Strike Wave

Source: Wiesbaden 7.0, Annex J G3 AMD UKR Running Estimates 01FEB, BuA 06 Capability 26FEB23, USAEUR-AF OPSUM 09FEB23, DSG Paper on Air Defense, Project FrankensAM 2DEC, Daily Reference Card Statements

Russia/Ukraine Joint Staff J3/4/5 Daily Update (D+369)

SECRET//NOFORN
CAO: 28 0500 EST Feb 23

Orders and Decisions

- Last 24: None
- Currently Pending: None

SIGACT / CCIR

- RUS/UKR NECs: 3x NECs, 4x non-threat missile launches; 5,265x total NECs
- Manned ISR over the Black Sea: 1x RC-135V/W (GBR) with 2x Typhoon escorts is scheduled for ISR operations from 0600-1000 EST

US Composition & Disposition-USEUCOM AOR

US Mil in USEUCOM: 91,896 / Afloat: 8,446 / Jasionka: 1,251

US Maritime Vessels

- 13x Surface Ships:
 - 0x Carrier, 5x CRUDES, 2x C2 ship, 6x Auxiliaries
- 5x Subs:
 - 4x SSN, 1x SSGN

US Air Components

- 9x FSs:
 - 2x 5th Gen, 7x 4th Gen
- BTF 23-2 (4x B-52s)
- 2x Army CABs:
 - 12th CAB, 1 AD CAB

US Land Units

- 1x Corps: V Corps
- 2x DIVs:
 - 4 ID & 101st ABN DIV
- 5x Army BCTs:
 - 2 SCR, 173rd IBCT, 2/1 ID, 2/1 CD, 2/101 IBCT

Composition Changes Next 72 Hours

Deployments

Redeployments

Projected Change (Air Mvmt)

-100 thru 03 Mar

Disposition Changes:

- Sea: NSTR
- Air: NSTR
- Land: NSTR

Activities Last 24 Hours

SEA:

- GEORGE H.W. BUSH CSG: U/W Adriatic Sea; FLOPS
 - OPS Sorties-73; Fixed Wing-54, Rotary Wing-17, COD-2
 - Exercise NEPTUNE STRIKE (20-28 Feb)

AIR:

- Airborne Sensitive Reconnaissance Ops (SRO)/ NATO ISR
 - BLK: [0 Manned, 2 Unmanned] 2x MQ-9
 - ROU: [2 Manned, 1 Unmanned] 1x U-2, 1x RC-135V/W, 1x MQ-9
 - POL: [3 Manned, 1 Unmanned] 1x U-2, 1x JSTARS, 1x CL-650, 1x MQ-9

- Operation ATLAS GUARDIAN: DoD-NATO supporting enhanced Vigilance Activities (eVA) and enhanced Air Policing (eAP): 9x US eAP CAP sorties complete (9x ASSURE; 0x SHIELD)

USAF continues eAP mission from Lask, POL

Alert 60 AEW: USAFE maintains Alert 60 AEW ISO Jasionka force protection from Powdz AB, POL

- Legend**
- NATO Country
 - Non-NATO Country
 - Russia


US/NATO SOF in UKR

- USA 14x pax
- GBR 50x pax
- FRA 15x pax
- LVA 17x pax
- NLD 1x pax
- Total: 97x pax

Total US Pax in UKR: 100

DoS Pax in UKR: 71

DoD Pax in UKR: 29 (Includes DAO, ODC, USSOF, and MSAU)



Activities Last 24 Hours Cont.

SAG-U

- Conducting bilateral training with partner nations supporting key UKR efforts

V CORPS

- South East Flank Battle Groups (BG): (POL, SVK, HUN, ROU, BGR): BGs conducted training with partner nations to deter RUS aggression

- Train & Advise UAF (UKR Armed Forces):

