

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA**

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA) **Criminal No. 09-276 (JR)**
)
 v.)
)
)
)
 STEWART DAVID NOZETTE,)
)
 Defendant.)
 _____)

**GOVERNMENT’S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
DETENTION PENDING TRIAL**

I. INTRODUCTION

The defendant, Stewart D. Nozette (“Nozette” or “defendant”) has been charged in a two-count indictment with attempted espionage: (1) one count of attempting to communicate, deliver, and transmit to a foreign government, to wit the Government of the State of Israel, and representatives, officers, and agents thereof, directly and indirectly, documents and information relating to the national defense of the United States, specifically, information classified as SECRET/SCI which directly concerned classified aspects and mission capabilities of a prototype overhead collection system and which disclosure could negate the ability to support military and intelligence operations, in violation of Title 18 U.S.C. § 794; and (2) one count of attempting to communicate, deliver, and transmit to a foreign government, to wit the Government of the State of Israel, and representatives, officers, and agents thereof, directly and indirectly, documents and information relating to the national defense of the United States, specifically, information classified as TOP SECRET/SCI and SECRET/SCI which directly concerned satellites, early warning systems, means of defense or retaliation against large-scale attack, communications intelligence information, and major elements of defense strategy, in violation of Title 18 U.S.C. §

794.

Title 18 U.S.C. § 794(a) provides, in relevant part, “that the sentence of death shall not be imposed unless the jury or, if there is no jury, the court, further finds that . . . the offense . . . directly concerned . . . *satellites, early warning systems, or other means of defense or retaliation against large-scale attack*; . . . *communications intelligence* or cryptographic information; or any other major weapons system or *major element of defense strategy*.” (Emphasis added) Accordingly, based on the specific allegations in Count 2 of the Indictment, the maximum penalty the defendant faces, if convicted, is death.

These are extremely serious charges that implicate the national security of the United States. The government alleges that the defendant attempted to transfer some of our nation’s most guarded and sensitive secrets, to which he had been granted access when he served in positions of trust for the United States. NOZETTE delivered and communicated this classified information to an individual he believed was an Israeli intelligence officer in exchange for an alias, a foreign passport, and cash payments. The government’s case against NOZETTE is exceptionally strong; the defendant was filmed and recorded, on several occasions, evincing his willingness and endeavors to commit espionage.

The government’s investigation reveals that NOZETTE is a serious flight risk and is, by virtue of the classified information “in his head,” a grave risk to the national security of the United States. Notably, NOZETTE was plotting his departure from the United States long before he was charged with attempted espionage. NOZETTE told a colleague that if that government attempted to imprison him for fraud and tax evasion charges, he would flee the United States and disclose classified information to a foreign government. His subsequent

requests for an alias and a foreign passport from the “Israeli intelligence officer” verify the seriousness of his remarks and underscore the fact that he indeed intended to escape justice.

Further, the government’s investigation has uncovered evidence that NOZETTE has the method and means to accomplish his indefinite flight from the United States. He has traveled extensively throughout numerous foreign countries and has worked as an aerospace consultant for several international aerospace entities. Most importantly, NOZETTE has contemplated and taken affirmative steps to prepare to leave the United States. And now, faced with an Indictment for which the death penalty is available, the defendant has an incredibly strong motivation to flee.

If he is released and flees to a foreign country – or to the safe harbor of a welcoming embassy, consulate, or interest section located in Washington, D.C. – he will, in effect, have fled the United States and be gone for good. No treaty allows the United States to compel the extradition of an individual charged with espionage.

Finally, NOZETTE has a proven track record of making misrepresentations to the U.S. District Court concerning his intent to comply with conditions of release (Exhibit A). NOZETTE pleaded guilty in January 2009 to charges of fraud and tax evasion. NOZETTE flagrantly violated the conditions of his release pending sentencing not only by committing a serious new offense, but also by attempting to arrange for a false identity and foreign travel documents to escape his sentencing.

Accordingly, there are no conditions of release that will reasonably assure the appearance of the defendant as required. The government respectfully offers the following in support of the defendant’s continued pre-trial detention and additional facts as the government may proffer at

any hearing on this matter.

II. LEGAL PRINCIPLES GOVERNING REQUESTS FOR DETENTION

When the government seeks to detain a defendant on the ground that he is a risk of flight pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2)(A), the government must demonstrate the defendant's flight risk only by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Xulam, 84 F.3d 441, 442 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Moreover, at a detention hearing following indictment, the government may present evidence by way of a proffer. United States v. Smith, 79 F.3d 1208, 1209-10 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

Section 3142(g) lists four factors that guide a court's detention decision: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged; (2) the weight of the evidence against the defendant; (3) the history and characteristics of the defendant; and (4) the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that would be posed by the defendant's release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g).

