

INSIDE THE GOVERNMENT'S SECRET
DRONE WARFARE PROGRAM

FIND

FIND



THE
ASSASSINATION
COMPLEX

FIX

FIX



JEREMY SCAHILL

AUTHOR OF BLACKWATER AND DIRTY WARS

AND THE STAFF OF
THE INTERCEPT

FOREWORD BY EDWARD SNOWDEN

AFTERWORD BY GLENN GREENWALD

FINISH

FINISH





TOP SECRET SCI


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TOP SECRET SCI

A top-secret document shows how the watchlist looks on internal systems used by drone operators.




An MQ-1 Predator unmanned aircraft.




With thanks to Sven Lindqvist's *A History of Bombing*, which served as a template for this narrative.


1.32 Collection, Nomination, Consolidation and the Use of the Terrorist Watchlist to Perform Screening Processes. The following is a chart depicting the collection, TERRORIST nomination, consolidation and screening processes:



A chart from the "March 2013 Watchlisting Guidance."



**NO RECOGNIZED
TERRORIST GROUP
AFFILIATION (280,000)**



**"OTHER" RECOGNIZED
TERRORIST GROUPS
(92,765)**



**AL QAEDA IN IRAQ
(73,189)**



**TALIBAN
(62,794)**



**AL QAEDA
(50,446)**



**HAMAS
(21,913)**



**HEZBOLLAH
(21,199)**



**HAQQANI NETWORK
(12,491)**



**AL SHABAB
(11,547)**



**FARC
(11,275)**




**ASA'IB AHL AL-HAQ
(8,385)**




**AL QAEDA IN THE
ARABIAN PENINSULA
(8,211)**

WHO'S ON THE WATCHLIST

All figures taken from an August 2013 slide produced by the National Counterterrorism Center.




An August 2013 slide from the National Counterterrorism Center.



Two charts from "Directorate of Terrorist Identities (DTI): Strategic Accomplishments 2013."

Most of the time drone operators are trying to kill someone specific. They call these people, the people being hunted, “objectives.”

What does an objective look like? Here’s an example.



This timeline was for a man named Bilal el-Berjawi. Intelligence agencies watched him for years, then the British government stripped him of his citizenship.



After calling his wife, who had just given birth in a London hospital, Berjawi was killed by an American drone strike. Some people thought the call might have given away his location, but the drones already knew where he was.

This was his car.



When drone operators hit their target, killing the person they intend to kill, that person is called a “jackpot.”

When operators miss their target and end up killing someone else, they label that person EKIA, or “enemy killed in action.”



The insignia of the Joint Special Operations Command.

TF 48-4 Focus and Organization

- ▶ (S/NF) TF 48-4 is organized into two main branches: East Africa (EA) in Nairobi, Kenya and Arabian Peninsula (AP) in Sana'a, Yemen
 - TF 48-4 EA and AP are further subdivided geographically into teams
 - TF 48-4 forward support element is at Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti
- ▶ (S/NF) ISR is based at three regional airfields, supplemented with sea-based Scan Eagles or MQ-8 Fire Scouts
 - Djibouti (Camp Lemonnier)*
 - Arba Minch
 - Manda Bay
- ▶ (S/NF) TF 48-4 counterterrorism operations are focused on violent extremist organizations (VEOs)
 - Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula
 - Al Qaida in East Africa/Al Shaabab
- ▶ (S/NF) TF 48-4 CT operations are only part of a broader whole-of-government approach to regional security / stability



SECRET//NOFORN

Source: TF 48-4 Command Brief

4

A slide from a classified Pentagon study outlines the air and naval assets of the secret task force charged with hunting down, killing, and capturing high-value individuals in Somalia and Yemen.



Michael G. Vickers, former undersecretary of defense for intelligence, was a powerful figure in the world of covert operations.



On May 23, 2013, President Obama gave his first formal address on drone strikes, at the National Defense University in Washington.



A still from a home video of Abdulrahman Awlaki playing with his younger siblings in the family's courtyard in 2009. The sixteen-year-old U.S. citizen was killed in a drone strike on October 14, 2011, in Yemen.



Lt. Gen. Michael Flynn, former head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, was an architect of JSOC's "find, fix, finish" doctrine.

PHASE I:

IDENTIFICATION AND FUNCTION OF VARIOUS LOCK FAMILIES
WARDERED, BIT KEY, DISC TUMBLER AND PIN TUMBLER LOCKS
WHEEL AND DIAL COMBINATION LOCKS
PADLOCK BYPASS TECHNIQUES
FOREIGN PADLOCK DEFEAT EXERCISE
SIMPLEX AND MECHANICAL PUSH BUTTON LOCKS
SCHLAGE WAFER LOCK PICKING AND DECODING
KEY CASTING AND KEY IMPRESSIONING
BUILDING ENTRY OPERATIONS AND DOOR HARDWARE BYPASS TECHNIQUES
TUBULAR KEY AND CRUCIFORM KEY LOCKS
MASTER KEY SYSTEM EXPLOITATION
PIN TUMBLER DECODING AND SIGHT READING
DIGITAL DOOR HARDWARE AND CLICK LOCKS
KEY MENSURATION AND USE OF CODE MACHINES AND KEY DUPLICATORS
WORKING WITH PIN TUMBLER CYLINDERS - MORTISE, RIM, EUROPROFILE, KEY-IN-KNOB
HOTEL MAG-STRIPE CARD KEY CLONING
RFID CREDENTIAL CLONING
WORKING WITH EUROPROFILE CYLINDERS
PICKING AND DECODING ROTATING DISC TUMBLER LOCKS
PICKING AND IMPRESSIONING DIMPLY KEY LOCKS
ADVANCED KEY IMPRESSIONING TECHNIQUES