- (USA): Patriot Training (16 Jan-27 Mar)
- (DEU): FA BN Collective Training #1 (06 Feb-07 Mar)
- (DEU): UKR Mech BTG #2 Collective Training (06 Feb-12 Mar)
- (FRA): Phoenix Strike (RANGER) (17 Feb-31 Mar)
- (DEU): UKR STRYKER BTG #4 Collective TNG (20 Feb-19 Mar)
- (DEU): UKR BDE #1 HQ Staff Training (20 Feb-01 Mar)
- (DEU): Phoenix Strike (RANGER Tranche 1) (22 Feb-31 Mar)
- (DEU): UKR (STRYKER) BTG #5 Collect. Training (24 Feb-25 Mar)
- (NLD): Phoenix Strike (Riverline) (26 Feb-18 Mar)
- (DEU): UKR Mech BTG #3 Collective Training (27 Feb-29 Mar)
- (DEU): FA BN Collective Training #2 (27 Feb-28 Mar)
- (DEU): UKR BDE #2 HQ Staff Training (27 Feb-28 Mar)

Activities Next 24-48 Hours

SEA:

- GEORGE H.W. BUSH CSG: U/W Adriatic Sea; FLOPS
 - OPS Sorties-79, Fixed Wing-61, Rotary Wing-18
 - Exercise NEPTUNE STRIKE (20-28 Feb)

AIR:

- Airborne Sensitive Reconnaissance Ops (SRO)/ NATO ISR
 - BLK: [1 Manned, 3 Unmanned] 1x RC-135V/W (GBR), 1x RQ-4, 2x MQ-9
 - ROU: [1 Manned, 1 Unmanned] 1x RC-135V/W (GBR), 1x RQ-4
 - POL: [1 Manned, 3 Unmanned] 1x CL-650, 3x MQ-9
- Operation ATLAS GUARDIAN: 16x U.S. and 94x NATO missions scheduled for Eastern Flank Border CAPs
- USAF continues eAP mission from Lask, POL

J5 Policy

Key Upcoming Engagements

- (T) Feb: CJCS s/c with UKR CHOD & Air Def CDR
- (T) 2 Mar: CJCS BILAT with ITA CHOD, MINDEF, and NSA-Equivalent in Rome
- (T) 6 Mar: CJCS BILAT with Spanish Military Leadership
- (T) 5 Apr: CJCS o/c with BEL CHOD

J4 Logistics

GMLRS						
Last 24hr Expended	Total Expended	OH	PDA Due in (24)	7-Day Burn Rate	DDI	28MO (7 Day)
17	9,584	278	0	13	22	21-Mar

155mm Rounds						
Last 24hr Expended	Total Expended	OH	PDA + Used Due in (24)	7-Day Burn Rate	DDI	28MO (7 Day)
779	951,752	10,892	30,000	3,474	4	3-Mar

PDA Deliveries

- 155mm Rounds/Charges/Fuzes/Primers
 - Enroute: 1,840x 155mm HE (PDA32)
 - Next 24 hrs: 1,840x 155mm HE (PDA32)

GMLRS

- Enroute: None
- Next 24 hrs: None

Other

- Enroute: 18x MAJXPRO (PD22); 12 HMMWVs (PD23/28)
- Next 24 hrs: 1x flight carrying Phoenix Ghost (PD25) to Ramstein

Activities Next 24-48 Hours

AIR Cont:

- Alert 60 AEW: USAFE maintains Alert 60 AEW ISO Jasionka force protection from Powdz AB, POL

LAND:

- Conducting bilateral training with partner nations supporting key UKR efforts

- SE Flank BGs: Conducts training with HN partner forces

- Train & Advise UAF (UKR Armed Forces):

- (USA): Patriot Training (16 Jan-27 Mar)
- (DEU): FA BN Collective Training #1 (06 Feb-07 Mar)
- (DEU): UKR Mech BTG #2 Collective Training (06 Feb-12 Mar)
- (FRA): Phoenix Strike (RANGER) (17 Feb-31 Mar)
- (DEU): UKR (STRYKER) BTG #4 Collective Training (20 Feb-19 Mar)
- (DEU): UKR BDE #1 HQ Staff Training (20 Feb-01 Mar)
- (DEU): Phoenix Strike (RANGER Tranche 1) (22 Feb-31 Mar)
- (DEU): UKR (STRYKER) BTG #5 Collective Training (24 Feb-25 Mar)
- (NLD): Phoenix Strike (Riverline) (26 Feb-18 Mar)
- (DEU): UKR Mech BTG #3 Collective Training (27 Feb-29 Mar)
- (DEU): FA BN Collective Training #2 (27 Feb-28 Mar)
- (DEU): UKR BDE #2 HQ Staff Training (27 Feb-28 Mar)