III. FACTUAL PROFFER

As found by the Grand Jury and further supported by the attached affidavit in support of the arrest of NOZETTE (Exhibit B) and additional investigation by the FBI:

Defendant's Position of Trust With the United States

NOZETTE is 52 years old and was born in Chicago, Illinois. He received a Ph.D. in Planetary Sciences from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1983. NOZETTE worked at the White House on the National Space Council, Executive Office of the President, from approximately 1989 through 1990.

NOZETTE assisted with the development of the Clementine bi-static radar experiment which is credited with facilitating the purported discovery of water ice on the south

pole of the moon. NOZETTE's Clementine concept, on exhibit at the National Air and Space Museum in Washington, D.C., was later hailed as the vanguard of the new "faster, cheaper, better" revolution in space exploration.

NOZETTE worked as a physicist in the "O Division," Advanced Concepts Group, at the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory from approximately 1990 to 1999, where he designed highly advanced technology. At DOE, defendant NOZETTE held a special security clearance, referred to as a DOE "Q" clearance. Q clearance is a DOE security clearance equivalent to the United States Department of Defense Top Secret and Critical Nuclear Weapon Design Information clearances. DOE clearances apply to access to information specifically relating to atomic or nuclear-related materials ("Restricted Data" under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954).

NOZETTE was the President, Treasurer and Director of Alliance for Competitive Technology (ACT), a corporation that he organized in March 1990, for the stated purpose of serving "the national and public interest by conducting scientific research and educational activities aimed at expanding the utilization of National and Government Laboratory resources."

Between approximately January 2000 and February 2006, NOZETTE, through his company ACT, entered into agreements with several United States Government agencies to develop highly advanced technology. NOZETTE performed some of this research and development at the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) in Washington, D.C.; the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) located in Arlington, Virginia; and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Goddard Space Flight Center located in Greenbelt, Maryland.

DARPA is the central research and development office for the U.S. Department of Defense. DARPA's mission is to maintain the technological superiority of the U.S. military and to prevent technological surprise from harming our national security.

NRL is a research laboratory that conducts scientific research and advanced technological development for the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps.

From approximately 1989 through 2006, NOZETTE held security clearances as high as TOP SECRET. During that time period, NOZETTE had regular, frequent access to classified information and documents related to the national defense of the United States.

In consideration of his being granted access to classified information, defendant NOZETTE signed nondisclosure agreements with the United States on at least five occasions. Specifically:

- a. On or about October 3, 2002, NOZETTE signed a Classified Information

Nondisclosure Agreement in which he acknowledged that:

. . . I have been advised that the unauthorized disclosure, unauthorized retention, or negligent handling of [classified information] by me could cause irreparable injury to the United States or could be used to advantage by a foreign nation.

. . . I have been advised that any unauthorized disclosure of [classified information] by me may constitute violations of United States criminal laws, including the provisions of Sections 793, 794, 798, and 952, Title 18 United States Code . . . Nothing in this Agreement constitutes a waiver by the United States of the right to prosecute me for any statutory violation.

. . . I understand that all information to which I may obtain access by signing this Agreement is now and will remain the property of the United States Government unless and until otherwise determined by an appropriate official or final ruling of a court of law . . . I agree that I shall return all materials that may have come into my possession or for which I am responsible because of such access . . . upon the conclusion of

my employment or other relationship with the United States Government entity providing me access to such material.

b. On or about September 16, 2004, NOZETTE signed a Sensitive

Compartmented Information Nondisclosure Agreement in which he acknowledged that:

. . . I hereby acknowledge that I have received a security indoctrination concerning the nature and protection of SCI, including the procedures to be followed in ascertaining whether other persons to whom I contemplate disclosing this information or material have been approved for access to it, and I understand these procedures.

. . . I have been advised that the unauthorized disclosure, unauthorized retention, or negligent handling of SCI by me could cause irreparable injury to the United States or be used to advantage by a foreign nation. I hereby agree that I will never divulge anything marked as SCI or that I know to be SCI to anyone who is not authorized to receive it without prior written authorization from the United States Government department or agency (hereinafter Department or Agency) that last authorized my access to SCI. I understand that it is my responsibility to consult with appropriate management authorities in the Department or Agency that last authorized my access to SCI, whether or not I am still employed by or associated with that Department or Agency or a contractor thereof, in order to ensure that I know whether information or material within my knowledge or control that I have reason to believe might be SCI, or related to or derived from SCI, is considered by such Department or Agency to be SCI. I further understand that I am also obligated by law and regulation not to disclose any classified information or material in an unauthorized fashion.