PHASE II:

VISUAL DECODING OF EDGE CUT AND HIGH SECURITY AUTOMOBILE KEYS
PICKING, DECODING, GENERATING KEYS TO EUROPEAN FORD / JAGUAR TIBBE LOCKS
GENERATING KEYS TO AUTOMOTIVE DIMPLE KEY LOCKS
VISUAL TUMBLER DECODING TECHNIQUES
ADVANCED AUTOMOTIVE KEY IMPRESSIONING
USE OF VARIOUS MECHANICAL PICKING AND DECODING TOOLS
AUTOMOTIVE KEY GENERATION - STANDARD AND HIGH SECURITY VEHICLE LOCKS
USE OF HAND HELD CLIPPERS TO GENERATE HIGH SECURITY KEYS BY CODE
USE OF ELECTRONIC CODE MACHINES TO GENERATE AND DUPLICATE HIGH SECURITY KEYS
SELECTED TRANSPONDER BYPASS TECHNIQUES
VEHICLE ACCESS AND KEY GENERATION PRACTICAL EXERCISES

PHASE III:

PHYSICAL RESTRAINT ESCAPE TECHNIQUES, TOOL CONSTRUCTION AND CONCEALMENT
MITIGATION OF OVERSEAS OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS
TACTICAL PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
CTR IN SUPPORT OF BUILDING ENTRY AND KEY GENERATION OPERATIONS
CTR IN SUPPORT OF VEHICLE ACCESS OPERATIONS
OPEN SOURCE TOOLS AND DATA BASES IN SUPPORT OF CTR OPERATIONS
RESTRICTED DATA BASES IN SUPPORT OF CTR OPERATIONS
USE OF TECHNICAL COLLECTION TOOLS IN SUPPORT OF KEY GENERATION MISSIONS
CULMINATING TEAM TACTICAL EXERCISES

U.S. military descriptions of the "skill set" required for advance force operations.

Over a period of four and a half months in 2012, U.S. forces used drones and other aircraft to kill 155 people in northeastern Afghanistan. Nineteen were jackpots; the remaining, 136 people, were classified as EKIA.

HAYMAKER Operations (01 May – 15 Sep 2012)					
Type	# Ops	EKIA	Detainees	JP	%
Enabled Ops	27	2	61	13	48%
Kinetic Strikes	27	155	N/A	19	70%
Total	54	157	61	32	

Note the “%” column. It specifies the number of jackpots (JPs) divided by the number of operations: a 70 percent success rate. But it ignores well over a hundred other people killed along the way.

This means that almost nine out of ten people killed in these strikes were not the intended targets.



THE KILL CHAIN

CORA CURRIER







Authorization to Use Military Force (AUMF) Operations

(S/NF) Step 1 - "Developing a target" to "Authorization of a target"


- TF 48-4 direct action operations are conducted under execution orders for Operation Copper Dune (AP/Yemen) and Operation Jupiter Garret (EA/Somalia)
- These orders specify delegated authorities, authorized targets and criteria for action
- TF intelligence personnel, with support from IC partners, builds the case for action
- This information, in a condensed format known as a "baseball card (BBC)", is packaged with the operations information into a "CONOPS" package and staffed up to higher echelons—ultimately to the President
- If proven that the target presents a threat to U.S. interest or personnel, then a 60-day authorization to action is given

Current Authorization to Action List	
Jupiter Garret (Somalia)	4
Copper Dune (Yemen)	16

CAO: 30 Jun 2012

(S/NF) Step 2 - "Authorizing" to "Actioning"

- If POTUS approves the CONOP, operations enter a targeting cycle
- Actionable intelligence provides potential targeting windows
- The targeting window suitability is determined by ROE:
 - must be Low CDE, "near certainty" of HVI presence based on two forms of intelligence, no contradictory intelligence
 - TF, GCC, CoM, CoS, HN Gov all must concur or no strike occurs



A slide from a May 2013 Pentagon presentation shows the chain of command for ordering drone strikes and other operations carried out by JSOC in Yemen and Somalia.

THE CHAIN OF COMMAND



Tom Donilon
National Security Adviser



Hillary Clinton
Secretary of State



Timothy Geithner
Secretary of the Treasury



Leon Panetta
Secretary of Defense



Eric Holder
Attorney General



Steven Chu
Secretary of Energy



Janet Napolitano
Secretary of Homeland Security

▲ **Principals Committee**

STEP ONE: CHOOSING A TARGET




JSOC Task Force



Gen. James Mattis
Centcom Commander



Gen. Martin Dempsey
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff





Barack Obama
President of the United States



Jeffrey Zients
Director of OMB



Susan Rice
Ambassador to the UN



Jacob Lew
White House Chief of Staff



John Brennan
Counter-terrorism Adviser



James Clapper
Director of National Intelligence



Gen. Martin Dempsey
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff



Leon Panetta
Secretary of Defense



STEP TWO: TAKING A STRIKE



JSOC Task Force



Gen. James Mattis
Centcom Commander

According to a Pentagon study obtained by *The Intercept*, President Obama signed off on 60-day authorizations to kill suspected terrorists, but did not sign off on individual strikes. This graphic shows the officials who would have been involved in approving targets in Yemen in early 2012, according to the chain of command laid out in the study.