RFI# 750 |

BDA From Recent Strike? 21Feb23 KP0255 POSS. Severe Damage



Target: KP0255 / Assembly Area
GRID: 49.602225,38.036206
Pre-Strike Image ID: 20FEB23221207046000E000.tif
Post-Strike Image ID: 21FEB235202120241512000021E_0AAAAABNABND
Date of Assessment: 21FEB23
Organization: 178 IS

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY

Overall Assessment is: **POSSIBLE SEVERE DAMAGE**
US-Produced / US-Mensurated Target

Pre-Strike 20FEB23 1116Z

Post-Strike 21FEB23 2123Z

Weaponneered
Aim Point



(SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY) On 21FEB23 1420Z, UAF engaged 1x Assembly Area with 2x PSW munitions, located IVO Bakhmut.
PHYSICAL DAMAGE ASSESSMENT: POSSIBLE SEVERE DAMAGE The strike caused severe damage to the structure. Comparing the post strike image to pre strike imagery, the structure identification features are no longer visible. The weaponneered aim point is approximately 0.5km from the FLOT.



SECRET//NOFORN

RFI# 750 | Why are JDAM-ERs Failing? BDA From Recent Strike?

MAU-12

GROUND SAFETY PIN HOLE

MANUAL RELEASE

CAUTION:

IF RED SHAFT IS VISIBLE; LINKAGE IS UNLATCHED

SOLENOID:

- Holds arming lanyard ring
- Arming lanyard is pulled when weapon drops
- Visual confirmation of this ~8 in wire after flight verifies fuze was armed properly

PLUNGER:

- Depressed (w/pn present) = power to solenoid
- Extended (w/pn dropped) = power to solenoid removed
- Power removed = solenoid de-energized = arming lanyard pulls free = weapons dud

AFT SWAY BRACE:

- B/U arming lanyard tied off here (US does this as well)

B/U ARMING LANYARD:

- 1000 of these were provided, GWT sending more soon



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE | CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

DAILY INTELLIGENCE UPDATE (U)**BREAKING INTEL ... IN THE LAST 24 HRS** (U)

Initial reporting not fully analyzed or coordinated (U)

1 POLAND/UKRAINE (U)

- 24 Feb: The Polish CHOD stated that Warsaw intends to "immediately" transfer four MiG-29 FULCRUMs to Ukraine (S//NF)
- This would be the first known transfer of fighter aircraft from a NATO member to Ukraine; Poland has 28 FULCRUMs in various states of operability, of which 16 are currently flyable (S//NF)

4 IRAN (U)

- 25 Feb: Iran conducted a partially successful flight test of a ZOLFAGHAR SRBM equipped with a cluster warhead from Shadad Desert Camp in southeastern Iran; two of at least seven submunitions impacted a target area at a range of ~570km (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)
- This may be Iran's first successful test of a ZOLFAGHAR SRBM equipped with a cluster warhead following two prior launches that ended in failure (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)

2 RUSSIA (U)

- 27 Feb: Russian UAS developer AO Kronshtadt completed the first full flight test of the SIRIUS UCAV at its testing center near Ryazan, southeast of Moscow; Russian officials considered the flight successful (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)
- The SIRIUS, also known as the INOKHODETS, will be capable of strike, ISR, and EW missions; Russia intended for the first flight to occur in 2021 (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA)

5 TERRORISM (U)

- 26 Feb: An airstrike killed AQAP external operations leader, Shura council member, and media emir Hammad al-Tamimi and his associate in Marib, Yemen; Tamimi is the second external operations leader killed since Nov 2022 (TS//SI//NF)
- Since at least 2016, Tamimi oversaw maritime attack operations—including the partially disrupted cell that attempted four attacks on Western ships off the coast of Yemen—and viewed attacking U.S. interests as AQAP's top priority (S//NF)

3 PRC (U)

- 25 Feb: TI DF-27 (C) analysis in ~2,100k
- The DF-27 targets at a high pr antship 2022 (TS