. . . I have been advised that . . . any unauthorized disclosure of SCI by me may constitute violations of United States criminal laws, including the provisions of Sections 793, 794, 798, and 952, Title 18, United States Code . . .

c. On or about August 23, 2005, NOZETTE signed another SCI

Nondisclosure Agreement, in which he reaffirmed that he had received security indoctrinations and understood, among other things, that he had been advised that the direct or indirect unauthorized disclosure by him of SCI information “could cause irreparable injury to the United States, and be used to advantage by a foreign nation,” and pledged that “I will never divulge anything marked as SCI or that I know to be SCI to anyone who is not authorized to receive it . . .”

He also re-acknowledged that he had been advised that such unauthorized disclosure could constitute violations of criminal laws including Title 18, United States Code, Section 794.

On or about March 17, 2006, NOZETTE was notified by the United States government that his access to SCI had been suspended and he was reminded of his continuing obligation to comply with the terms of the Nondisclosure Agreements he had signed.

Between in or about November 1998 through January 2008, NOZETTE acted as a technical consultant for an aerospace company that was wholly owned by the Government of the State of Israel.

Between in or about November 1998 through January 2008, the aerospace company requested that NOZETTE provide technical data and advice. Approximately once a month, representatives of the aerospace company proposed questions, or taskings, to NOZETTE. NOZETTE answered the aerospace company's questions and, in return, NOZETTE received regular payments from the company, totaling approximately \$225,000.

On or about January 6, 2009, NOZETTE traveled to a different foreign country (foreign country A), via Dulles International Airport. Upon his departure from Dulles, a Transportation Security Agency Security Officer inspected NOZETTE's personal belongings and noted that NOZETTE had two computer "thumb" drives in his possession.

On or about January 28, 2009, upon his return to the United States from foreign country A, an officer for the United States Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) conducted a thorough search of NOZETTE's baggage and carry-on luggage. The CBP officer could not locate the thumb drives that had been in NOZETTE's possession when he had left the United States.

On January 30, 2009, NOZETTE pleaded guilty to charges of conspiracy to defraud the

U.S. government with respect to false claims and tax evasion in an amount up to \$399,999. As part of his sentence, NOZETTE agreed to pay restitution of \$265, 205 to the U.S. government.

Prior to Nozette's January 2009 travel to foreign country A, NOZETTE informed a colleague that if the United States government tried to "put him in jail" for fraud and tax evasion, NOZETTE would move from the United States to Israel or foreign country A, and "tell them everything" he knows.

The Undercover Operation

On September 3, 2009, NOZETTE was contacted via telephone by an individual purporting to be an Israeli intelligence officer, but who was, in fact, an undercover employee of the FBI (UCE). During that call, NOZETTE agreed to meet with the UCE that day on Connecticut Avenue, N.W. in front of a major hotel in Washington, D.C.

Later that day, NOZETTE met with the UCE and had lunch in the restaurant of the hotel. During the lunch, NOZETTE demonstrated his willingness to work for Israeli intelligence, as illustrated by the following conversation:

UCE:I'll just say it real quick and then we'll just move on. Quick, I wanna clarify something from the start. And I don't say it very often, but umm, I work for Israeli Intelligence...

NOZETTE: Mm-hmm

UCE:...Agency known here as Mossad.

NOZETTE: Mm-hmm

UCE: So from now on I'm not gonna say this. But if I say service...

NOZETTE: Mm-hmm

UCE:so you know what that, what it is. But I just wanna be sure, I'll let it out so

we don't have any ambiguity later on. But....

NOZETTE:....Mm-hmm

UCE: How you doin'?

NOZETTE: Good. Happy to be of assistance.

After lunch in the hotel restaurant, NOZETTE and the UCE retired to a hotel suite to continue their discussion. The entire discussion in the hotel suite was recorded with concealed video and audio equipment. During the conversation, NOZETTE informed the UCE:

NOZETTE: I haven't been, I haven't, um, been involved in a classified work for the last couple of years.

UCE: Okay.

NOZETTE: But I had everything.

UCE: Okay.