Gerald Feierstein
Ambassador to Yemen




CIA Station Chief in Yemen




Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi
President of Yemen




The ISR study recommended more captures, rather than killings, because of the intelligence that could be gleaned from interrogations and collected materials.




A slide from the ISR study recounts the hunt for an alleged al Qaeda member (likely Fahd Saleh al-Anjaf al-Harithi), showing that two others died in a botched attempt to kill him.



Since the first drone strike in Yemen in 2002, hundreds of people have been killed in U.S. operations in Yemen and Somalia, many of them innocent civilians. The tallies shown here were compiled by the Bureau of Investigative Journalism from reports of both CIA and JSOC drone strikes and other operations. The large range in the estimates is due to the inherent difficulties of collecting data on airstrikes in war zones. The identities of the "people killed" were often unknown and may include civilians as well as suspected terrorists or militants. The United States almost never publicly acknowledges individual operations.




A top-secret slide confirms the central role Germany plays in the U.S. drone war.




Transatlantic cables connect U.S. drone pilots to their aircraft half a world away.



President Barack Obama and Chancellor Angela Merkel.



A top-secret slide deck obtained by *The Intercept* shows the complex architecture of the U.S. drone program.





Yemenis gather around a burned car after it was torched by a drone strike on January 26, 2015. Among the dead was a teenage boy.


53 ←


TOUCHDOWN

→ 93

Hellfire missiles, the explosives fired from drones, are not always fired at people. In fact most drone strikes are aimed at phones. The SIM card provides a person's location; when turned on, a phone can become a deadly proxy for the individual being hunted.


When a night raid or drone strike successfully neutralizes a target's phone, operators call that a "touchdown."





U.S. MILITARY DRONE AND SURVEILLANCE NETWORK IN AFRICA 2012–2015


	LOCATION	AIRCRAFT / PERSONNEL	CONFIRMED
1	Djibouti (Lemonnier)	10× MQ-1 (Predators), 4× MQ-9 (Reapers), 6× U-28, 2× P-3MS, 8× F-15E	2012
2	Arba Minch, Ethiopia	1× MQ-1 (Predator), 1x MQ-9 (Reaper)	2012
3	Manda Bay, Kenya	2× MFW (Medium Fixed-Wing)	2012
4	Nairobi, Kenya	Unknown	2012
5	Indian Ocean (on ships)	ScanEagle/Fire Scout detachment, Armada Sweep system	2012



	LOCATION	AIRCRAFT / PERSONNEL	CONFIRMED
6	Kismayo, Somalia	Up to 40 people	2015
7	Niamey, Niger	MQ-1 (Predators)	2014
8	Baledogle, Somalia	30 to 40 people	2015
9	Seychelles	MQ-9 (Reapers)	2012
10	Djibouti (Chabelley)	MQ-9 (Reapers), MQ-1 (Predators)	2013
11	Entebbe, Uganda	PC-12 aircraft	2013
12	Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso	PC-12 aircraft	2013
13	N'Djamena, Chad	MQ-1 (Predators)	2014
14	Cameroon	MQ-1 (Predators), 90–300 people	2015

Sources: 1) ISR study; 2) ISR study; 3) ISR study; 4) ISR study; 5) ISR study; 6) Foreign Policy; 7) The Washington Post; 8) Foreign Policy; 9) The Washington Post; 10) The Washington Post; 11) The Washington Post; 12) The Washington Post; 13) The New York Times; 14) The Washington Post


2 × P-3MS



6 × U-28



8 × F-15E




U.S. AIRCRAFT BASED IN DJIBOUTI FOR TARGETED KILLING PROGRAM

4 × MQ-9 REAPER



10 × MQ-1 PREDATOR



Camp Lemonnier, a base in Djibouti, has been a focal point of the U.S. Military's drone operations in Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. A secret Pentagon study obtained by *The Intercept* lists the drones as well as surveillance and attack aircraft that operated out of Lemonnier in 2012 as part of the military's targeted killing program.

“Baseball cards” (BBCs) are the military’s method for visualizing information; they are used to display data, map relationships between people, and identify an individual’s so-called pattern of life.

This isn’t quite what a baseball card looks like, but they are said to include much of the following information.

CAD: 30 OCT 2012

OBJ LETHAL BURWYN – QARI MUNIB

Exp Trgr: SIGINT

Target Data

Objective: 3.1.1: Neutralize Taliban Shadow Leadership

Characterization: Taliban Sub Cdr

- Exercises command and control over specific portion of organization
- Reports to senior leaders
- Has operational autonomy
- Manages the network and executes guidance

Significance:

- Qari Munib is a Taliban subcommander operating in Pech District responsible for numerous attacks on CF//ANSF. He is associated with numerous Taliban district shadow governors, relays guidance and provides BDA on attacks to TB officials in Pakistan.