6 ISRAI

- 28 Feb: F dual citiz who were opened f
- Palestin further rioting



TOP SECRET//SI//TK//FGI BHR ISR//NOFORN//EXDIS

Israel | Pathways to Providing Lethal Aid to Ukraine (U)

Israel has committed to providing nonlethal aid to Ukraine comprised of intelligence, counter-UAS support, and a civil early warning system as it seeks to maintain its freedom of action in Syria by balancing its ties with the U.S. and Russia. PM Netanyahu indicated Israel has considered providing Ukraine additional defensive systems and support at the UN. Jerusalem likely will consider providing lethal aid under increased U.S. pressure or a perceived degradation in its ties to Russia as a result of Moscow's actions in Iran or Syria that undermine Israeli interests. (S//NF//EXD)

Graphic: (TS//SI//TK//FGI BHR ISR//NF)

MOST PLAUSIBLE



JERUSALEM ADOPTS TURKISH MODEL FOR UKRAINE AID

SCENARIO Israel adopts Turkey's model—under U.S. pressure—and sells lethal defense systems or provides them through third-party entities; it openly advocates for a peaceful end to the conflict and offers to host mediation efforts


BACKGROUND Ankara has successfully maintained cordial relations with Moscow while facilitating arms transfers to Kyiv; Jerusalem may believe it can similarly balance its ties



RUSSIA EXPANDS STRATEGIC ASSISTANCE TO IRAN

Russia transfers strategic systems, such as Su-35 FLANKERS or SA-21s to Iran, or expands assistance to Iran's missile, nuclear, or space programs, prompting Israel to provide lethal aid

The IDF is concerned Russia will provide advanced systems or technology, such as steel alloys or other materials used in both missile and space programs, in exchange for Iranian weapons



ISRAEL EXPANDS OUTREACH TO THE U.S. FOR COUNTER-IRAN OPERATIONS

Russia continues to allow Iranian advanced conventional weapons through Syria, prompting Israel to request expanded U.S. support for Israeli counter-Iran activities in exchange for lethal aid to Ukraine

Israeli defense leaders are advocating for increased risk-taking to counter Iran, including proposing bilateral Israel-U.S. operations; Israel has regularly requested ATG overflights to support strikes in Syria



EXPANDED ADVERSARY AIR DEFENSE PRESENCE AND USE IN SYRIA

Russia incurs casualties from Israeli strikes and begins directly targeting Israeli aircraft with SAMs; Iran transfers advanced SAMs such as the IR-SA-2 or IR-SA-3 to Syria, shifting Israel's calculus on lethal aid

Israel periodically strikes Syrian and Iranian air defenses in Syria; in 2022, Russia fired an SA-21—likely for messaging purposes—after Israeli aircraft left Syrian airspace following a strike

Graphic: (TS//SI//TK//FGI BHR ISR//NF)

SCENARIOS THAT COULD DRIVE JERUSALEM TO PROVIDE LETHAL AID (U)

SELECT ISRAEL-ORIGIN WEAPONS THAT COULD BE TRANSFERRED TO UKRAINE (U)


Graphic: (TS//SI//NF)

BARAK-8/MX SAM



- In use by Israeli Navy; ground-based system is export-only
- Long (70km) and extended range (150km) variants
- Used by Azerbaijan, India, and the UAE, with Morocco scheduled to receive the system in mid-2023 and Colombia in 2026

SPYDER SAM



- Israeli export-only NASAMS equivalent
- Fires Israeli PYTHON and DERBY AAMs, short- (20km) and medium-range (50km) variants
- Used by Georgia, India, the Philippines, Singapore, Vietnam, and the UAE; Czechia scheduled to receive the system in 2025

SPIKE ATGM



- Israeli JAVELIN equivalent
- Four variants with differing ranges (2km–10km) and non-line-of-sight capability (35km)
- Exported to 27 countries: Finland, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain, and the UK can manufacture but not export the system

Graphic: (TS//SI//NF)

(U) Coordinated with DIA (DRI, MARC), MSIC, NGIC, USCENTCOM

Joint Staff J2 | DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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Classified By: Director for Intelligence, J2, FW74
Derived From: Multiple Sources
Declassify On: 50X1-HUM