NOZETTE: And I had all, all the way to Top Secret SCI, I had nuclear....

UCE: That's prior to a couple of years ago.

NOZETTE: Yeah.

UCE: Is that what you...

NOZETTE: Yeah. And I had it, uh, I had it w-, I had all the nuclear clearances. I had a whole raft of...

UCE: Okay.

NOZETTE: ...special access.

UCE: Um...

NOZETTE: Uh, so any that the U.S. has done in space I've seen.

The UCE then asked NOZETTE if he would be willing to provide answers to questions about United States satellite information:

UCE: [A]nswers to those questions. And, uh, so if you were to give me those answers. I mean what is it that, you know, what would you like in return? Is there anything?

NOZETTE: Oh, you could pay me.

The UCE explained to NOZETTE that the “Mossad” had arranged for a “dead drop” communication system so that NOZETTE could pass information to the “Mossad” in a Post Office Box. The UCE also provided NOZETTE with a “clean phone” so that NOZETTE could send text messages or leave voicemail messages for the UCE.

NOZETTE made the following statements to the UCE:

NOZETTE: Well okay. So let me get to the bottom line.

UCE: Yes.

NOZETTE: So actually there are two things that . . .

UCE: Yes please....

NOZETTE: A couple things I want.

. . .

NOZETTE: But you want me to be a regular, continuing asset?

UCE: Right.

NOZETTE: Which I’m willing to do.

. . .

NOZETTE: I don’t get recruited by Mossad every day. I knew this day would come by the way.

UCE: How's that?

NOZETTE: (Laughs) I just had a feeling one of these days.

UCE: Really?

NOZETTE: I knew you guys would show up.

UCE: How you, um . . .

NOZETTE: (Laughs) And I was amazed it didn't happen longer . . .

UCE: Hm. I'm s-, I'm sure my, back at home, one of the few people had actually said it, but I, people did say, 'I'm surprised you guys didn't come sooner than this but, um, um, but you . . .'

NOZETTE: I thought I was working for you already. I mean that's what I always thought, [the foreign company] was just a front.

. . .

NOZETTE: Now the second thing.

UCE: Yes.

NOZETTE: I would like, I don't know if it's going cost anything, but I have no idea how to, or effectively, bureaucratically do it. So my parents are Jewish, right?

UCE: Okay, yeah.

NOZETTE: So I have a right, I theoretically have the right of return.

UCE: Okay. To the state, yes.

NOZETTE: Right. How could I get an Israeli passport?

NOZETTE: Because if I'm gonna work I wouldn't mind having another base of operations . . .

UCE: Uh-huh.

NOZETTE: . . . outside the US to work out of.

UCE: Okay.

NOZETTE: You know, If I'm going to do other work internationally in space I wouldn't mind having to, uh, having a, alternative, uh, passport.

NOZETTE and the UCE met again on September 4, 2009, in the same hotel suite at approximately 11:00 am. During this encounter, NOZETTE assured the UCE that although he no longer had legal access to any classified information at any United States government facility, he could, nonetheless, recall the classified information to which he had been granted access.

NOZETTE said, "**It's in my**" head [pointing, indicating his head].

However, NOZETTE initially claimed to be wary of providing any classified information to the UCE. For example, when the UCE implied that the "Mossad" was only interested in obtaining sensitive United States government information from NOZETTE, NOZETTE replied, "**I'll show you mine, you show me yours.**"

NOZETTE's purported concerns were soon assuaged, once he became satisfied in the belief that he was actually dealing with a foreign intelligence officer. NOZETTE remarked, "**So but, you know, I'm trusting you. I'm just thinking that this is a, although the post office box deal, it sounds, that seems kind of Mossad-like . . .**"

NOZETTE later agreed not only to communicate classified information to the "Mossad," but also to be recorded while he recited the classified information. NOZETTE told the UCE, "**So one good thing I can easily do for you is like what we're doing here . . . is we can just talk . . . and you can have people come and we can chat and they can like, record it or something.**"

NOZETTE later offered, "**I can always come over there,**" meaning Israel, to

disclose the classified information. NOZETTE then informed the UCE, **“I always fly business class . . . Have them pay for business class.”**

Throughout the meeting with the UCE, NOZETTE repeatedly asked when he could expect to receive his first payment from the “Mossad.” NOZETTE specified that although **“cash is fine,”** he preferred to receive cash amounts **“under ten thousand . . . per lump you can handle here, they don’t report it.”**