Decoratory Reporting:

- 30OCT12: Munib planned to inform unidentified associates regarding casualties from a reported attack on 30 OCT on Manogay base. (GQP01135157601267698)
- 29OCT12: Munib instructed likely Taliban associates to stay busy utilizing Pikas and PKMs. (GQP01135151308444915, GQP01135148821505821)
- 29OCT12: Munib instructed Taliban associates to likely execute attacks, to including IEDs, for the next two days against an unidentified base. (GQP0113515323257403)
- 19OCT12: Munib prepared two IEDs for upcoming attacks. (ACODEX/M1/500/EC/PP/293,1404Z)
- 8OCT12: Qari Munib planned to pick up his explosives in Marzawara District which were sent by ██████████ (QUICKSBURG). (ACODEX/M1/500/EC/PP/282,1435Z)
- 30SEP12: qari Munib planned to meet with a weapons dealer to buy a PKM. (ACODEX/M1/500/EC/PP/274,2332Z) 2AUG2012: ██████████ (FLATHEAD) coordinated with Qari Munib for an attack that would start the next day intended and was intended to take over three separate districts. (ACODEX/M1/500/EC/PP/215,0643Z)

Ethnicity/Nationality: Pashtun

TOT Lab: JPEL: JTL: Pending Approval Recidivists: N

Intelligence Value:

- The C/K of Qari Munib would decrease attacks on CF//ANSF in central Kunar. Qari Munib could provide information on other senior TB members in Narang and Pech districts.

PO:

- Influence patterns of life IOT facilitate C/K opportunities
- Disrupt C2 network;
- Reduce popular support to restrict FOM.
- Post-Op Mitigation: Yes

Battlefield Geometry

LAST KNOWN LOC: 425XD08636572243

Link Analysis

SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY

(U) The Death of Anwar Nasser Aulaqi

(TS//NF) Anwar Nasser Aulaqi, a dual U.S./Yemeni citizen, regional commander for AQAP, and well-known extremist lecturer who preached at two U.S. mosques attended by some of the September 2001 hijackers, was killed in Yemen on 30 September 2011. The CIA tracked Aulaqi for three weeks before a joint operation with the U.S. military killed Aulaqi. The special operation killed four operatives, including Samir Khan, another American who played a key role in inspiring attacks against the U.S. Aulaqi's death represents another integrated CIA and military success in the counterterrorism fight.

A secret NSA document describes the assassination of Anwar al Awlaki, a U.S. citizen.

(S) New Tactical Collection System Joins the War on Terrorism

FROM:


Technical Advisor, Target Reconnaissance and Survey (S316)
Run Date: 01/18/2005

DISTANTFOCUS pod is new system for tactical SIGINT and precision geolocation... first deployed in December (S)


(U//FOUO) What resembles "LITTLE BOY" (one of the atomic bombs dropped on Japan during World War II) and as LITTLE BOY did, represents the dawn of a new era (at least in SIGINT and precision geolocation)?

(S) If you answered a pod mounted on an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) that is currently flying missions in support of the Global War on Terrorism, you would be correct.

Excerpt from a 2005 NSA document.




A Pentagon chart showing that as of June 2012 manned spy planes accounted for the majority of flights over Yemen, even though drones were more efficient, since they could spend more time over a target. Over Somalia the military used a mix of manned and unmanned aircraft.



When the military was focused on a “finish” (kill) operation, drones were taken off the surveillance of other targets.

ISR Contribution to Operations

- ▶ (S//SI//NF) FMV and Aerial Precision Geolocation (APG) dominate Find-Fix-Finish part of F3EA
 - APG tips narrow aperture FMV during Find
 - During Fix and Finish, FMV and APG are used together, to maintain HVI location and PID
 - SIGINT including Computer Network Operations (CNO) also contribute to Find and Fix




- ▶ (S//NF) HOA kill / capture operations require input from other sources to drive the next "find"
 - ~75% of finishes in HOA are kinetic strikes
 - Very little "finish-based" intel (DOMEX or interrogation) to drive next "F3" cycle
- ▶ (S//NF) In HOA, analysis-intensive intelligence replaces tactical site exploitation, disrupting / slowing the "cycle"
- ▶ (S//NF) This intelligence also feeds the AUMF process which authorizes HVIs for kill / capture
 - AUMF approval usually requires several months of intel / ISR target development

8

A slide from the ISR study notes that deadly strikes in Yemen and Somalia reduce the amount of intelligence for future operations.

Target Package Sources - HOA 2012

S//NF



■ NSA - Serialized SIGINT Report

■ NSA - Partner SIGINT Report

■ TD - CIA TD/TDX Source Report

■ IIR - FBI/DOD Intelligence Information Report


■ Other

SIGINT, HUMINT is gap-filler for absent TIR/DOMEX

The military relies heavily on intelligence from electronic communications, much of it provided by foreign governments, but acknowledges that the information is "neither as timely nor as focused as tactical intelligence."



A man walks past destroyed buildings in Zinjibar, capital of Abyan Province in southern Yemen, on December 5, 2012.



Cell phone data was critical for finding and identifying targets, yet a chart from the ISR study shows that the military had far less information in Yemen and Somalia than it was accustomed to having in Afghanistan.



ISR Platforms and Capabilities

Current ISR Systems used in HOA Small-Footprint Operations

System	Sensor					Platform				# of Aircraft in theater (as of 30 June 2012)	Armed for Operations (X)	Manned (M) Or Unmanned (U)
	FMV	HD-FMV	PTT COMINT	DNR COMINT	APG	Time On Station (hours) - Mogadishu	Time On Station (hours) - Sana'a	Cruise Speed (KIAS)	Max Endurance (Hours)			
P-3 MS	2		X	X	X	4	5	228	12	2		M
Medium Fixed Wing (MFW)	X		X	X	X	4	n/a	unk	8	2	X	M
U-28	2		X		X	—	3	270	5	6	X	M
MQ-1 Predator	1		X		X	6	12	70-90	20	6	X	U
MQ-9 Reaper	1	X	X		X	9	10	175	14	4	X	U
Scan Eagle	X					13	n/a	55	15	1 USN Det		U
MC-12 Liberty (Ext'd Range)	1		X		X	2(4)	4 (6)	300	6 (8)			M

SECRET//SI//NOFORN

Red text denotes capabilities not in theater


- (S/NF) The PID-providing phenomenologies, HD-FMV and DNR COMINT, are largely absent from ISR systems operating in HOA
- Not all MQ-9s have HD-FMV
 - MFW platforms currently only fly in Somalia
 - P-3 MS is a low-density / high-demand platform currently not in Theater

A chart comparing the surveillance capabilities of the various drones and aircraft flying over Yemen and Somalia in 2012.

Drones are not magical. They have to take off from somewhere. Increasingly that somewhere is on the continent of Africa.


But where exactly?


As of 2012, the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) had bases in Djibouti, Kenya, and Ethiopia. JSOC operated eleven Predators and five Reaper drones over the Horn of Africa and Yemen.



After crashing multiple Predator drones near Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti, the U.S. military moved operations to a more remote airstrip in Chabelley, Djibouti.

Here's a snapshot of how the United States views its surveillance capabilities on the continent of Africa more broadly.






Blackfin I/II survey equipment.

“Can get you in a lot of trouble.” Review by Nathan Wessler, staff attorney with the ACLU’s Speech, Privacy, and Technology Project:


“From the maker of the Stingray, this device provides the added power to listen in on calls and read text messages. Also useful for kicking nearby phones off the network (you can choose between just blocking a single target phone or scrambling the signals of all phones in the area). Take note: Wiretapping calls and text messages requires a special ‘superwarrant’ signed by a judge. Playing around with a Blackfin without adequate court supervision can get you in a lot of trouble.”



Cyberhawk Battlefield Data Recovery/SSE.

“More than enough data to map an entire social network.” Review by Jennifer Lynch, senior staff attorney, Electronic Frontier Foundation:

“Are you trying to break the next big criminal syndicate? If so, the Cyberhawk may be your go-to device. It’s able to get data off over 79 cellphones, including saved and dialed numbers, SMS messages, pictures, calendar entries, and even sound files. That’s more than enough data to map the entire social network of an organization—even if your targets use throwaway ‘burner’ phones. And the best thing about it? It uses software and components made right here in the United States. But better get a warrant to search those phones—in 2014, the Supreme Court said it’s the law.”




**Spartacus II Ground-Based
Geolocation (Vehicular).**

“Can be easily moved from plane to car to body.”

Review by Jennifer Lynch, senior staff attorney, Electronic Frontier Foundation:

“You’ll feel like a powerful Greek gladiator with the Spartacus II. It’s the smallest high-powered dual-band system on the market and can be moved easily from a plane to a car or even to your body—all without changing the system. While the \$180,000 price tag might put it out of reach for smaller agencies, its cross-border capabilities could make it easy to acquire with DHS funding. And if it’s used at the border, you might not even need to get a warrant before you use it.”




DRT 1101B Survey Equipment.

“Up to 10,000 targets.”

Review by Jennifer Lynch, senior staff attorney, Electronic Frontier Foundation:

“Are you trying to monitor a huge political protest? Look no further than DRT. Nick-named ‘dirt boxes,’ these devices can locate up to 10,000 targets and can process multiple analog and digital wireless devices all at the same time. They’re even capable of intercepting and recording digital voice data. The best thing about the devices is the fact that no one may ever know you’ve used one. Just be careful—if your targets do figure out you’ve used a DRT box, and you haven’t gotten a warrant, they may be able to convince a judge to throw out all the evidence you’ve collected on them after you used the device. You can mount DRT models like this one in an aircraft to fly over the crowd.”

The military worries about what it calls the “tyranny of distance” in its efforts to maximize orbits. An orbit, in this context, refers to a cycle of continuous, unbroken coverage of a target. Compared to the traditional battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. drones have to travel farther to reach their “named areas of interest,” or NAIs, in Yemen and Somalia.



Here’s where the United States appears to have “finished” people in Yemen.





A video produced by al Shabaab purports to show Berjawi's mangled vehicle in the aftermath of the drone strike that killed



Church Street Market near Edgware Road, northwest London. September 29, 2015.



Abbey Road in St. John's Wood, London. September 29, 2015.



A note written by Berjawi in October 2010, after his U.K. citizenship was revoked. No appeal was filed.