NOZETTE then assured the UCE that he knew **“how to handle cash . . . you buy consumables . . . cash is good for anything . . . you eat it, drink it or screw it.”**

At the conclusion of the second meeting, NOZETTE informed the UCE, **“Well I should tell you my first need is that they should figure out how to pay me . . . they don’t expect me to do this for free.”**

On or about September 10, 2009, undercover FBI agents left a letter in the “dead drop” facility for NOZETTE. In the letter, the FBI asked NOZETTE to answer a list of questions concerning United States satellite information. FBI agents also provided signature cards, in NOZETTE’s true name and an alias, for NOZETTE to sign and asked NOZETTE to provide four passport sized photographs for the Israeli passport NOZETTE requested. The FBI agents also left \$2,000 cash for NOZETTE in the “dead drop” facility which NOZETTE retrieved the same day, along with the questions, signature cards, and a thumb drive.

On or about September 16, 2009, NOZETTE was captured on videotape leaving a manila envelope in the “dead drop” Post Office Box in the District of Columbia.

On or about September 17, 2009, the FBI agents retrieved the sealed manila envelope NOZETTE had dropped off. Inside the envelope were the following items:

- a. The signed passport signature cards (in true name and in an alias);
- b. Four passport-sized photographs of NOZETTE;
- c. One page document containing “Answers” to the questions left by the FBI undercover agents on September 10, 2009, which employed a prearranged code used to identify the most sensitive information;
- d. The document containing the questions left by the FBI undercover agents on September 10, 2009; and
- e. A computer “thumb drive” or “memory stick.”

One of the “Answers” provided by NOZETTE contained information classified as SECRET/SCI which related to the national defense, in that it directly concerned classified aspects and mission capabilities of a prototype overhead collection system, which disclosure could negate the ability to support United States military and intelligence operations.

In addition to disclosing SECRET/SCI information, NOZETTE offered to reveal highly classified information that directly concerned nuclear weaponry, military spacecraft or satellites, and other major weapons systems. Nozette stated:

Held a DOE Q clearance from 1990-2000, which involved insight into all aspects of nuclear weapons programs. Held TS/SI/TK/B/G clearance 1998-2006, . . . Held at least 20+ SAP . . . from 1998 -2004 . . . Full understanding of these programs would require interaction in the homeland . . .

. . . These are among the most sensitive subjects and it will have to be recreated from memory over some time.

. . . Your token is most appreciated and at the level, which is reasonable for each weekly interval given the support requested.

Also on or about September 17, 2009, undercover FBI agents left a second communication and an encrypted thumb drive in the “dead drop” facility for NOZETTE. In the letter, the FBI asked NOZETTE to answer another list of questions concerning United States satellite information. NOZETTE retrieved the questions from the “dead drop” Post Office Box later that same day.

On or about October 1, 2009, NOZETTE was filmed on video retrieving a \$9,000 cash payment and leaving a manila envelope in the “dead drop” Post Office Box in the District of Columbia.

On or about October 1, 2009, the FBI agents retrieved the sealed manila envelope left by NOZETTE in the Post Office Box..

Inside the envelope, FBI agents discovered the thumb drive that was provided to NOZETTE on September 17, 2009, which included another set of “Answers” from NOZETTE. The “Answers” contained information classified as TOP SECRET/SCI and other information classified as SECRET/SCI. This classified information related to the national defense, in that it directly concerned United States satellites, early warning systems, means of defense or retaliation against large-scale attack, communications intelligence information, and major elements of defense strategy.

In addition to providing the TOP SECRET/SCI and SECRET/SCI information, NOZETTE wrote:

The holdings are appreciated and another token would be appropriate as the information density is increasing. It is important to try to specify what is needed as has been done. Please bear in mind that an extremely valuable (handler) piece of information has been provided . . . Assuming the quality is moving in the correct direction a thumb drive 8 G or more is needed.

On or about October 5, 2009, NOZETTE purchased a one-way airline ticket from Washington Reagan National Airport to Buffalo Niagra International Airport in Buffalo, New York, with frequent flyer miles. FBI agents observed NOZETTE rent a car at the Buffalo airport, drive to a restaurant for lunch, and then spend one night at a motel.

On or about October 6, 2009, NOZETTE flew from Buffalo, New York, through Chicago, Illinois, to San Diego-Lindbergh Field International Airport in San Diego, California. La Jolla, California is approximately ten miles from San Diego-Lindbergh Field International Airport.