SECRET//SI//NOFORN

FFF Timeline: Objective Peckham Case Study

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
FFF	IPOE/POL & Find						
HUMINT	Data Unavailable						
SI&INT	Data Unavailable						
APG	Data Unavailable						
FMV	Data Unavailable						

Activity	Description Summary
Intelligence collection on target to establish pattern of life	
• (S/NF) 2006:	OBJ Peckham attended "Bayt Al-Jinn", a specialized training program – including explosives training
• (S/NF) 2006 - 2009:	OBJ Peckham returned to the UK and provided financial support to AQ allied elements in East Africa
• (S/NF) Oct 2009:	OBJ Peckham returned to Somalia after his second attempt; Travel was coordinated by OBJ LOCKHART
• (S/NF) Dec 2009:	OBJ Peckham coordinated with Kenyan based facilitator to facilitate money, equipment, and fighters through the UK to SOM
FIX	Target has been located for kinetic/non-kinetic engagement
• (S/NF) 23 June 2011:	Strike failed – Problems with Approval Authorities, NAVAF C2, and AC malfunction
• (S/NF) 12 January 2012:	Fix during a vehicle follow – No Strike
FINISH	Kill/Capture or neutralization of an enemy Target
• (S/NF) 21 Jan 2012:	OBJ PECKHAM was eliminated via kinetic strike – 0359: White SUV enters CEJ 012 (OBJ PECKHAM VAN) – 0802: Adult with heavy strides and slight limp (OBJ PECKHAM) – 0811: Vehicle follow begins – 1039: Full Register/Match (S) – 1103: Strike – 1131: Full Reg (S) – 1254: Continue to monitor the scene

OBJ PECKHAM MOVEMENT

SECRET//SI//NOFORN Source: TF 48-4 Basebell Cards, Oct 2006 - June 2012; EA ISR Logs, Jan 2011 - June 2012; IBM Analysis

4

A secret case study details the surveillance and assassination of "Objective Peckham," Bilal el-Berjawi, in January 2012.



Lisson Grove in northwest London, September 29, 2015.




Bilal el-Berjawi holding an AK-47 rifle in a martyrdom video produced after his death by al Shabaab's media wing.



Regent's Park Mosque, northwest London, September 29, 2015.

For many years lawyers and human rights advocates have wondered about the chain of command in cases of non-battlefield assassinations. Who authorizes them? Do they fall within the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), or through some other authority?

The secret documents are not comprehensive on this point, but they suggest a linear chain—all the way up to the president of the United States (POTUS).



A village security force commander and coalition special operations forces identify insurgent fighting positions during a daylong firefight in Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, April 12, 2012.


OPN HAYMAKER Effects

Objectives & Measures of Effectiveness

- AQ no longer views NE Afghanistan as a safe haven:
 - Marginal Disruption
- Loss of key AQ members / enablers:
 - Marginal Disruption
- Local opposition to AQ members / enablers:
 - Localized Disruption
- Exodus of key AQ:
 - Minimal Disruption

Effects against AQ and TB enablers in Kunar and Nuristan are considered temporary without a long-term, persistent campaign

OPN HAYMAKER (01 Jan 2012-28 Feb 2013)				
Type	Opi	EKIA	Detainees	JP
Enabled Ops	4	0	4	4
Kinetic Strikes	56	219	N/A	35
Total	60	219	4	38




Senior Nuristan Taliban Detainee

Ahmad (OBJ BRANDYWINE)

"Hands down, the scariest/most intimidating message for the Taliban, at any level, from fighter to Taliban senior leadership, is anything to do with drones or aerial bombings. The Taliban has no way to defend against them and they are certain to end in absolute destruction of whatever their target is."

OPN HAYMAKER: Massing sustained kinetic effects to deny AQ sanctuary in Kunar & Nuristan

A summary of operations conducted from January 2012 through February 2013 as part of Operation Haymaker, a U.S. military campaign in northeastern Afghanistan aimed at



A breakdown of 2011-12 mission statistics for Task Force 3-10, a U.S. special operations task force responsible for missions in Afghanistan at that time.



U.S. special operations personnel prepare to board a UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter during a mission in Kunar Province, Afghanistan, February 25, 2012.

SECRET//REL TO USA, PVEY CAO: 30 OCT 12

TF East – Request for Kinetic Strike Approval

LETHAL BURWYN – Priority Targets

Desired Results
Kill Qari Munib (LETHAL BURWYN)

Military Value

- Qari Munib is a Taliban subcommander operating in Pech District responsible for numerous attacks on CF/ANSF. He is associated with numerous Taliban district shadow governors, relays guidance and provides BDA on attacks to TB officials in Pakistan.

Disruptive Reporting:

- 30OCT12: Munib planned to inform unidentified associates regarding casualties from a reported attack on 30 OCT on Manogay base. (GQPO1135157601267666)
- 29OCT12: Munib instructed likely Taliban associates to stay busy utilizing PKas and PMMs. (GQPO113515130846915, GQPO1135148823505821)
- 29OCT12: Munib instructed Taliban associates to likely execute attacks, to including IEDs, for the next two days against an unidentified base. (GQPO113515323257403)
- 19OCT12: Munib prepared two IEDs for upcoming attacks. (ACODEX/M1/500/EC/PP/293,14042)
- 30CT12: Qari Munib planned to pick up his explosives in Marawara District which were sent by ██████████ (QUICKSBURG). (ACODEX/M1/500/EC/PP/282,14852)
- 30SEP12: qari Munib planned to meet with a weapons dealer to buy a PMM. (ACODEX/M1/500/EC/PP/274,2322) 24162012 ██████████ (LATHAM) coordinated with Qari Munib for an attack that would start the next day intended and was intended to take over three separate districts. (ACODEX/M1/500/EC/PP/213,06432)

Supporting Intelligence (PVID): Single View/VID: 1-4937 64542 10OCT12

Proposed Action and Collateral Damage: LOW

- Target is considered SINGLE-USE and CDE is assessed as LOW

IO Effects:

- Media effect: unlikely
- Political sensitivities: unlikely
- Population blowback: unlikely

CAT 1 Concerns:

- None

BSO Concur with use of KS as of 0610Z 30 OCT 12

Criteria for Kinetic Strike

- SIGINT correlation to TI
- VID within 24 hrs
- FMV lock after SIGINT correlation
- Low-CDE
- Duration of LTA approval: 14 Days

Location will change pending updated SIGINT/IMINT correlation

Confidence Level:

Low Moderate High

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

SECRET//REL TO USA, PVEY

A 2012 U.S. military request for an airstrike targeting Qari Munib, an alleged Taliban subcommander operating in northeastern Afghanistan.

TF East – Request for Kinetic Strike Approval

LETHAL BURWYN – Priority Targets



Desired Results
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Supporting Intelligence (PVID):

Single View/Vid: 1:49137 04662 800C11

Proposed Action and Collateral Damage: LOW

• Target is considered SINGLE-USE and CDE is assessed as LOW

ID Effects:


- Media effect: unlikely
- Political sensitivities: unlikely
- Population blowback: unlikely

CAT-1 Concerns:


- None

Criteria for Kinetic Strike


- SIGINT correlation to TI
- VID within 24 hrs
- FMY lock after SIGINT correlation
- Low-CDE
- Duration of LTA approval: 14 Days




Location will change pending updated SIGINT/IMINT correlation



A 2012 U.S. military request for an airstrike targeting Qari Munib, an alleged Taliban subcommander operating in northeastern Afghanistan.



A storyboard detailing a 2012 U.S. drone strike targeting Qari Munib, an alleged Taliban subcommander.



A “link analysis” purporting to detail alleged Taliban subcommander Qari Munib's ties to other militant figures.



Cyber and military intelligence specialists monitor U.S. Army networks in the Cyber Mission Unit's Cyber Operations Center at Fort Gordon, Georgia.

SECRET//NOFORN

OPN HAYMAKER Functional Teams

Current Ops (24hr cycle)

Targeting Officer NGA analyst SIGINT analysts ITCs FMV screeners	HAT D7/D13 11th IS CIA	SIGINT analysts Intel. analysts FMV screeners
	DIA Sr. analyst NGA Targeteer	NSA-Washington NSA-Georgia CNOS

Future Ops (48hr cycle)

Development Ops (+48hr cycle)

36 total personnel attached to TF EAST

A slide detailing Operation Haymaker's "functional teams," which included personnel from a range of U.S. military units and intelligence agencies.

Manhunting Basics

- **HUMINT** These aren't the terrorist you're looking for
- **IMINT** FMV is your friend ... and enemy
- **SIGINT** May I ask who's calling, please?
- **ABI** More layers are preferred
- **SNA** More connections aren't always best
- **IPB** Yep, IPB
- **F3EA** Can we stop adding letters?

- **Kinetic v. Direction Action**

The slide titled "Manhunting Basics" takes a lighthearted approach to the core mission of the Haymaker campaign: finding and killing specific individuals.

OP WAYGAL – Operational Targeting Criteria

Waygal District:

- **Maturity of HUMINT network – HIGH.**
 - HI networks have developed over the past 12-18 months. HAT and OGA have myriad complementary sources, some of whom may be able to trigger our operations.
- **Quality of established NAIs – HIGH.**
 - We currently have high fidelity on 8x NAIs in Waygal. This speaks to the level of historic HI, SI, FMV development in the valley.
- **Depth of SIGINT start points – MED.**
 - A third of our active targets have good selectors. NSA-W has taken on SI development in Waygal, greatly enhancing our understanding of the SI environment.
- **Number of active targets – HIGH.**
 - Over a dozen active targets across 3 villages, most of whom are JTL'd or could easily be. Known AQ Arabs are on this deck.
- **H-value* – HIGH.**
 - Waygal is an historic AQ sanctuary. The targets there are not only senior-level Taliban facilitators and hosts, but Arabs themselves.
 - Faruq al-Qahtani and Dost Mohammad and their entourages frequent Waygal.
 - Elimination of these targets will provide demonstrable measures of success.

HAYMAKER Value (H-Value) is the assessed return on investment of achieving success in a named operation

A slide reporting a robust presence of human intelligence sources in the district of Waygal, a "historic" al Qaeda sanctuary in northeastern Afghanistan.

HAYMAKER Operations (01 May – 15 Sep 2012)					
Type	# Ops	EKIA	Detainees	JP	%
Enabled Ops	27	2	61	13	48%
Kinetic Strikes	27	155	N/A	19	70%
Total	54	157	61	32	

A comparison of raids (described as “enabled ops”) and airstrikes (described as “kinetic strikes”) reveals significant differences in the total number of prisoners taken versus individuals killed during an intensified period of Haymaker operations.