Between on or about October 8, 2009 through October 10, 2009, NOZETTE visited a safe deposit box at Bank of America on 7680 Girard Avenue, La Jolla, California, (the La Jolla safe deposit box) on at least three occasions. Bank records indicate that NOZETTE rented the La Jolla safe deposit box in his name in July 2008.

On October 19, 2009, NOZETTE met again at a Washington, D.C. hotel with the UCE. A draft transcript of excerpts from a videotape of that meeting are attached as Exhibit C. During this final meeting, NOZETTE proclaimed that he had “**crossed the Rubicon,**” indicating that he had passed such highly sensitive classified information to the “Mossad” that he could never “**tell anyone.**” NOZETTE later asked if the “Mossad” could teach him how to beat a polygraph examination, presumably so that he could gain access to additional classified United States information on behalf of the “Mossad.”

NOZETTE informed the UCE that he had made the “**career choice**” to work for “Israel” under the alias provided by the “Mossad.” However, NOZETTE indicated that his wife did not have a need for relocation or an Israeli passport because she “**would ask too many questions.**” NOZETTE remarked that he wanted, at a minimum, to live in a country that didn’t have an

extradition treaty with the United States. Nozette stated: “**And I like [the] name, the alias name. And I like the idea of setting up an alias. And I like the (unintelligible) escape route to have a place outside the country.**”

NOZETTE also explained to the UCE that he had previously established safe deposit boxes “out of state” and locally in order to store classified program information that he knew would be of value someday. NOZETTE indicated that it had been important for him to hide information “out of state” so that if his house in Chevy Chase, Maryland were ever searched by the U.S. authorities, they would not find the information.

During his discussion with the UCE, NOZETTE stressed that NOZETTE would need to travel with an alias and Israeli passport if he were to exit the United States via an international airport, because “**the Homeland Security, they’ll see me going in and out . . . they’ll scan the passport.**” However, NOZETTE offered that he could more easily leave the United States by crossing the border into Canada through “Buffalo,” or into Mexico.

NOZETTE also clearly expressed his need for significantly more money from the “Mossad” for his espionage activities. NOZETTE informed the UCE that the United States had invested a total of \$1 billion to develop and deploy the classified program he had compromised. NOZETTE explained that he only wanted a percentage of the development cost, roughly \$2 million, as compensation for his espionage. The UCE handed \$10,000 (in one-hundred dollar bills) to NOZETTE during their final discussion. NOZETTE placed the \$10,000 in his pocket.

NOZETTE was arrested by the FBI in the hotel suite on October 19, 2009. Before being placed under arrest, NOZETTE asked the FBI agents if he could use the bathroom in the hotel suite. While in the bathroom, NOZETTE lifted the tank lid and hid the \$10,000 in the toilet’s upper tank.

The FBI later recovered the money from the toilet. At the time of his arrest, FBI agents found a key to the La Jolla safe deposit box in NOZETTE's wallet.

On or about October 23, 2009, the FBI obtained a search warrant for the La Jolla safe deposit box. In the box, agents discovered (among other things) three computer drives, eight videotapes, fifty-five gold "Krugerrand" coins worth roughly \$50,000, and \$30,000 in savings bonds.

Also relevant to this detention hearing, the government's investigation has revealed that NOZETTE is a person of means. He owns numerous residential properties in several states, including his home in Chevy Chase, Maryland and a vacation home in Merritt Island, Florida. A recent tax assessment estimates the approximate value of the properties at \$1,959,999 and \$550,000 respectively.

IV. ARGUMENT

In cases where defendants have been charged with espionage, courts have regularly found that there are no conditions that will assure the defendant's appearance. (See United States v. Kostadinov, 527 F. Supp. 1547, 1551 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); United States v. Cole, 715 F. Supp. 677, 680 (E.D. Pa. 1988); United States v. Amirnazmi, No. 08-CR-429, 2008 WL 4925015, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 18, 2008) (defendant could exploit high level contacts in foreign government to secure passport and flee).

There is extremely strong evidence that NOZETTE would flee the United States if he were released pending trial. Indeed, he has already stated his intent and made preparations to flee the United States prior to his sentencing for fraud and tax evasion. (See United States v. Anderson, 384 F. Supp.2d 32, 36 (D.D.C. 2005) (ordering pre-trial detention where there was "strong

_____/s/_____
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and accurate copy of the foregoing was served upon the following counsel, electronically, on this 28th day of October, 2009:

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Counsel for Stewart David Nozette

as well as all other counsel of record.

_____/S/_____
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