**Senior Nuristan
Taliban Detainee**
Ahmad (OBJ BRANDYWINE)

“Hands down, the scariest/most intimidating message for the Taliban, at any level, from fighter to Taliban senior leadership, is anything to do with drones or aerial bombings. The Taliban has no way to defend against them and they are certain to end in absolute destruction of whatever their target is.”

A quote attributed to an alleged Taliban detainee describes the psychological impact of living under the threat of U.S. airstrikes.

SECRET//NOFORN

OPN HAYMAKER

Success Criteria – Before and After

August 2011 – HAYMAKER 1.0 IOC	February 2013 – HAYMAKER 2.0 IOC
<p style="text-align: center; font-size: small; margin: 0;"><u>Loss of key AQ members / enablers</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – K/S successfully killed approximately one AQ target per year, AQ easily reconstitutes. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – HAYMAKER efforts succeeded in killing/capturing few key AQ targets. Improvement over pre-HAYMAKER efforts, but pace of successes needs to be faster.
<p style="text-align: center; font-size: small; margin: 0;"><u>Local opposition to AQ members / enablers</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Little to no local opposition to AQ; AQ entrenched in key Taliban networks. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Nascent developments in some valleys indicate locals are tiring of AQ efforts to root out spies as a perceived method to stopping strikes.
<p style="text-align: center; font-size: small; margin: 0;"><u>Exodus of key AQ</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Relatively free movement to/from PAK at AQ’s discretion. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Few individuals have returned to Pakistan due to routine operational necessity and continue to support AQ efforts both in AFG and externally.
<p style="text-align: center; font-size: small; margin: 0;"><u>AQ no longer views NE Afghanistan as a safe haven</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – AQSL discussions specifically focused on utility of AFG as a safehaven – movement of families, construction of AQ-specific infrastructure. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Sporadic reporting of concern over viability of safehaven overshadowed by AQSL discussions of post-2014 sanctuary.

A slide reveals the Haymaker campaign’s limited strategic achievements.

NAME	OBJECTIVE	GROUP	Rank_MW	EKIA
JAMIL UR-RAHMAN	LEAD HILL	TB/AQ FAC	Commander	EKIA
SAKHR AL-TAIFI	VILONIA	AQ	Deputy emir	EKIA
NABI RAHMAN	SKANG	AQ/TB	Commander & facilitator	EKIA
MUSA	POSTAL SERVICE	TB/AQ FAC	Commander & facilitator	EKIA
HANZALLAH	COLLISON	AQ	Commander	EKIA
YUSUF	MIRAMAX	AQ/HUJI	Commander	EKIA
MUFTI ASAD	TOUCHSTONE	AQ/HUJI	Commander	EKIA
ABU WALID	CHATHAM BARS	AQ	Commander	EKIA
FATEH GUL	VULCAN	AQ	Facilitator	EKIA
TURABI	GREEN RUN	TB/AQ FAC	Facilitator	EKIA
ATTIQULLAH	HUDSON	TB/AQ FAC	Commander	EKIA
MATAQI	POST MORTEM	TB/AQ FAC	Facilitator	EKIA
DADULLAH	RAYBURN	TTP	Commander	EKIA
ABU SAIF	LIONSGATE	AQ/HUJI	Commander	EKIA
MULLAH JALAL	ORONO	TB/AQ FAC		EKIA
ASADULLAH	RIBEYE	TB/AQ	Sub-Commander & facilitator	EKIA
ABDUL RAUF	WAKIKI	AQ/TTP	Sub-Commander & facilitator	EKIA
ASAD	KEITHSTONE	TTP/TB	Sub-Commander	EKIA
NUMAN	POSTMASTER	TB/AQ FAC	Commander	EKIA
YAHYA	JUNIOR BOYS	TB/AQ FAC	Facilitator	EKIA
MOHAMMAD RASUL	LETHAL ASPEN	TTP/TB	Commander	EKIA
SAIFULLAH	CANNON LAKE	TTP	Commander	EKIA
GHAJAR AHMAD	IOWA	TB	Commander	EKIA
HAMIDI	WIND RIVER	TB/AQ FAC	Sub-Commander & facilitator	EKIA
AMMAR	ANARCHY	LeT	Commander	EKIA
ABDULLAH	HEARTBREAK RIDGE	AQ	Commander	EKIA
DOST MOHAMMAD	DAKOTA	TB	Shadow governor	EKIA
TURAB aka KHANJAR	KNIFE GAME	AQ/TB	Commander & facilitator	EKIA
QARI MUNIB	LETHAL BURWYN	TB	Sub-Commander	EKIA
HAJI MATI	RONAN	Salafist	Commander	EKIA
DOWRA	VIKING	Salafist	Commander	EKIA

TB — Taliban

AQ — al Qaeda

AQ FAC — al Qaeda facilitator

HUJI — Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami

LeT — Lashkar-e-Taiba

TTP — Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan

EKIA — enemy killed in action



A wounded Afghan boy receives treatment at a hospital in Kunar Province on February 13, 2013, after a NATO airstrike killed ten civilians.

U.S. intelligence agencies hunt people primarily by locating their cell phone. Equipped with a simulated cell tower called Gilgamesh, a drone can force a target's phone to lock onto it and then use the phone's signals to triangulate that person's location.

Here is what a watchlist looks like.

